

# UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD835562
NEW LIMITATION CHANGE
TO Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM Distribution authorized to DoD only; Administrative/Operational Use; 28 SEP 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Army Adjutant Generals Office, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY
ago, d/a ltr, 29 apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

## **DISCLAIMER NOTICE**

**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY  
PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED  
TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT  
NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT  
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**

Adjutant General's Office (Army) Wash, D.C.

Lessons Learned Rept. #5-67

OCSFOR OT-RD-67X043, dated

28 Sep '67

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

LOANED TO DDC FOR PROCESSING.

THIS COPY IS NOT TO BE MARKED OR

MUTILATED. REQUEST THAT SPECIAL

HANDLING, INCLUDING IMMEDIATE

MICROFICHING, BE PROVIDED IN ORDER

THAT THE COPY MAY BE PROMPTLY

RETURNED TO THE LENDER. THE RE-

PORT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO DDC

ACCESSIONS DIVISION. Attn: M. West

AD 835562

DDC FORM  
FEB 67 70

plc  
19 Jul '68

File CY  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RETURN TO LTC HOLT  
3B 474

# OPERATIONS REPORT

## LESSONS LEARNED

### REPORT 5-67

CIVIL DISORDERS - TF DETROIT



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Sep 67) FOR OT RD 67X043

28 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned 5-67 - "Civil Disorders - TF Detroit"

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This is the fifteenth of a series of reports dealing with lessons learned during current and recent operations. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are secured from the lessons learned during recent domestic disorders.

2. Much has been said in the public media concerning operations of TF Detroit. The attached report, although prepared with great rapidity and published herewith edited only for legibility, focuses attention on those areas properly matters of concern for commanders and staffs at all levels. These include: contingency planning; coordination between Regular, Federalized and Civil Forces; supply; communication; and the problem of the degree of force to be applied. The opinions stated therein do not necessarily reflect official Department of the Army doctrine. However, the lessons cited and implied may be adapted for use in developing training material and in preparing recommendations for modification of doctrine.

3. Previously published reports of the Operations Report - Lessons Learned series were:

a. Summary of Lessons Learned, Vietnam, 2 November 1965, UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 1-66, Operation CRIMP, 22 March 1966, marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

c. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 2-66, The Battle of Annihilation and the BONG SON Campaign, 1 April 1966, CLASSIFIED.

d. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 3-66, The PLEIKU Campaign, 10 May 1966, UNCLASSIFIED (Limited Distribution).

e. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 4-66, Evasion and Escape RVN, 24 May 1966, CLASSIFIED.

Marking FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
is canceled when separated from  
protected material

I

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

f. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 5-66, Combat Service Support - RVN, 10 June 1966, UNCLASSIFIED.

g. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 6-66, Lessons Learned in Vietnam - 1966, 1 July 1966, UNCLASSIFIED.

h. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 7-66, Operations COCOA BEACH and HAPPY VALLEY, 11 Aug 1966, CLASSIFIED.

i. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 8-66, Engineer Notes #1, 13 October 1966, UNCLASSIFIED.

j. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 9-66, Equipment, 7 December 1966, CLASSIFIED.


k. Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Report 1-67, Observations of a Platoon Leader, 30 January 1967, UNCLASSIFIED.

l. Operations Report - Lessons Learned 2-67 - Counter-Guerrilla Tactics, 13 March 1967, marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

m. Operations Report - Lessons Learned 3-67, Engineer Notes #2, 6 April 1967, UNCLASSIFIED.

n. Operations Report - Lessons Learned 4-67 - "Observations of a Battalion Commander," 7 June 1967, marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:



KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
Civil Disorders -  
TF Detroit

### DISTRIBUTION:

Office, Secretary of the Army  
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff  
Comptroller of the Army  
Chief of Research and Development  
Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Chief, Office of Reserve Components  
The Adjutant General  
Chief of Engineers  
Chief of Communications-Electronics  
Chief, National Guard Bureau

II

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

- Chief of Information
- Chief of Military History
- Chief, Army Reserve
- The Provost Marshal General
- Chief of Support Services
- Chief of Personnel Operations
- Commanding General
  - US Continental Army Command
  - US Army Materiel Command
  - US Army Combat Developments Command
  - US Army Strategic Communications Command
  - US Army Security Agency
  - US Army Intelligence Command
  - US Army, Alaska
  - US Army, Hawaii
- Army Corps (Including Reserve Components CCNUS)
- Army Training Centers
- CONUS US Army Divisions
- US Army Divisions (Reserve Components)
- US Army Forces Southern Command
- Superintendent, US Military Academy
- Commandant
  - US Army Command and General Staff College
  - US Army War College
  - US Army Air Defense School
  - US Army Armor School
  - US Army Artillery and Missile School
  - US Army Aviation School
  - US Army Chemical Corps School
  - US Army Engineer School
  - US Army Military Police School
  - US Army Infantry School
  - US Army Intelligence School
  - US Army Medical Field Service School
  - US Army Ordnance School
  - US Army Quartermaster School
  - US Army Security Agency School
  - US Army Signal School
  - US Army Transportation School
  - US Army Special Warfare School
  - US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course
  - US Army Civil Affairs School

### COPIES FURNISHED:

- Chief of Naval Operations
- Chief of Staff, US Air Force
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Commandant
  - Armed Forces Staff College

III

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

**COPIES FURNISHED:**

Commandant  
Industrial College of the Armed Forces  
National War College  
Senior Army Advisors  
Naval War College  
Marine Corps Schools  
Air University  
State Adjutant General, US Army National Guard  
Librarian  
AG Library - Pentagon  
Air University Library

IV

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE DETROIT  
THIRD U. S. ARMY, FT. MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330

AJBGC-O

Prepared from notes  
dated 2 Aug 67. For-  
warded 16 Aug 67.

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Task Force DETROIT  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

TO: Headquarters, Department of the Army  
ATTN: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Washington, D. C. 20310

## 1. References.

a. AR 1-19, Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Department of the Army, dated 26 May 1966.

b. OPLAN 563, GARDEN PLOT (U), Third United States Army, 1 December 1963.

c. DA Message 825631, ACSFOR, Subject: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, 28 July 1967.

2. Inclosed is the After Action Report (RCS CSFOR-65) of operations conducted by Task Force DETROIT from 24 July 1967 to 2 August 1967.

1 Incl  
as

  
J. L. THROCKMORTON  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding

## Copies furnished:

5 - CINCSRIKE, MacDill AFB, Fla.  
10 - CG USCONARC, Ft Monroe, Va.  
5 - CINCAFSTRIKE  
(Distribution continued page 2)

REGRADED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
BY AUTHORITY OF DA 833399/222213Z SEP 67  
ON 25 SEP 67

FOR-OT-RD  
67X043

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Copies furnished:

- 2 - CG MDW, Wash D.C.
- 2 - CG First USA, Ft Meade, Md.
- 5 - CG Third USA, Ft McPherson, Ga.
- 2 - CG Fourth USA, Ft Sam Houston, Tex.
- 10 - CG Fifth USA, Ft Sheridan, Ill.
- 2 - CG Sixth USA, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
- 5 - AG Mich State National Guard, Lansing, Mich.
- 2 - CG 82d Abn Div, Ft Bragg, N.C.
- 2 - CG 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky.

**AFTER ACTION REPORT - TASK FORCE DETROIT**

**INDEX**

	<b>Page No</b>
<b>Section I - Significant Unit Activities</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Section II - Commander's Observation and Recommendations</b>	<b>15</b>
1. Personnel	15
2. Operations	15
3. Training and Organization	19
4. Intelligence	25
5. Logistics	25
6. Other	25
<b>Annexes:</b>	
A. Journal of Significant Events	A-1
B. Maps showing unit boundaries and strengths	B-1
C. After action report; 43d General Support Group	C-1
D. After action report; 46th Inf Division	D-1
E. After action report; 82d Abn Div	E-1
F. After action report; 127th Tactical Recon Wing	F-1
G. Separate report; G4 activities	G-1
H. Separate report; Signal activities	H-1
I. Separate report; Aviation activities	I-1
J. The President's Proclamation	J-1
K. Authority - LOI for Task Force Detroit	K-1
L. Orders	L-1

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

### 1. BACKGROUND

Widespread racial disorders erupted in metropolitan Detroit early on Sunday morning, 23 July 1967. The disturbance began in Detroit's 10th Precinct area at the climax of a police raid on an illegal after-hours liquor establishment in the 9000 block on Twelfth Street.

At 0510 hours on Sunday the 10th Precinct received the first calls for police assistance from the Twelfth Street neighborhood. At 0630 hours the first fire had started and the arriving fire trucks drew large crowds. From 0800 hours until noon, there was a lull in the area. Starting about noon gangs started surging along Twelfth Street, looting and setting fire to businesses, moving off onto the side streets and finally into private homes. Mayor Cavanagh requested State Police assistance shortly before 1500 hours. When looting and arson grew he asked for the Michigan National Guard.

With nightfall the looting and number of fire calls increased substantially. Shortly after 1800 hours, the first of more than 8,000 guardsmen arrived in the city deploying from Central High School through the riot-torn areas. Police barricades were put up, a curfew announced, bars, gas stations and public places closed. A state of public emergency was declared in Detroit by Governor Romney effective 231800 July 1967. Negro gangs, confined at the first outbreak to 29 blocks on the west side, spread over a 14-square mile area Monday. Early Monday, 24 July, Governor Romney recommended the deployment of Federal Troops to the city of Detroit to assist State and local authorities in re-establishing law and order.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. NARRATIVE

At 0500 hours on Monday, 24 July, the XVIII Abn Corps HQ at Ft Bragg received the first alert notification from HQ, US Continental Army Command with respect to committing active Army troops in Detroit. Over the next several hours, instructions were received from higher headquarters concerning the size of the force and the probable time, place and method of deployment. By 0715 hours, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps had developed plans to send one brigade each from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions together with a division command element from the 82d for a total commitment of close to 5,000 troops. The 101st Airborne Division was placed under operational control of XVIII Airborne Corps at 0620 hours and one Bde was subsequently attached to the 82d Airborne Division (Task Force 82) upon arrival at Selfridge AFB. At this time both divisions were reported prepared to meet a 3-hour reaction time. The overall command of the task force was vested in Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps to be assisted by a small staff selected from the XVIII Airborne Corps staff. The task force was to be called Task Force DETROIT. (See Annex J)

Paralleling the Army actions were instructions by the Air Force through Tactical Air Command channels to its Tactical Airlift units at Forbes AFB, Kan., Sewart AFB, Tenn., Langley AFB, Va., Lockbourne AFB, Ohio, Pope AFB, N.C. and Dyess AFB, Tex.

At 1125 hours, General Johnson called Lieutenant General Throckmorton personally and directed that deploying elements stand fast until further orders. One hour later General Throckmorton received instructions from Mr. Vance to launch Task Force DETROIT to Selfridge Air Force

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7  
Base and to meet him there upon his arrival at about 1500 hours. The Commanding General and staff, Task Force DETROIT, with two jeeps, loaded into a C-130 and departed Pope at 1250 hours. The aircraft arrived at Selfridge AFB, Michigan at 1455 hours.

In accordance with the air movement plans which had been developed Monday morning, 24 July, the first aircraft with 82d Airborne Division troopers aboard departed Pope Air Force Base at 1400 hours. The lead element of the 101st departed Fort Campbell at approximately the same time.

Upon arrival at Selfridge AFB, appropriate members of the Task Force DETROIT staff prepared to receive and billet the troops scheduled to start arriving at about 1600 hours. General Throckmorton met Mr. Vance's plane which arrived at 1510 hours. They held a brief conference and then departed by car for the Police Headquarters in downtown Detroit arriving there at 1625 hours.

At Police Headquarters, General Throckmorton and Mr. Vance were introduced to Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh, Commissioner of Police Girardin, Colonel Davids of the Michigan State Police and Major General Simmons, Commanding General, 46th Division, Michigan National Guard.

Following a briefing on the situation by the Governor, Mayor and Commissioner of Police, Governor Romney asked how soon the Federal troops would be deployed as he was holding back on the deployment of the remainder of the 46th Division in order to coordinate the movements of the Guard and the Federal troops. Mr. Vance stated that the Federal troops would not be deployed until he had an opportunity to review the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the President who would then decide the course of action to be taken. Mr. Vance and General

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Throckmorton were taken on a tour of the city by the Governor and Mayor.

This tour through the areas of the city which had suffered the most from the rioting, looting, and burning covered the two hour period from 1715 and 1915.

Upon their return to Police Headquarters, the Governor asked General Throckmorton and Mr. Vance to sit in on a meeting with a group of negro community leaders and two negro US Congressmen - Mr. Charles Biggs and Mr. John Conyers, Jr. This meeting which lasted until about 2100 hours was concerned for the most part with whether Federal troops should be employed in the city. About half of the community leaders, with Congressman Biggs as spokesman, believed that the situation demanded immediate employment of Federal troops. The other half led by Congressman Conyers believed that the situation was not sufficiently critical to justify the employment of Federal troops at that time.

During the tour of the city, Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton had independently arrived at the conclusion that Federal troops were not needed at that time. The tour had taken them through all the hardest hit areas without incident. No looting or sniping had been observed during the tour. In a few areas, fires were burning but they appeared to be coming under the control of fire fighting equipment on the scene. Furthermore, there were large areas of the city where only an occasional window was broken or store burned out. In the downtown business district there was no evidence of lawlessness. Although the Governor and Mayor were insistent on the need to employ Federal troops, the apparent evidence did not sustain their request.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 While the conference with the community leaders was underway, General Throckmorton and Mr. Vance continued to receive reports on incidents and fires from the police command center down the hallway from their office in the Detroit Police Headquarters. Soon after dark, the incidents began to rise and at about 2130, it became obvious that the precautionary measure should be taken of moving Federal troops closer to the city in order to be more responsive. Accordingly at 2140 hours with Mr. Vance's approval, General Throckmorton directed the movement of three battalions from Selfridge AFB to the State Fairgrounds. Since troops had been placed on 30 minute alert and buses were available at their bivouac areas, it was anticipated they would be underway by 2215 for the one hour trip to the Fairgrounds. As it turned out, the departure of the troops was delayed a half an hour by the State Police who insisted that each individual bus driver receive a thorough briefing before allowing the convoy to proceed on the freeway from Selfridge AFB to the State Fairgrounds.

During the period from 2145 hours to 2300 hours on Monday night, Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton watched carefully as the incidents throughout the city, as reported over the police radio, rose steadily. At 1900 hours the number of incidents reported was 60, at 2100 hours 85, and at 2300 hours 124. This sharp rise convinced all the members of Mr. Vance's team that Federal troops should be employed and he in turn so recommended to the President.

At 2320 hours, the President signed a proclamation which authorized the use of Federal troops in the city of Detroit, and federalized the Army and Air National Guards of Michigan. (See Annex I)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At this time, the 46th Michigan National Guard Infantry Division, had 4,946 officers and men available in the city of Detroit. (See Map #2, Annex B). They had been alerted the previous day while undergoing annual field training at Camp Grayling, Michigan, and had spent Sunday night moving the 200 miles to Detroit by motor. As of 0900 hours, Monday, 24 July, the division had 3,485 men deployed in the city in accordance with a deployment plan it had developed previously. (See Map #1, Annex B). This plan was known as Operation SUNDOWN and, as subsequent events disclosed, it was a major assist in the rapid deployment of the guard forces into the city.

Shortly after the President signed the proclamation, General Throckmorton called Major General Simmons, Commanding General, 46th Infantry Division to inform him that he was now under his command and requested him to stand by at his headquarters for a visit. General Throckmorton also requested a liaison officer be sent to the Command Post TF DETROIT located in the Police Headquarters in downtown Detroit. General Throckmorton then drove to the State Fairgrounds where he contacted Major General Seitz, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, and instructed him to assume responsibility in the eastern half of the city east of Woodward Avenue from the 46th Infantry Division for the restoration of law and order in that area. The time of change-over would be as soon as possible at a time to be mutually agreed upon by the division commanders. This time was shortly thereafter established at 250400 July 1967 local time. (See Map #5, Annex B)

From the Fair Grounds, General Throckmorton proceeded to the 46th Infantry Division CP at the Artillery Guard Armory where he issued

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

instructions to General Simmons relieving him of responsibility for the east side of town and assigning him responsibility for the west side. Prior to General Throckmorton's departure from the 46th Division CP, General Seitz arrived to coordinate with General Simmons.

During the inspection tour conducted by the Mayor, General Throckmorton and Mr. Vance, they had visited three areas which had been harder hit by the disturbances than any others. These were in the 2d Precinct along Grand River Avenue, the area around 12th Street north of Grand River Avenue in the 10th Precinct and the area around Mack Avenue in the 5th Precinct in the eastern part of the city. Of the three areas, 12th Street had been the hardest hit on Sunday and early Monday; however, as it became dark on Monday, the incident rate shifted from the 12th Street area which had become relatively quiet and began to climb highest in the eastern part of the city. Thus at the time the decision was made to assign TF 82 to the eastern portion of the city, it appeared that the regular troops were taking over the most active sector of the city. Other factors influencing the decision to assign the eastern portion to TF 82 were the closer proximity of eastern Detroit to Selfridge and the proximity of the 46th Division CP at the Artillery Guard Armory to western Detroit.

At 0410 hours, 25 July, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division assumed responsibility for the 5th and 7th Precincts and for those portions of the 1st and 13th Precincts east of Woodward Avenue.

With the employment of the 3d Brigade, sufficient space was available to move the remainder of the troops from Selfridge Air Force Base to the State Fair Grounds. This redistribution of troops was accomplished with Mr. Vance's approval.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thus at 0900 hours, 25 July, there was a total of 7725 officers and men employed in Detroit. (See Map #5, Annex B) There were three battalions in reserve at the Fair Ground, of which one was in Task Force DETROIT reserve with one battalion at the Light Guard Armory. 12

The 127th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (NG) flew vertical and oblique aerial photo missions over Detroit on 25 July to support operations in the city. Additional photo coverage missions were flown on 28 July and 1 August prior to the unit's release from active Federal Service. (See Annex E).

During the day on Tuesday, the incidents reported to the Police Command Center dropped off approximately 50% from those reported the previous day. That night they reached a peak of 90 in the half hour period from 2300 to 2330 compared to 124 during the same period the previous night.

The significance of these figures is not in the totals but in the trends which the comparison indicates. It was learned shortly after the TF DETROIT staff began receiving these figures that their accuracy was quite suspect, but they could be used to portray a trend.

During this period and, in fact, throughout the stay in Detroit, Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton made numerous trips through the city both at night and during daylight hours. They never saw any looting or individuals setting fires. Although they heard shots fired on several occasions, none of them were fired in the Commanding General's or Mr. Vance's vicinity. The fact remains, of course, that there were 41 people killed in the city during the disturbances but conditions overall did improve rapidly starting on Tuesday, 25 July.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Wednesday, 26 July

13 Initially, the 46th Division encountered considerable difficulty in the 12th Street area. To begin with, insufficient troops were deployed into the area to insure that they could gain control and restore order. This situation was corrected Tuesday night, and early Wednesday morning with the assignment by the division commander of additional troops to the 2d Brigade. When General Throckmorton visited the 12th Street area on Wednesday afternoon, he found that the 46th Division had barricaded 12th Street at both ends and was not permitting any people or vehicles on the street. General Throckmorton ordered the battalion commander to open up the street immediately. Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton then walked several blocks in the middle of the street to encourage the people to come out. In a few minutes, they began to appear and the cars began to move through the area.

It was late on 25 July that the first request arose in connection with the use of riot control agents. A platoon of TF 32 with a sniper cornered in a building routed a request to General Throckmorton for authority to use riot control grenades. General Throckmorton was available when the request reached his command post and gave a prompt reply in the affirmative. Unfortunately, it took too long to process the request and reply through channels so that when permission was received by the platoon the sniper had escaped. As a result, a request to change the policy was submitted to Department of the Army late on 25 July and was promptly approved by General Johnson. The new policy gave General Throckmorton the authority to delegate the use of riot control agents to company commanders if he desired. This was immediately accomplished by verbal order

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to the division commanders late on 25 July and confirmed by a letter of instruction to the division commanders published on 26 July (See Annex K). 14

A conference was held early the afternoon of 25 July to determine which Michigan Air National Guard units called to active Federal service on 24 July would be recommended for release from active service. Initially twenty-four ANG units were called into active military service. Many of these units were specialized units and were not of use in support of TF DETROIT operations. A final recommendation was made to Department of the Army and approved to retain the 127th Combat Support Squadron (TR), 127th Tactical Hospital and the 191st Tactical Dispensary. On 26 July, the 127th Combat Support Squadron (TR), with an aggregate strength of 244 personnel, was placed under the operational control of the Detroit Police Commissioner to be used as a man-power source to provide guards at static guard posts and fire stations in the city.

On Wednesday, the rate of incidents continued to fall and at the peak period 74 incidents were recorded by the police between 2300 and 2330.

### Thursday, 27 July

By Thursday morning, General Throckmorton decided that the time had come to take such actions as TF DETROIT could to return the city to normal on a phased basis.

Upon TF DETROIT's arrival on Monday, the guardsmen on duty in the streets stood with bayonets fixed and rifles loaded. Initial instructions to Task Force DETROIT were to fix bayonets and insert loaded magazines in individual weapons but not to chamber or fire a round except on orders from an officer. At 0930 hours, 27 July, it was directed that all bayonets

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

15 would be removed from rifles and placed in scabbards. Weapons were to be unloaded with magazines carried in pouches or pockets and all belted ammunition placed out of sight.

At 1600 hours, 27 July, the Governor and Mayor conducted a meeting of about 200 community leaders. The announced purposes of this meeting were to:

a. Encourage everyone to do everything possible to restore law and order and return to normal operations in the city.

b. To initiate the establishment of a committee to develop programs designed to prevent a repetition of the lawlessness and violence which had occurred.

With the continued decline of incidents in the city, planning guidance was given to the 46th Infantry Division and Task Force 82 for the withdrawal of Task Force 82, and assumption of all responsibility by the 46th Infantry Division.

Included in the step- y-step plan was the lifting of the curfew by the Governor on Thursday night. The Governor had previously approved lifting the curfew and a public announcement to this effect was made by the Governor's Office on Thursday morning. However, at 1900 hours, 27 July, the Governor reinstated the 2100 and 0530 curfew until further notice.

On Thursday the peak of the incidents dropped down to 46 during the period 2302-2330 hours.

Friday, 28 July

Early on Friday morning the 46th Division commenced the relief of TF 82 in the eastern section of the city. This initial phase of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

turnover called for the 46th to assume responsibility for all of the eastern sector except the 5th Precinct for which the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division would retain responsibility until Saturday morning.

For unexplained reasons, the Mayor changed his mind and withdrew his concurrence in the final phase of the turnover requesting that it be delayed 24 hours. Mr. Vance acceded to this request.

Saturday, 29 July

No activities of special significance occurred in the city on this date except that the Governor announced that the curfew would be relaxed and extended from 2300 to 0530 hours. The prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages remained in effect.

In the afternoon, instructions were issued to the 46th Division and TF 82 to turn over responsibility for Precinct 5 to the 46th Division effective 0800 hours, Sunday, 30 July. (See Frag Ord #2 and Ch 1, Annex K)

Saturday night the peak in incidents reported by the police occurred between 2100 and 2130 with 35 incidents being recorded.

Sunday, 30 July

Beginning on Sunday, 30 July, the presence of the military was gradually reduced. On Sunday, a very few motorized patrols and guards could be observed and the bulk of the Federal Troops had been withdrawn to assembly areas throughout the city. For all intents and purposes the city was back to normal with the State Police force hardly in evidence and the city police having returned to normal duty hours.

With the relief of the employed troops of TF 82 by elements of the 46th Division without incident, plans were finalized for withdrawal of

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17  
Federal troops from the Detroit area. These provided for the movement of the 2d Bde, 101st Airborne Division, to Selfridge AFB on 31 July and its movement to Fort Campbell by air on 1 August. (See Frag Ord #4, Annex K) The 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, was to move to Selfridge on 1 August and redeploy to Fort Bragg on 2 August. These moves were all completed as planned and without incident. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division closed into Fort Campbell, Kentucky at 1529 hours, 1 August and final elements from the 82d Airborne Division closed into Ft Bragg, North Carolina at 1745 hours, 2 August.

In accordance with DA directives, the Michigan National Guard units reverted to State control at 1200 hours, 2 August. At this time the Commanding General, Task Force DETROIT, turned over responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the city to the Commanding General, 46th Infantry Division. The headquarters, TF DETROIT, withdrew from downtown Detroit and moved to Selfridge AFB during the afternoon of 2 August. The headquarters and attached units commenced redeployment from Selfridge AFB at 1600 hours. TF DETROIT was disestablished as of 1800 hours, 2 August 67. The final headquarters element closed into Ft Bragg, N.C. at 2330 hours, 2 August 1967. Final elements of attached units closed into Ft Bragg at 0024 hours, 3 August 1967, bringing to a close TF DETROIT Operations.

### 5. REACTION/RESERVE FORCES.

As Federal troops of TF 82d were initially committed in the City of Detroit during the early morning hours of 25 July, 2 airborne infantry battalions were designated and remained in reserve at the State Fair Grounds, the 1/502d Infantry in TF DETROIT Reserve and the 3/187th

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Infantry in TF 82 reserve. A composite reserve was constituted by the 46th Infantry Division from the 1/119th Arty, 2/119th Arty and 3/182d Artillery Battalions and retained at the Artillery Armory on 8 Mile Road. In addition to these reserve forces, the CG, TF DETROIT, directed on 26 July that each battalion-size unit in TF 82 and the 46th Infantry Division maintain one platoon size force on a 15 minute alert with transportation ready to move on order.

TF DETROIT had sufficient UH-1D aircraft attached to provide a capability to lift one infantry company on short notice. The aircraft were positioned at the State Fair Grounds from early on 25 July until completion of the operations in Detroit. TF 82 promulgated a detailed operation plan for rapid reaction airmobile operations on 26 July. Initially 19 landing zones were surveyed and selected which provided a landing area for the airlifted company in every section of the city.

The above actions assured the TF Commander of sufficient reaction/ reserve forces and the flexibility to meet any foreseeable contingencies that might arise in the Detroit area. (See Annex H)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### SECTION II - COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. Personnel

PROBLEM: Personnel accounting.

DISCUSSION: In the haste of moving large Regular Army elements to the Detroit area via air on short notice, and the mobilization of National Guard elements from widely separated locations and summer activities, accurate and timely personnel accounting was virtually non-existent.

RECOMMENDATION: That all unit and troop movement SOP's of both Regular Army and National Guard units be revised to insure strict, accurate and timely personnel accounting, with emphasis on departing and closing strengths, personnel reports every 6 hours during initial stages of an operation and accurate unit strengths upon change of tactical boundaries.

#### 2. Operations

a. PROBLEM: Inclusive areas of responsibility.

DISCUSSION: Designation of the area of responsibility for Task Force Detroit should have been the Detroit Metropolitan area rather than the City of Detroit. Both of the small cities of Hamtramck and Highland Park being contiguous to the city had to be included in overall security plans.

RECOMMENDATION: That inclusive areas of responsibility be assigned to a Task Force Commander which may include any smaller municipalities with an overall city complex.

b. PROBLEM: Inclusive police jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION: During operations in the Detroit area, a wide variety of law enforcement agencies were employed. The major elements which had to be coordinated with military forces were state and city police, and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

often it was necessary for these forces to work quite closely together.

20

RECOMMENDATION: That providing legal considerations will permit, the command and control of both state and city police operating in an area of responsibility be placed under the overall military commander.

c. PROBLEM: Armor and/or APC's.

DISCUSSION: Active Army troops in Detroit had no tanks or armored personnel carriers available. Time and again, it was proved by the 46th Inf Div that these weapons had both a protective and psychological influence on a riot situation.

RECOMMENDATION: That armor/APC units be designated, and promptly made available, for employment with active Army forces. It is further recommended that one platoon of tanks and one company of APC's be assigned per a two brigade size task force.

d. PROBLEM: City contingency plans.

DISCUSSION: The 46th Division deployed initially into the City of Detroit in conformance with a deployment plan known as Operation SUNDOWN. This plan, which was developed sometime ago, provided information of the bivouac areas, command post areas, police organization and other information of value to a military unit which might be required to move into Detroit to restore law and order.

RECOMMENDATION: That city contingency plans be developed by the National Guard for those large metropolitan areas where disturbances might occur, and be filed at CONARC for prompt transmittal to force commanders of the active Army ordered into the area.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

e. PROBLEM: Operation maps.

21 DISCUSSION: A wide variety of forces were employed in the Detroit area. These included Regular Army, National Guard, State Police and City Police units, and each had access to different maps. This problem was compounded by Regular Army units using different city maps obtained from different oil companies, the city police using at least two different police maps of different scales and coverage and interested command posts outside the Detroit area having even still different maps. Further, it is visualized that in an operation of similar type in the future, there would not be sufficient time to affect distribution of a common map.

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate study be undertaken to gain some system of uniform reference common to all maps by which information can be quickly transferred.

f. PROBLEM: Reduction of composite guidance to meaningful military directives.

DISCUSSION: During operations in the Detroit area, it was necessary to closely coordinate military operations with both local authorities, and representatives of national, civil and military authority. In turn, to affect timely response of military units, oral orders had to be issued which were not always properly staffed, coordinated and announced to all elements of the command. An initial fast-moving situation, inadequate communications and urgent administrative requirements also contributed to some confusion and improper staff procedure.

RECOMMENDATION: That it should be recognized that, in the final analysis, the burden of translating all decisions, policies, actions and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

orders into meaningful directives to accomplish given objectives falls on the Task Force Commander and his staff. Toward this end, he should be accompanied by sufficient staff to handle this burden.

22

g. **PROBLEM:** Operational reporting.

**DISCUSSION:** During the initial stages of Operation Detroit, inquiry was received from various agencies of the National Defense Establishment, Department of the Army, CONARC, STRICOM, 3d US Army and 5th US Army, for information regarding the current situation. A SITREP was required by the Army Operations Center every six hours, and these supplemented by many direct telephone conversations. All of these requests and requirements tended to hamper current operations.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

(1) That a single Headquarters be designated to receive all operational reports and furnish information, as required, to all other agencies in order to reduce the administrative burden on the task force headquarters.

(2) That a SITREP be required initially on a 12 hour basis, and reduced to 24 hour basis as soon as practicable.

h. **PROBLEM:** Tactics in CONUS cities.

**DISCUSSION:** The type of resistance encountered in the Detroit area was not that normally to be expected under riot conditions where large mobs or crowds must be controlled in the streets by formations of troops with weapons and/or riot control agents. Rather, the resistance was similar to the final stages of World War II where troops were moving through cities where the people were for the most part friendly, but there were still small groups or individuals carrying out sniping and looting activity.

23

RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to the development of tactics whereby a given area of a city is "sealed-off", and slowly the area is reduced in size by systematic search for offenders and weapons until it is entirely cleared.

3. Training and Organization:

a. PROBLEM: Contingency plans for civil disturbance operations.

DISCUSSION: The 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division are designated for planning and execution of 3d Army Plan 563 GARDEN PLOT. Consequently, no plan existed at Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps for the rapid organization, assembly and deployment of a command and control element for TF Detroit. Thus, on very short notice, selected personnel were designated to accompany the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and additional personnel and equipment deployed later to sustain a 24 hour operational capability.

RECOMMENDATION: That CONARC designate the appropriate Commanding Generals, to plan for and provide the command and control element for deployment in CONUS where it is anticipated two or more division size units, to include federalized National Guard elements, may be employed in an area of civil disorder.

b. PROBLEM: Selected training subjects.

DISCUSSION: A wealth of experience was gained from operations in the Detroit area which may well serve as a basis for review, revision and implementation of many training subjects. These are:

- (1) Realistic riot control training.
- (2) Individual responsibilities and procedures for all soldiers in a civil disturbance area.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- (3) Detection and apprehension of snipers.
- (4) Application of night illumination devices.
- (5) The use of all types of weapons involving chemicals.
- (6) Combat in cities modified to CONUS conditions.
- (7) Conduct of day and night airmobile operations to multiple landing zones within and in close proximity to large cities.
- (8) Designation of reaction forces to insure maximum flexibility, high mobility and fast reaction to all types of situations which may develop in an objective area.
- (9) Handling of civilian personnel in an objective area who are not involved in rioting and disorder.
- (10) Adequate control of all ammunition.
- (11) Message center operations.
- (12) Relations with, and support of local firemen and policemen.
- (13) Foot and mounted patrolling.
- (14) CPX's for commanders and staffs involving riot and disorder situations.
- (15) Plans and actions for reaction/reserve forces.
- (16) The legal aspects of apprehension and restraint of civilians.
- (17) Traffic control.
- (18) Military bearing and appearance of the soldier/unit as a factor in mob psychology.
- (19) Fire discipline.
- (20) Processing, search and handling of suspects.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

25 (21) Basic military reporting procedures with special emphasis on types of incidents to report in civil disorders that have military intelligence value.

(22) Use of PSYWAR units in civil disorders.

(23) Cross training of combat service support troops to be used as infantry.

(24) Conduct of reliefs and transfer of responsibility in metropolitan areas.

(25) Use of infantry with armor and/or APC's.

(26) Vehicular-mounted crew-serve weapons.

(27) Respect for private property.

(28) Use of armored vests.

(29) Liaison with adjacent military units and local civilian authorities.

c. PROBLEM: Lessons Learned.

DISCUSSION: A summary of lessons learned is presented below. These lessons should be studied by all levels of authority and incorporated into future plans, operations and/or publications:

(1) Basic GARDEN PLOT Plan should be modified to permit units to take M-60 machine guns on civil disturbance missions. Machine guns mounted on  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks (even with rigid restrictions as to when they can be loaded) have a psychological effect on the populace.

(2) FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters needs revision to include addition of procedures for dealing with "snipers, looters, and arsonists."

(3) Use of city buses for transportation is advantageous in that gasoline supply and maintenance problems are not the responsibility

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the unit commander, drivers can be supplied on a shift basis by the bus company, and drivers know their way around the city.

(4) Police liaison of all levels down to battalion is required. Co-location of brigade and higher CP's with police command posts is also desirable.

(5) Federal troops should man stationary posts to secure civilian establishments - efforts of this type should be limited to public utilities and governmental installations.

(6) Unit command and control vehicles should not be bumped from normal position in air movement table in order to provide rapid maximum personnel lift. Units can not operate effectively without these vehicles.

(7) Units should bring all authorized 1/4 ton trucks to the civil disturbance area since there are many requirements for motorized patrols.

(8) Units should be assigned sectors in a city which correspond to police precincts or sub-divisions. Battalion rotation of areas should be held to a minimum.

(9) "Rules of engagement" should be consistent and thought out in advance. Example: Use of tear gas was delegated to Co CO level, whereas any officer could give order to load weapons. Senior man on any patrol (or post) should have the authority to give the load weapons order - there may not be an officer available at a critical time.

(10) Smoke grenades are almost as effective as irritant gas grenades and should be utilized.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

27 (11) Transport helicopters have potential uses in civil disturbances. Rapid reaction of reserves is essential. Landing zones can be found in parks, school yards, etc.

(12) Military communications should be provided as back-up to initially installed commercial systems.

(13) Large school buildings are ideal CP locations.

(14) National Guard unit appearance would be improved if they were provided additional fatigues and covers for their helmets.

(15) Broad, mission type orders are the rule for civil disturbance missions: i.e., "Restore law and order in Detroit."

(16) Fraternization of troops with populace must be controlled - up to a point.

(17) Most of the civilians in the disturbance area are law-abiding and welcome troops in the area. They provide food, drink and entertainment for the troops without charge.

(18) G-2 briefing as to the "hot areas" in a city should be provided, if possible, before a commander completes his plan for commitment of troops.

(19) Troops should be billeted in their area or zone of responsibility, if at all possible.

(20) Withdrawal of federal troops should be gradual, and without fanfare or advance notice.

(21) Manned road blocks, to be effective, must be provided with a physical block for the road.

(22) Rules for escalation and de-escalation must be flexible in that some unit areas or individual posts are "hotter" than others.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(23) Home station "BOLD SHOT" and other alerts should use a civil disturbance contingency, as well as a foreign country contingency, in order to perfect procedures.

28

(24) Unit integrity in the commitment of forces to civil disturbances missions must be stressed.

(25) 46th Inf Div, in coordination with state and city police had a prepared plan for a civil disturbance in Detroit. Such advance planning should be done for all major cities in the US by state N.G. units.

(26) DA supply forms are different than NG forms. The former are not readily available when an NG unit is federalized.

(27) NG units, other than SRF, have insufficient communications to permit effective control when assigned to a C.D. mission.

(28) DA policy as to duties of Active Army advisors to NG units, once unit is federalized, needs clarification.

(29) Ammunition authorized to be stored in NG armory is not sufficient to permit unit to be committed to C.D. missions. Allowance should be increased.

(30) NG tank battalions (armed with pistols normally) were provided M-1 rifles although most personnel took basic training with the M-14.

(31) M-113 APC's are effective in civil disturbance operations.

(32) Illumination devices can be used effectively on civil disturbance missions.

(33) The fact that there are weapons in ROTC armories should not be overlooked when suppressing riots in cities.

4. Intelligence

PROBLEM: Intelligence Reporting.

DISCUSSION: In domestic disturbances, the problem of intelligence reporting is complicated by a lack of hard guidelines on what is considered intelligence information. During the operation in Detroit, intelligence information proved to be anything which would indicate trends of violence, i.e., fires, police responses, deaths, etc., in addition to the location and identification of the "enemy." A requirement existed to report intelligence information to the Army Operations Center every six hours in the form of an ISUM. The formal report every six hours diverted considerable time and effort from intelligence operations to produce the required ISUM.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That Unit Intelligence Officers direct the intelligence collection effort by issuing specific guidance pertaining to the reports required for a given operation. .
- b. That ISUM's be initially submitted for every 12 hour period and, after the situation stabilizes, be submitted for every 24 hour period.

5. Logistics

See Annex F.

6. Other

- a. PROBLEM: Limited office space for Headquarters, TF Detroit.

DISCUSSION: It is absolutely essential that a commander be located near the offices of both local and national authorities on the scene of a riot or disorder, or at a central decision/policy making location. During Operation TF Detroit, one office of approximately

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

200 square feet on the 3d floor, Headquarters Detroit Police Building was allocated to the Commanding General, and for a period of 48 hours served as the only office space for the commander and his immediate staff. Conditions were most crowded, and the facility afforded little privacy to the commander for official conferences or telephone communications. Late on the evening of 26 July 1967, two office trailers were leased, parked adjacent to the police headquarters and served respectively as working space for the G3 and the combined staff elements of G1, G2, G4 and Signal. This too was an awkward arrangement because of the need for principal staff officers to be immediately available to the commander and again, space was most limited.

RECOMMENDATION: That in future operations, one of the earliest requirements to be made known to local officials must be the essential requirement for adequate and properly located office space. As a minimum, four adjacent rooms of approximately 200 square feet each should be immediately made available, one for the commander's private office, one for the Chief of Staff and associated administrative assistants of the command group, one for the G3 section and one for the G2 section.

- b. Signal - See Annex G.
- c. Aviation - See Annex H.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS - TASK FORCE DETROIT

(ALL TIMES LOCAL)

31

MONDAY, 24 July 1967

0450 XVIII Airborne Corps received alert warning from Third US Army.

0502 USCONARC directed that 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions be alerted and prepare to move one brigade from each division to Detroit by 1200 hours local time, Monday, 24 July 1967.

0530 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions directed to prepare one brigade respectively for movement to Detroit by 241200 July 1967.

0600 USCONARC directed that lead elements from both brigades be prepared to depart in 3 hours.

0605 Confirmed availability at Pope AFB of 39 C-130 aircraft. Pope had not received instructions through TAC channels to alert air crews at this time.

0620 The 101st Airborne Division placed under Corps control by USCONARC.

0710 82d Airborne Division reported ability to meet 3 hour reaction time.

1712 101st Airborne Division reported ability to meet 3 hour reaction time.

0900 Forces Committed  
46th Div 3,485  
SEE MAP NO 1

1045 USCONARC directed deployment of 1 battalion 82d Abn Div to Selfridge AFB ASAP.

1115 Chief of Staff Army directed that a 2 brigade-size force move to Selfridge AFB ASAP. Aircraft to be recycled on a continuous 24-hour airstream. Priority to Ft Bragg forces.

1125 Chief of Staff Army directed CG, XVIII Air Corps to hold until further notice.

1225 Sec Vance directed CG, XVIII Airborne Corps to launch forces.

1252 CG, TF DETROIT and Staff depart Pope AFB for Selfridge AFB.

A-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1400 TF 82. Chalk #1 launches from Pope AFB with lead elements of 1/508 Inf.

1405 101st Abn Div. Chalk # launches from Ft Campbell with first elements of 2d Bde. 32

1455 CG, TF DETROIT and Staff arrive at Selfridge AFB.

1505 Sec Vance and party arrive at Selfridge AFB, met by Gen Throckmorton.

1540 Command Post, TF DETROIT established at Selfridge AFB. Troops assembled and placed on 30 minute alert.

1600 Forces Committed:  
46th Div 4,946  
SEE MAP NO 2

1625 Gen Throckmorton and Sec Vance conferred with Gov Romney and Mayor Cavanaugh at Police HQ, Detroit.

1630 Initial contact established with 46th Inf Div (NG).

1715 Mr. Vance and Gen Throckmorton began tour of Detroit.

1720 Telephone message from Ft Bragg advised that 3/187 Inf would be substituted for 3/506 Inf deployed from Ft Campbell.

1845 Advance TF 82 (HHC 3d Bde) elements departed Selfridge AFB for State Fair Grounds, Detroit.

1900 Status of TF DETROIT elements at Selfridge AFB is:  
2/501st 20% closed  
2/505th 30% closed  
1/505th 85% closed  
1/508th 85% closed

1935 Mr. Vance and Gen Throckmorton met with community leaders and received report of riot situation.

2015 LOI GARDEN PLOT 1-67 (DA msg DA 824879) received at Task Force DETROIT Operations Center.

2140 CG, TF DETROIT directed that TF 82 (HHC TF 82) proceed to State Fair Grounds with Bde-size TF (3 bns) ASAP and await further orders.

2245 Brigade TF began deployment to State Fair Grounds. Delay by State Police insistence on briefing all bus drivers.

2300 Army Chief of Staff advised TF DETROIT by telephone that Michigan National Guard had been federalized and placed under OPCON of LTG Throckmorton effective 2320 hours.

A-2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- 2320 Forces committed:  
46th Div 4,946  
SEE MAP NO 3
- 2317 CG, TF DETROIT located in Deputy Commissioners Office, Central Police Station, Detroit.
- 2340 Gen Throckmorton informed CG, 46th Div that unit federalized and under TF DETROIT.
- 2350 (Headquarters, TF DETROIT (Main)) closed at Selfridge AFB.

## TUESDAY, 25 July 1967

- 0120 1/508th Inf, 1/501st Inf and 2/505th Inf enroute from Selfridge AFB to State Fair Grounds.
- 0145 LTG Throckmorton toured Detroit area.
- 0200 1/508th Inf, 1/501st Inf and 2/505th Inf close at State Fair Grounds.
- 0223 1/508th Inf and 1/501st Inf Bns moved from State Fair Grounds to Southeastern High School (1/501st move to Eastern HS).  
2/505th Inf held in reserve at State Fair Grounds.
- 0400 Forces committed:  
46th Div 4,946  
TF 82 1,089  
TOTAL 6,035  
SEE MAP NO 4
- 0400 TF DETROIT OPORD 1-67 published. Woodward Ave. dividing the city north to south established as division boundary. TF 82 area east of Woodward Ave., 46th Inf Div west.
- 0400 3d Bde TF 82 relieved 3d Bde, 46th Inf Div in area of responsibility effective 250400. Area east of Woodward Ave. and south of Edsel Ford Expressway. (Police precinct areas #1, #7 and #5).
- 0500 1/505th Inf, TF 82 departs Selfridge AFB for State Fair Grounds.
- 0600 2/501st Inf, 1/502d Inf and 3/187th Inr, TF 82 depart Selfridge AFB for State Fair Grounds.
- 0600 1/505th closed Fair Grounds. Released to Gen Seitz.
- 0614 2d Bde TF 82 established at State Fair Grounds.
- 0707 2/501 Inf, 1/502 Inf and 3/187 Inf TF 82 close at State Fair Grounds.

A-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 5,166  
TF 82 2,559  
Mich Air Gd -  
TOTAL 7,725  
SEE MAP NO. 5.

1325 2/505 Inf departs State Fair Grounds for SE High School.

1530 2/501 Inf TF 82 departs State Fair Grounds for Burroughs School.  
2/505 Inf TF 82 closes at SE High School.

1540 Dep Sec Vance relieved 1/126 Inf, 46th Inf Div to State control  
at the request of Gov Romney for use in Lansing, Mich.

1630 2/501 Inf TF 82 closes at Burroughs School.

1700 CP locations TF 82:  
3d Bde SE High School  
1/501 Eastern High School  
1/505 Lillibridge School  
2/501 Burroughs School  
2/505 SE High School  
2d Bde State Fair Grounds  
1/508 NE High School  
3/187 State Fair Grounds  
1/502 State Fair Grounds

2207 All CS and CN grenades ordered withdrawn from individuals and  
held under company control by Gen Throckmorton.

2317 Air National Guard reports strength of 2132 troops. Can arm  
approximately 800 for use as guards with carbines and .45 cal  
pistols.

2320 17 UH-1Ds available: 3 at Fair Grounds; 14 at Selfridge AFB.

WEDNESDAY, 26 July 1967

0145 8 sniper incidents reported since 251700 hours.

0150 3d Bde has 13 mounted patrols out and 80 men on 24-hour static  
guard posts.

0445 Status of tracked vehicles:  
14 APCs in area  
8 APCs with 2d Bde  
2 APCs with 3d Bde  
4 APCs with Div HQ (2 on low-boys)  
6 tanks  
4 M-41st with 2d Bde - 2 M-48A1 with 2d Bde

A-4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

35

0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 5,209  
TF 82 3,589  
Mich Air Gd 660  
TOTAL 9,458  
SEE MAP NO. 6

1205 300 Air National Guard Troops detailed to guard 17 Bell Telephone installations. 2/246 Inf, 46th Inf Div relieved of Bell Telephone commitments.

1636 TF 82 and 46th Inf Div directed to maintain platoon size reaction force on 15 minute alert.

1640 Elements of 127th Combat Spt Sqdn (213 pers) placed under OPCON of Police Commissioner to provide guard details for minor posts.

1920 Status on Static guard posts:  
TF 82: 27 posts 383 personnel  
46th Inf Div: 90 posts 861 personnel

2125 Authority to use CS delegated to CG, TF 82 and CG, 46th Inf Div with further authority to subdelegate to company level. (Based on authority received from CofS Army).

THURSDAY, 27 July 1967

0115 CG and Mr. Vance visit 2d Bde, 46th Inf Div.

0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 5,148  
TF 82 3,589  
Mich Air Gd 660  
TOTAL 9,397  
SEE MAP NO. 7

0935 Gen Throckmorton directed that all troops unload weapons, remove all ammunition from sight, and sheath all bayonets.

0955 Gen Throckmorton directed removal of road blocks from Mack and 12th Sts.

1555 TF 82 directed to remove flak vests and do everything to present a return-to-normal appearance to the public.

2400 -  
0130 CG tours 12th St and Mack Ave. areas.

FRIDAY, 28 July 1967

0000 TF 82 elements (1/508) relieved by elements 46 Inf Div starting 0310 hours. 1/508 Inf and HHC 3/187 departed areas starting at 0500.

A-5

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

0515 HHC 3/187 and 1/508th Inf TF 82 closed at State Fair Grounds.

0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 6,539  
TF 82 2,344  
Mich Air Gd 660  
TOTAL 9,543  
SEE MAP NO. 8.

0917 2/501 Inf TF 82 closed at Burroughs School.

1145 1/501 Inf TF 82 begins move from Eastern High School to Burroughs School.

1211 1/501 Inf closed at Burroughs School.

1820 46th Inf Div directed to assume responsibility for Police Precinct 5 effective 290800 hours after relieving TF 82 in zone. TF 82 elements establish CP in Chandler Park.

1955 1/125 46th Inf Div closed into Northwestern High School.

SATURDAY, 29 July 1967

0105 1/125 Inf 46th Inf Div displaced to Northwestern High School effective 281900.

0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 6,609  
TF 82 2,344  
Mich Air Gd 660  
TOTAL 9,613  
SEE MAP NO. 9.

1320 Effective 1200 hours curfew in effect from 2300 to 0530 hours. Prohibition on sale of alcoholic beverages still on.

1700 Dr. Drachler, Sup of Public Schools, called CG re: Summer School Program. Guidance not to disrupt 46th Div dispositions but accommodate within reason.

2150 CG notified acting Army Chief of Staff of fatal shooting of a looter by TF 82 trooper.

2200 3/246 closed light guard Army.

SUNDAY, 30 July 1967

0730 2/126 closed new location.

0800 3d Bde 82d Abn Div closed Chandler Park.

A-6

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

37

- 0831 3/246 Armor closed L1111bridge School. 46th Inf units now 100% closed.
- 0900 Forces committed:  
     46th Div       6,526  
     TF 82         -  
     Mich Air Gd    222  
     TOTAL         6,748  
 SEE MAP NO. 10.
- 0940 Gov Romney agreed to move curfew 1100 to 0530. Continue ban on alcohol.
- 0950 46th Inf informed that 82d relieved of all commitments including guarding of fixed installations.
- 1405 82d issued a warning order to move 2d Bde (3 bns) (1/501, 2/501, 3/187) to Selfridge AFB 090031 Jul 67.
- 1445 CG approved FRAG Ord #3 with Mr. Vance's concurrence to move 3 bns 101st Abn Div to Selfridge AFB on 30 Jul 67.
- 2235 CG visited 46th Inf Div CP.

MONDAY, 31 July 1967

- 0900 1/501 departed Burroughs School for Selfridge AFB.
- 0900 Forces committed:  
     46th Div       6,485  
     TF 82         -  
     Mich Air Gd    244  
     TOTAL         6,729  
 SEE MAP NO. 11
- 0911 2/501 departed Burroughs School for Selfridge AFB.
- 0921 3/187 departed State Fair Grounds for Selfridge AFB.
- 0925 CG, Gov Romney, Mr. Vance conferred. Gov Romney concurred in redeployment.
- 0930 Bde HQ and combat support units departed State Fair Grounds for Selfridge AFB.
- 1045 2 Bde HQ and combat support units arrived at Selfridge AFB.
- 1105 1/501 closed at Selfridge AFB.
- 1110 2/501 closed at Selfridge AFB.

A-7

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

TUESDAY, 1 August 1967

38

0530 1/501 1st Aircraft departed Selfridge AFB for Ft Campbell.  
0613 1/501 departed Selfridge AFB for Ft Campbell.  
0713 2/501 departed Selfridge AFB for Ft Campbell.  
0826 1/502 departed Selfridge AFB for Ft Campbell.  
0900 Forces committed:  
46th Div 6,485  
Mich Air Gd 244  
TOTAL 6,729  
SEE MAP NO. 12.  
0904 1/501 closed at Ft Campbell.  
0953 2/501 closed at Ft Campbell.  
1102 HQ 3 Bde departed for Selfridge AFB.  
1150 46th Inf Div instructed to reduce guard activity by 50% on 12th Street and Mack Street.  
1225 1/502 closed at Ft Campbell.  
1432 3/187 closed at Ft Campbell.  
1529 HQ 2 Bde closed at Ft Campbell.

WEDNESDAY, 2 August 1967

0545 First element of TF 82 begins redeployment from Selfridge AFB to Ft Bragg.  
0900 Forces committed:  
46th Inf Div 6,485  
TF 82 -  
Mich Air Gd 244  
TOTAL 6,729  
SEE MAP NO. 13.  
1200 TF DETROIT relieved of mission of providing riot control assistance. Michigan National Guard units revert to State control.  
1340 Final SITREP (#35) dispatched from TF DETROIT to AOC.  
1800 TF DETROIT is disestablished.

A-8

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**


39

240900 JUL 67

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT STATUS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAP #1



TOTAL COMMITTED: 3485

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT	
Scout Car Territorial	
Presidential Escorting	
Scout Car Passengers	
City Limit Line	
IN USE 10 OCT 70-71-72	

TF 82  
(NOT ESTABLISHED)

46TH INF DIV  
DEPLOYED:  
20 BDE

RESERVE:  
(ENROUTE FROM GRAYLING)

CMO & SPT  
(REAR DET AT GRAYLING)

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

MICH AIR NAT GU  
(NOT DEPLOYED)

3,485

3,997


713

2,195

2,137

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

46TH INF DIV 8,195  
MICH. AIR NAT GU 2,137  
TOTAL IN AREA 10,332



8395  
2137  
116  
TOTAL

TF DETROIT  
46TH INF DIV  
HIGH AIR NAT GD  
TF 82  
COND SPT  
TOTAL IN AREA


8

5-3

MAP #3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT STATUS

242320 JUL 67



46TH INF DIV  
DEPLOYED:  
20 BDE  
30 BDE  
FIRE & UTILITY GDS

RESERVE:  
CMD & SPT  
HEAR WGT AT GRAYLING  
FLINT, MICH

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

MICH AIR NAT GDS  
(NOT DEPLOYED)

2,725  
1,316  
905  
6,946

1,900  
393  
713  
243  
3,249

8,195  
2,137

TOTAL COMMITTED: 4946

DETROIT POLICE & FIRE  
Slow Car Transport  
Protect Remains  
Slow Car Remains  
City Limit Lines  
MICH AIR NAT GDS

EMPLOYED:  
RESERVE:  
FIREGRANDS  
SELF-RIDGE  
COMD & SUPT  
TOTAL TF 82


1,624  
2,362  
4,316

IF DETROIT

46TH INF DIV  
MICH, AIR NAT GDS  
TF 82  
COMD & SPT  
TOTAL IN AREA

8,195  
2,137  
4,516  
149  
15,997

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STRENGTH & DEPLOYMENT STATUS

250400 JUL 67

46TH INF DIV

DEPLOYED:  
20 BDE  
30 BDE  
FIRE & UTILITY GDS

RESERVE:  
CMD & SPT  
REAR DET AT GRAYLING  
FLINT, MICH

46TH INF DIV TOTAL  
MICH AIR NAT GD  
(NOT DEPLOYED)

2,725  
1,316  
905  
4,946  
1,900  
393  
713  
243  
3,249  
8,195  
2,137

DEPLOYED:  
(ENROUTE TO SEHS)

RESERVE:  
FAIRGROUNDS  
SELFRIIDGE  
CMD SPT


TF 82  
1089  
2254  
994  
179  
4516

TOTAL COMMITTED: 6,035

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT  
Scout Car, Ten 10-1  
Patrol Car, Ten 10-1  
Scout Car, Ten 10-1  
City Limit Line

TF DETROIT  
46th INF DIV 8195  
MICH AIR NAT GD 2137  
TF 82 4516  
CMD & SPT 116  
14964

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY




MAP #6

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT STATUS

260500 JUL 67



46TH INF DIV

DEPLOYED:

2D BDE

3D BDE

FIRE & UTILITY GDS

RESERVE:

COMD & SPT

REAR DET AT LANSING

HOSPITALIZED

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

MICH AIR NAT GD

DEPLOYED:

RESERVE:

METRO AIRPORT

BATTLECREEK, MICH

3,138

1,160

911

5,209

1,172

1,213

434

9

2,828

8,037

660

784

688

2,132

IF 82

DEPLOYED:

2D BDE

3D BDE

RESERVE:

FAIRGROUNDS

COMD & SPT

TOTAL IF 82

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IF 82

736

2,853

3,589

986

181

4,756

TOTAL COMMITTED: 9458

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Squad Car Territories

Precinct Boundaries

Squad Car Boundaries

City Limit Line

REMOVED OCT 28 1966

IF DETROIT

46TH INF DIV

8,037

2,137

4,756


142

15,079

COMD & SPT

TOTAL IN AREA

45



Map #7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT STATUS

270900 JUL 67

46TH INF DIV

DEPLOYED:  
2D BDE  
3D BDE  
FIRE & UTILITY GDS

RESERVE:  
CMD & SPT  
REAR DET AT LANSING  
HOSPITALIZED

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

MICH AIR NAT GO  
DEPLOYED:  
RESERVE:  
METRO AIRPORT  
BATTLE CREEK MICH

TOTAL COMMITTED: 9397

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT	
Squad Car Territories	
Precinct Boundaries	
Squad Car Boundaries	
City Limit Line	
REMOVED ON 12-10-66	


TF 82

DEPLOYED:  
2D BDE  
3D BDE

RESERVE:  
FAIRGROUNDS  
CMD & SPT

TF DETROIT  
46TH INF DIV 8083  
MICH AIR NAT GO 2137  
TF 82 4778  
CMD & SPT 182  
TOTAL IN AREA 15160

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



MAP #8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY STRENGTH & DEPLOYMENT STATUS

280900 JUL 67

46TH INF DIV  
DEPLOYED:

1ST BDE 940  
2D BDE 3,698  
3D BDE 1,452  
FIRE & UTILITY GDS 449  
6,539

RESERVE:  
CMD & SPT 1,096  
REAR DET AT LANSING 323  
HOSPITALIZED 135  
11  
1,565

46TH INF DIV TOTAL 8,104

NICH AIR NAT GD  
DEPLOYED:

RESERVE: 660  
METRO AIRPORT 789  
BATTLECREEK, NICH 688  
2,137

TOTAL COMMITTED: 9543

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT  
Scout Car Teamsters  
Pitman's  
Scout Car Boundaries  
City Limit Line  
Metropolitan Police

DEPLOYED:  
3D BDE 2,344  
RESERVE: 2,135  
FAIRGROUNDS 303  
CMD & SPT: 303  
TOTAL TF 82 4,782

TF DETROIT  
46TH INF DIV  
NICH AIR GD  
TF 82  
CMD & SPT  
TOTAL IN AREA 15,321


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

643

290900 JUL 67

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAF #9



46TH INF DIV

DEPLOYED:  
1ST BDE 955  
2D BDE 3,794  
3D BDE 1,413  
FIRE & UTILTY GDS 447  
6,609

RESERVE:  
CMD & SPT 1,082  
REAR DET AT LANSING 297  
HOSPITALIZED 116  
11  
1,507

46TH INF DIV TOTAL 8,116

MICH AIR NAT GD

DEPLOYED: 660

RESERVE:

METRO AIRPORT 789  
BATTLECREEK, MICH 688  
2,137

TF 82

DEPLOYED:  
3D BDE 2,144  
RESERVE: 2,135  
CMD & SPT: 303  
TOTAL 4,782

TOTAL COMMITTED: 9613

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Street Car Yard, etc.

Firearm Divisions

Small Car B. Divisions

City Limit Line

Map of Detroit

TF DETROIT

46TH INF DIV 8,116  
MICH. AIR NAT GD 2,137  
TF 82 4,782  
CMD & SPT 304  
TOTAL IN AREA 15,339


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAP #10

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STRENGTH & DEPLOYMENT STATUS

300900 JUL 67



TOTAL COMMITTED: 6,743

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Scout Car Territories

Precinct Boundaries

Scout Car Boundaries

City Limit Line

REVISED OCT 25, 1966

TF DETROIT

46TH INF DIV 8128

MICH AIR NAT GD 2137

TF 82 4782

COND & SPT 277

TOTAL IN AREA 15324

48

46TH INF DIV

DEPLOYED:

1ST BDE

2D BDE

3D BDE

RESERVE:

COND & SPT

REAR DET AT LANSING

HOSPITALIZED

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

MICH AIR NAT GD

DEPLOYED

RESERVE:

METRO AIRPORT

BATTLE CREEK, MICH

2,114  
2,945  
1,467  
6,526

1,172  
297  
116  
17  
1,602

8,128

222

1,228  
687  
2,137

TF 82

DEPLOYED:

RESERVE:

CHANDLER PARK

FAIR GROUNDS

COND & SPT

2344


2135

303

4782

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6-10-68



TOTAL COMMITTED: 6729

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT	
Scout Car Territories	
Precinct Boundaries	
Scout Car Boundaries	
City Limit Line	
NEWSD OCT 29, 1966	

TF 82

DEPLOYED:

RESERVE:

FAIRGROUNDS 2135

CHANDLER PARK 2344

COMD SPT: 303

TF 82 TOTAL 4782

2,065

2,871

1,549

6,485

1,245

297

102

17

1,661

8,146

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

NICH AIR MAT GP

DEPLOYED:

RESERVE:

METRO AIRPORT

244

67

311

TF DETROIT

46TH INF DIV

NICH AIR MAT GP

TF 82

COMD & SPT

TOTAL IN AREA

14,004


9,146

311


4,782

765

14,004



4-11-68



MAP #13

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY STRENGTH & DEPLOYMENT STATUS

020900 Aug 67

46TH INF DIV  
DEPLOYED:

1ST BDE 2,065  
2D BDE 2,871  
3D BDE 1,549  
TOTAL 6,485

RESERVE:  
CHD & SPT  
REAR DET AT LANSING  
HOSPITALIZED

46TH INF DIV TOTAL

8,146  
MICH AIR NAT GD  
DEPLOYED:  
RESERVE:  
METRO AIRPORT

TOTAL COMMITTED: 6729

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT	
Stout Car Precincts	1,187
Precinct Boundaries	1,187
Stout Car Reserves	1,187
City Limit Line	1,187
MAY 1968 EST. 10,000	

DEPLOYED: TF 82  
RESERVE:  
SELF-DEFENSE  
TOTAL

1,187  
1,187

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

46TH INF DIV 8,146  
MICH. AIR NAT GD 311  
TF 82 1,187  
COND & SPT 842  
TOTAL 10,486

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

53

HEADQUARTERS  
43D GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
Fort Carson, Colorado 80913

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

TO: Commanding General  
Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps  
ATTN: AJBGD  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

1. (U) References:

a. Message, Commanding General, Task Force Detroit, Subject: TF Operational Report (RCS CS For-65) dated 31 July 1967.

b. Admin Order Nr. 3, Headquarters Task Force Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, dated 1 August 1967.

2. (C) In accordance with references a and b above, the following after action report; "Lessons Learned", delineates the activities and recommendations of the 43d General Support Group, Fort Carson, Colorado, during the time it was attached to Task Force Detroit from 26 July through 4 August 1967.

3. (C) Section I.

a. Administration: The 43d General Support Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), and the 352d Transportation Company (Light Truck), attached to the 43d GS Group at Fort Carson, received orders to deploy from Fort Carson to Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan on 261435 July 1967. The HHC was augmented by maintenance and communication personnel from a Maintenance Company of the 43d GS Group and from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The telephonic message alerting the 43d GS Group for movement specified sections of the applicable TO&E, or both personnel and equipment, to accompany the troops.

(1) The 43d GS Group elements were deployed by air from Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, commencing at 262100 July 1967 and the final elements closed at Selfridge Air Force Base (AFB), at 271400 July 1967. The 43d GS Group was then placed under the staff supervision of the ACoFS, G-4, XVIII Airborne Corps, for the duration of the operation in Detroit.

C - 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

(2) The following additional combat service support units from Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were attached to the 43d GS Group for the duration of the operation:

- (a) 364th Supply and Service Company (-).
- (b) Support Platoon, 67th Maintenance Company.
- (c) Magazine Platoon, 571st Ordnance Company.
- (d) 99th Transportation Movement Control Section

(3) All units were quartered in Building 1409, Selfridge AFB with the exception of the 67th Maintenance Company personnel, who occupied and worked out of Building 1426.

b. Principal Operations: The 43d GS Group and attached units performed the following functions:

(1) Group Headquarters: Provided command, control, staff planning and supervision of all organic and attached units.

( ) Maintenance scheduling was supervised by the Supply, Service and Maintenance Section of the Group Headquarters to assist TF Detroit elements, specifically the 46th Infantry Division (Michigan National Guard), the 82d Airborne Division and its attached elements and other non-divisional units of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Food Service personnel organized and supervised the operations of a ration breakdown point, operated by personnel of the 364th Supply and Service Company which supported approximately 15,000 troops of TF Detroit. The ration breakdown point commenced operations on 281200 July and ceased at 010730 August. All personnel of the 43d GS Group, (560 officers and EM) organic and attached, were fed from two (2) tents erected in the vicinity of Building 1409. Class A rations for the Group personnel were fed beginning with the supper meal of 28 July. The last Class A meal served was supper on 3 August. All other meals consisted of "C" rations. (All separate ration personnel will pay for meals consumed through military payroll deduction.)

(b) The Group Headquarters operated the Departure Air Control Group (DACC) in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, Air Launching Control Element (ALCE), and was responsible for outloading and air movement of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and non-divisional units attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, to their home stations. In addition, on 3 August, the Group Headquarters and the 352d Transportation Company, conducted a final area police of all facilities and areas on Selfridge AFB used by Army troops during the operation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

55

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

(2) Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG).

(a) The mission of the Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) was to redeploy to home stations, all Regular Army elements attached to Task Force Detroit. Airlift capability was provided by the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command.

(b) To accomplish the DACG mission, the following teams from the 43d GS Group were formed to provide a twenty-four hour operational capability:

1. Team 1, Departure Airfield Control Officer.
  - a. Four (4) Officers.
  - b. Four (4) Enlisted Men.
  - c. Two (2)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks w/VRC 47 radio and four (4) radio telephone operators.
2. Team 2, Call Forward Area.
  - a. Two (2) Officers.
  - b. Six (6) Enlisted Men.
  - c. One (1)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck w/VRC 47 radio and two (2) radio telephone operators.
3. Team 3, Joint Inspection Point.
  - a. Four (4) Enlisted Men.
  - b. One (1)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck w/vrc 47 radio and two (2) radio telephone operators.
4. Team 4, Marshalling Area.
  - a. Four (4) Enlisted Men.
  - b. One (1)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck w/VRC 47 radio and two (2) radio telephone operators.
5. Team 5, Traffic Control Element.

Twelve (12) Enlisted Men.

C-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

56

6. Forty-five (45) 2½ ton trucks from the 43d GS Group's 352d Transportation Company were used to transport personnel from the Marshalling Area to the runways.

(c) The operations of the DACG consisted of the following:

1. Checking the line up of vehicles and personnel in the Marshalling Area against cargo and passenger manifests and chalk (load) number.

2. Guiding chinks to Call Forward Area where vehicles were washed and chinks inspected for proper loading, tie down, gas level and make up of chalk manifest.

3. Conducting joint inspection with Aerial Port Team of the U.S. Air Force Aircraft Launching Control Element (ALCE) to again insure that loads were properly tied down, gasoline levels were proper and manifests agreed with load lists.

4. To coordinate with ALCE on any changes made to loading lists or manifests.

(3) On 1 August, the DACG processed 97 aircraft loads of the 101st Airborne Division. On 2 August, 160 aircraft loads consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, 50th Signal Battalion, USA-STRATCOM and the 17th Aviation Company elements were processed. On 4 August 71 aircraft loads of the 43d GS Group Headquarters and 352d Transportation Company were processed. MG Seitz, CG, 82d Airborne Division commented that the processing of his elements was one of the smoothest that he had ever seen.

(4) 352d Transportation Company (Light Truck) commenced operations on 27 July and operated until departure from Selfridge AFB on 4 August. Principal operations included support of the 82d and 101st Airborne and 46th Infantry Division and the Fifth U.S. Army Forward Area Support Center (FASC) elements to transport personnel, equipment, rations and miscellaneous items. The 352d also supported non-divisional units attached to TF Detroit, i.e., the 17th Aviation Company and the USASTRATCOM Detachment. At various times, as many as ten (10) 2½ ton trucks were attached to the 82d, 101st and 46th Division elements and remained with these units. Patrols of the 46th Infantry Division were posted using these trucks. Ninety (90) missions were dispatched and a total of 16,764 miles were driven. The 352d also assisted the DACG in outloading the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d and 101st Airborne Division elements and non-divisional units attached to TF Detroit. Rations for the 46th Infantry Division were delivered from Selfridge AFB to the Artillery Armory, Detroit, daily from 28 July through 3 August, by the 352d Transportation Company.

C-4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

57

(5) 364th Supply and Service Company (-) was primarily responsible for operating the ration breakdown point. Operations commenced on 281200 July 1967 and continued until 010730 Aug 1967. It supported approximately 15,000 troops of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, the 46th Infantry Division (Michigan National Guard) and the 43d General Support Group and its attached units. Six (6) refrigerated semitrailers obtained from a rental basis were used for storing perishables.

(6) Support Platoon, 67th Maintenance Company provided maintenance support to TF Detroit and attached elements. This support was in the form of maintenance contact teams which went to the units to perform direct support maintenance and the platoon also operated a direct exchange facility. In addition, the 67th Maintenance Company personnel installed Xenon searchlights on six (6) tanks of the 46th Infantry Division on 29 July. On 1 August, the main effort was directed to assisting the 82d Airborne Division, prior to its redeployment to home station.

(7) Magazine Platoon, 571st Ordnance Company operated an ammunition igloo for the 43d GS Group in which all Group basic loads of ammunition were stored. When personnel of the Group were sent into Detroit on support missions, and were required to carry weapons and ammunition, the latter was issued by Magazine Platoon personnel. Ammunition was returned to the Magazine Platoon when support personnel returned to Selfridge AFB. No ammunition was expended by any of the 43d GS Group personnel. The Magazine Platoon operated an ammunition collection point for loose ammunition and broken lots. It collected these items from the XVIII Airborne Corps and its Regular Army elements prior to their redeployment and turned the ammunition over to the Fifth Army Forward Area Support Center (FASC). In addition, the platoon assisted the FASC in issuing ammunition to Regular Army units to reconstitute their basic loads.

(8) 99th Transportation Movement Detachment coordinated all transportation requirements for the 352d Transportation Company which were received from ACofS, G-4, XVIII Airborne Corps.

#### 4. (C) Section II - Lessons Learned.

##### a. Personnel.

(1) In future operations of this type, all personnel and equipment of the 43d General Support Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company should be deployed. The Materiel Management and Chaplain Sections should definitely accompany the Group. Materiel Management in an operation of this nature is a necessity in order to properly schedule maintenance activities and priorities, and to supervise repair parts supply. A chaplain would have been invaluable, not only for the spiritual welfare of the troops, but to assist the S-1 section in preparing programs for maintaining morale.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

58

(2) Additional maintenance support in the form of a full GS Maintenance Company should have been deployed with all organic equipment, repair parts and tools. The Regular Army Divisional units were well prepared and well organized for accomplishing their own maintenance. The National Guard Division and the non-divisional units required maintenance assistance. However, the personnel available to the 43d Group did not have the necessary equipment, repair parts or DX items to accomplish all required maintenance. The equipment specified in the alert message proved inadequate for sustained operations. As stated in paragraph 3a above, a maintenance contact team from the 43d General Support Group's 183d Maintenance Company was integrated into the Headquarters Company of the Group when it was noted by the Group Commander that no maintenance support was to accompany the 43d GS Group from Fort Carson to Detroit. The Support Platoon, 67th Maintenance Company did an outstanding job, but their numbers and equipment were not sufficient to meet all the requirements for maintenance which were generated.

(3) The Magazine Platoon, 571st Ordnance Company and the 99th Transportation Movement Detachment were sufficiently staffed, organized and equipped for this operation.

(4) The 364th Supply and Service Company, had sufficient personnel to operate the ration breakdown point. However, a Bath Platoon with equipment would have been an invaluable adjunct, especially when units moved into the Marshalling Area on Selfridge AFB.

(5) The 352d Transportation Company brought all equipment and personnel and had an adequate number of both to operate efficiently for extended periods.

b. Operations.

The 43d GS Group Headquarters Command Section, Plans and Operations Section, Supply, Service and Maintenance Section, Personnel Section and Company Headquarters, functioned efficiently and effectively in accordance with the COSTAR concept, in support of this operation. Although a Support Brigade, Inventory Control Center and Field Army Support Command were not included in TF Detroit's organization, the functions of these units were accomplished by ACoS, G-4, XVIII Airborne Corps and the Fifth US Army Forward Area Support Center. The Group Headquarters demonstrated the ability to deploy from home station, absorb attachments of COSTAR type units and commence operations in less than 24 hours after arriving at its destination.

C-6

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

59 SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

c. Training and Organization.

This operation was an invaluable training vehicle for the 43d GS Group and its attached units. This was a live situation, contrasted to training exercises at home stations and the units learned that they could operate under field conditions even though they had never previously worked with the other units in the TF Detroit GS Group. Refinements in future operations will result from the experience gained in Detroit, especially in regard to equipment requirements, additional training in communications, intelligence and staff procedures.

d. Intelligence.

There were not too many opportunities for personnel of the 43d GS Group to collect intelligence information. In any future similar operation, formal debriefings will be conducted on all personnel returning from support missions by the Security, Plans and Operations Section to insure that no items of intelligence information have been overlooked.

e. Logistics.

(1) Prior to arrival at Detroit, the 43d GS Group was not appraised of the combat service support elements which it would control, nor the organizations it would support during the operation. The 43d GS Group with attached support elements should have been deployed immediately following the combat elements.

(2) The attached maintenance capability was materially reduced because of repair parts non-availability; especially "fast-moving" items. Even with an "02" priority, repair parts supply was inadequate due to the lack of time, not items. This was due, mainly, to not having a task force unit with an established authorized stockage of repair parts on hand.

(3) Trucks of the Transportation Company were, at times, attached to Task Force Detroit elements on a full-time basis. This reduced the overall transportation capability otherwise available.

(4) Generally, the logistics support provided was adequate except where reduced by repair parts non-availability or the absence of units on the troop list to provide these items, i.e., a Repair Parts Company.

(5) In the Food Service area the following points were noted:

(a) Sufficient spare parts for the field fire units are a must and at a premium. Each unit must insure that enough field mess equipment to sustain itself is packed and transported to the maneuver area.

c-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

(b) Several of the units which were attached to the 43d GS Group had not brought field mess equipment with them and consequently had to be absorbed by the 43d GS Group Headquarters and the 352d Transportation Company for messing.

(c) The opening of the ration breakdown point was delayed 24 hours because the refrigerated vans were obtained from a meat packing plant and had not been cleaned prior to arrival. Cleaning, deodorizing, and cooling these vans required 24 hours.

(6) Recommendations - Logistics.

(a) That combat service support elements with command and control headquarters be phased in more quickly.

(b) That command and control headquarters such as the 43d General Support Group be provided with troop lists and associated equipment density, when alerted.

(c) That repair parts units (COSTAR) or maintenance companies with a supply mission (repair parts) be included in the General Support Group. These must be units supporting generally the same type equipment in the Task Force for authorized stockage list items. This would materially reduce the number of "O2" priority requisitions submitted and decrease downtime, (inoperable equipment).

(d) That a more definite supply and maintenance system (local procedures) be established immediately upon activation of a Task Force Headquarters. This should include the support available, where it is, how to obtain it, and when each support element will be operational.

(e) That trucks of the Transportation Company not be attached to Task Force elements for sustained periods. Transportation support generally, should be on an "on-call" basis to prevent reducing capabilities and/or support to other elements and to allow sufficient time for organizational maintenance to be performed properly.

(f) Operation of the DACG.

1. Operations on 1, 2, and 4 August proceeded smoothly and ahead of schedule. The 43d GS Group had never been involved in operating a DACG and preparation for this operation required a tremendous amount of study and prior planning. The participation of the 43d GS Group in this phase of the operation was a rewarding experience and an extremely valuable training adjunct. The first days operation was effective, however, the succeeding operations, using the experience gained on the first day, proceeded expeditiously without any difficulty whatever.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report: Lessons Learned

61

2. In the course of operations, the following discrepancies were noted which can be eliminated with additional training (or reiteration of previous training) plus command supervision at company level:

- a. Equipment loads were not properly tied down.
- b. Last minute changes to manifests and loading lists were numerous.
- c. Vehicle fuel levels above the 3/4 full mark.
- d. Full gasoline cans, immersion heater tanks, and stove burners were found in the beds of vehicles under other cargo.
- e. 3/4 ton trucks were loaded over their rated capacities.

*Jerome Aaron*  
JEROME AARON  
LTC, GMLC  
Commanding

Copies furnished:  
CG, 5th Inf Div (M) & Ft Carson  
DCSLOG, Fifth US Army

c-9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS 46TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
MICHIGAN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
South Cedar Annex Box 9035  
Lansing, Michigan 48909

63  
HQC-

7 August 1967

SUBJECT: TF Operational Report (RCS CS For -65)

TO: Commanding General  
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1. References:

- a. AR 1-19.
- b. Message from CG TF DETROIT, dated 311900 Z Jul 67.

2. This is a special after-action report on operations conducted by TF DETROIT. Special emphasis has been placed on identifying shortcomings and successes which contribute to a lesson learned. The report covers the period from start of the operation (23 Jul 67) until transfer of operational command from CG, TF DETROIT, 021200 Aug 67.

SECTION I

Significant Organization Activities

3. TRAINING: A limited amount of training time was available during the major portion of the operation, however, as the pace slowed and time was available a training program was developed and training was conducted, with emphasis on the following subjects:

- a. Riot control and Civil Disturbances.
- b. Troop Information.
- c. First Aid.
- d. Guard Duty.
- e. Personal Hygiene.
- f. Maintenance of individual and unit equipment.
- g. Military Courtesy and Discipline.

Basic Ltr, Hq 46th Inf Div, subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67 cont.

h. Much emphasis was placed on conduct, appearance, and bearing of the soldiers.

i. Training value was centered on control of snipers, patrol of built up area, reporting information, and staff operations and procedures. 64

4. MOVEMENTS:

a. When the order to mobilize troops was received they were located as follows:

(1) At Camp Grayling conducting Annual Field Training: HHC 46th Inf Div; 46th Admin Co; HHD 46th Avn Bn w/Co B 38th Avn Bn (Ind ARNG) attached; Co A (AM) 46th Avn Bn (SRF) attached to HHD 38th Avn Bn (Ind ARNG); 126th Inf Det; 107th Sig Bn; 107th Engr Bn; 1437th Engr Co (FB) (SRF); 46th Inf Div Spt Comd (-) Co C 107 Med Bn; HHC 1st Bde; HHC 3d Bde; 2-125th Inf; 1-126th Inf; 2-126th Inf; 1-146th Cav (-) Trp B (SRF); 2-246th Armor; 3-246th Armor; and 46th Inf Div Arty (-) 2-182d Arty (SRF).

(2) The following units had completed AFT in June and were located at home station: HHC 2d Bde (SRF) Wyoming; 1-125th Inf (SRF) Flint; 3-126th Inf (SRF) Wyoming; 1-225th (Abn) Inf (SRF) Detroit; 2-182d Arty (SRF) Detroit; Trp B 1-146th Cav (SRF) Detroit; 156th Sig Bn (CA) Detroit; and Co C 107th Med Bn Detroit.

(3) Units attached to the Division at Camp Grayling for Annual Field Training: HHD & Co B 38th Avn Bn, Ind ARNG; 522d ASA Co, USAR; Co A 12th SF Gp (Abn), USAR; and 1-113 Armor, Iowa ARNG.

(4) Attached to the Division at Camp Grayling were 825 Reserve Reinforcements. These personnel were assigned to the several units of the Division, and it was necessary to detach them immediately.

b. A delaying factor in two armored battalions and Cavalry Squadron was the requirement for turn-in to the Concentration Site of track laying equipment.

c. The 210 mile distance between Detroit and Grayling was a logistical factor.

d. The movement of the 107th Sig Bn was delayed until 241600 Jul 67 to allow for the recovery of needed equipment which was installed at Camp Grayling to support the Annual Field Training mission. The movement of this battalion was interrupted by a call for reinforcement at Flint for riot duty; they were released the following noon for operations at Detroit.

e. The 156th Sig Bn (CA), stationed in Detroit, was conducting a Multiple Unit Training Assembly on 23 Jul 67, therefore this organization was immediately available for employment, and with a very short distance to travel.

f. There were not enough vehicles available to move the whole Division at one time, therefore, commercial bus transportation was utilized. This slowed down the deployment of some units for a short period of time, in at

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67 cont.

65 least one instance two hours and twenty minutes from the time organization was ready to move until the last bus load departed from the Armory where the organization was located.

g. The movement from Camp Grayling to Detroit by the Division (-) was conducted without incident.

5. COMMENTS:

a. Use of armor, both tanks and APCs, caused sniper fire to cease upon approach of armor.

b. Use of Medical Battalion personnel, while intended for medical support, was used with success initially as guards on critical telephone installations and guarding firemen against snipers.

c. Status of National Guard troops was changed from Active State Service to a Federalized status on 24 Jul 67 without affecting the operation in any way, except for the change in boundaries.

d. The area of 12th Street was the most critical area at the beginning of the operation, and continued to be critical throughout the operation. This is the area where most of the sniping and burning took place (Precinct 10 in the City of Detroit). Continuous patrols, both foot and motor, and the use of tanks and APCs brought this situation under control in a very short time.

e. Due to the rapid buildup of troops in the affected area, there was very little opportunity for commanders to be briefed properly or to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area.

f. The Selected Reserve Force units were hampered in their operations because of the shortage of several vehicles and radios which had been loaned to the Reinforcing Reserve units for field training. Reinforcing Reserve units were still short several of these items which indicates a shortage of this type of equipment for conducting operations of this nature. Police radios were relied upon in several instances.

g. Training in riot control has been limited to mob control. This operation involved control of snipers, apprehension of looters, and block search procedures. Only one instance of mob control tactics was reported and this was of a minor nature.

h. Security ammunition allowances (TA 23-101) are inadequate. Lack of ammunition during the initial stages of the operation could have been a critical factor, however, a supply was provided from Camp Grayling.

i. Maneuver battalions, artillery battalions, engineer battalions, engineer float bridge company, and the non-organic signal battalion were employed

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report, dtd / Aug 67, cont.

under brigade control. This system, while not normal, worked very well in this operation.

j. Tactical integrity could not be maintained initially in many instances. While it is better not to fragment a squad, the situation dictated the employment of 3 man jeep patrols with a police officer in the group. The team concept (2 vehicles, 1 officer and 7 men) proved to be the most effective method.

k. Immediate reaction forces of from 20 to 50 men were organized to lend support where needed in the event a patrol required assistance on short notice.

l. A definite need exists for teletypewriter communications between the Division Tactical Operations Center and each of the Brigade Operations Centers. This would provide rapid communications, an accurate record of orders issued, and a more reliable means of exchanging information.

m. Mission assignments were used in the early stages of the operation, zones of responsibility were assigned later, and brigade and battalion boundaries were established along police precinct lines. This method of control allowed for necessary coordination with the police and was the most feasible solution.

n. The method and manner of implementing force (whether to load weapons or not, use of CS chemical, sheathed or unsheathed bayonets) presented some very real problems. This was solved by publishing specific instructions in a sufficient number of copies to provide each soldier with a copy. The requirement that an officer be present before live ammunition was used presented some problems because it was impossible to always have an officer present when sniping occurred or looting was observed.

o. Maps were a problem throughout the operation. There were not enough maps of the same scale for all headquarters, consequently overlays were difficult to use.

p. School buildings, primarily high schools, were used for brigade and battalion headquarters and quarters for personnel of all organizations except one. This was a better solution than the use of bivouac areas in city parks because security was more easily maintained.

q. A chemical capability was readily available, however suitable targets did not exist in this operation. The Division had available 6 each Riot Agent Dispersers M3, expedient dispersers (CS filled CO2 type fire extinguishers), 328 lbs of bulk chemical agents (CS-1 and CN), an adequate supply of colored smoke grenades, and 130 CS grenades.

r. Protective gas masks for helicopter pilots were not available at the beginning of the operation. They did become available from Active Army supply during the operation, however, they were later withdrawn.

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

67 s. Personnel assigned to protect firemen from snipers (2 per fire engine) were unable to maneuver and pursue snipers. Firing round for round at the snipers proved ineffective, however, a burst of 5 or 6 rounds was effective and in most cases the sniping stopped when this tactic was employed.

t. It was determined that police agencies need to have a better understanding of the organization of company and battalion size units. This would assist in maintaining more integrity of each element, and might eliminate fragmenting units.

u. Armored vests would have been useful. This item was not available to guard personnel, and when they were requested it was denied, although active Army elements were equipped with this item.

v. The movement of the division from Camp Grayling to Detroit presented no problems as there were Class III supplies available at Camp Grayling which were utilized. Refrigeration for perishables was difficult.

w. No problems were encountered in drawing or issue of Class III supplies during the period that the Division was on duty in the Detroit area. A majority of the Class III supplies were procured through local vendors.

x. On 28 July coordination was made with XVIII Corps, Fifth US Army Forward Support Group, OTAC, AMC, 43d Support Group and Division units to install searchlights on five (5) tanks assigned to committed units. Searchlights were installed on tanks within 36 hours after request was made.

y. Initial oral instructions by XVIII Abn Corps indicated that no items, including spare parts, could be procured until a DA Form 2765-1 was on hand at Corps. This was later changed permitting us to make a verbal request, followed by a completed DA Form 2765-1 for extremely critical requirements. This helped speed up the process and cut the 60 mile round trip time required for the special messenger delivering these forms to XVIII Corps.

z. Laundry service was promised by higher echelons of Logistical Support as being available on Tuesday, 25 July 1967. Pickup and delivery stations were established at the Detroit Artillery and Light Guard Armories. This pick up service did not materialize until late Thursday, 27 July with the first clean laundry being returned to the pick up points on Sunday 30 Jul. Some of the laundry that was turned in on 27 July has not been received to date, 3 August. This promised laundry service did not materialize because it appears that contracts were not let to a sufficient number of vendors to support both the 46th Infantry Division and TF 82 assigned to Task Force Detroit. The shortage of uniforms and the poor appearance of the Michigan Army National Guard personnel was unavoidable because of the poor laundry service provided in Detroit. Division personnel had just returned from a week of duty in the field at the AFT Site prior to being assigned to Task Force Detroit and had many uniforms in various laundries in the Grayling vicinity which could not be obtained even as of 3 August because of transportation, collection of payment, identification of laundry owners and other related problems.

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

aa. Major problems were encountered in obtaining repair parts, some items of clothing and items for personnel to sleep on. It is felt that personnel of XVIII Corp did an excellent job in supporting the operation, however, the time required to initiate requisitions by the Property Book (Commanding Officers) at unit level, and process these requisitions through command channels i.e.: Bn, Bde, Spt Comd Division, XVIII Corp, Etc., until the time shipment of material was received was excessive. 68

ab. Ammo was drawn from state security stock, Ground Shield stock, Camp Grayling, and Fifth US Army Forward Support Group, creating an administrative work load that has not been overcome to date. All ammo records are in the process of review.

ac. Logistical problems encountered in supporting the Michigan State Police were the providing of mess equipment, establishing mess facilities, providing Class I supplies, making arrangements for quarters and providing small quantities of Class V Items.

ad. A large stock of all classes of supply were on hand at the National Guard Training Site, Grayling, Michigan which was ordered to support Annual Field Training. No problems were encountered in supporting units in Detroit except transporting items from Camp Grayling to Detroit, however, if the Division had been committed after the AFT period it is doubtful that sufficient assets of all classes would have been available in the State to support the initial immediate requirements.

ae. The intelligence aspect of the situation was closely watched to effectively procure and move supplies through the city. This entailed effecting very close liaison with the G2 Section. Because of sniper action and lack of familiarization with the city, guards and guides had to be furnished for all supply movements. Armed guards were furnished by support personnel thus creating additional burden on already overworked 50% strength organizations and units of the Division Support Command.

af. It is felt that supply personnel are not adequately trained in Active Army Supply Accounting procedures as contained in AR 735-35. Supply accounting procedure schools had to be conducted and consequently the first requisitions for supplies were not forwarded to XVIII Corps until Thursday, 27 Jul 67. It is also noted that many units did not have or know how to utilize supply catalogs, this also delayed the processing of requisitions in that Federal Stock Numbers, Unit of Issue and other information had to be obtained by XVIII Corps before supply action could be initiated.

ag. The 46th Inf Div organization and strength greatly influenced the effectiveness of the personnel sections within the Battalions and Major Commands of the Division. The Division base and two Brigades are reinforcing reserve type elements authorized strength of 50% of full TO & E. One Brigade is a Selected Reserve force which is authorized and manned at 100% of full TO & E. Because of the 50% limitation in authorized strength for 2/3 of the Division and the maximum number of personnel deployed to accomplish the mission, the following deficiencies resulted:

046

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

69 (1) Inability to man 24 hour shifts at all staff levels without undue hardship and loss of efficiency on the part of personnel.

(2) On the spot establishment of administrative sections to perform administrative functions where said sections did not exist because of 50% manning levels. Personnel manning these sections were inexperienced, consequently the quality of work was less than the desired results.

(3) The use of administrative type personnel for tactical missions (patrols, security guards, firemen and utility guards, etc) not only hampered the functioning of administrative procedures but there is question as to their abilities to perform adequately in this substitute role.

(4) Division G-2 reported need for Psychological Warfare teams but due to understrength, the Division was unable to provide personnel which could have been utilized for this purpose.

(5) Low strength resulted in organizations inability to appoint officer and enlisted personnel to act as special service personnel thus reports of inadequate or no special service activity to Division Headquarters were not made.

ah. Reports from all the Battalion and Major Command Commanders were unanimous in emphasizing that the Morale and Espirit de Corps of all personnel was superior. This condition prevailed throughout the entire operation of Task Force Detroit despite adverse publicity by newspapers, radio, and magazines.

## SECTION II

### Observations and Recommendations

#### 6. PERSONNEL:

a. Recommend arrangements be made to furnish Psychological Warfare Teams for future operations of this nature, whether Division is in a Federal or State Status.

b. Recommend a greater effort on the part of Active Army Agencies to rapidly supply in sufficient quantities the necessary administrative forms (SF 88 and 89; DD 214; DD 220; OURL-2; VA Form 29-8282; VA Form 21-526e) for the transition of NG units from reserve component status to Active Army status.

c. Recommend Dept of Army be made aware of the fact that a National Guard Division when federalized are entirely dependent on Active Army agencies and installations for support in the areas of Post Exchange, motion picture films, athletic equipment, laundry service and USO Shows.

d. Recommend replacements be furnished by Active Army to increase the 50% elements of the Division to at least 80% of full TO & E to overcome the many and serious problems experienced because of the lack of sufficient manpower.

7. OPERATIONS:

a. Riot control tactics should be reviewed for possible changes. Current situations in the United States indicate certain groups initiating a somewhat different type of violence. Tactics should be developed to counter-act firebomb and sniper attacks. Some areas that might be examined: Sealing off trouble areas, control and elimination of snipers at once, use of armored personnel carriers with fast reaction teams, use of launched CS grenades (non-burning type), protecting firemen, and establishment of close liaison with police command elements. 70

b. Ammunition allowances for riot control duty should be included in the appropriate TA to insure immediate availability.

c. Police and National Guard units should be authorized to shoot looters and firebombers immediately after the outbreak of lawlessness. This should be widely publicized by radio and TV.

d. Cooperation and coordination between the National Guard and police agencies concerned should be maintained throughout an operation to quell disorders because the conduct of separate operations is impracticable and impossible. Police Precinct boundaries should be considered when prescribing boundaries between military elements.

e. Planning between local police and Military units should be disseminated to Federal authorities and followed by all participants.

8. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

a. Annex AA, CONARC Reg 350-1, provides the basic guidance for the training of National Guard units. Riot control training is not specifically authorized, however, a limited amount of this training is conducted under Civil Defense as integrated or concurrent training. It is recommended some consideration be given to authorizing riot control training.

b. Adequate command and staff mobile communications should be made available and responsive early in the operation during the time when control and information are most vital.

9. INTELLIGENCE:

a. City maps with a minimum of scale 2" to 1 mile and police precinct maps were essential for effective operations and intelligence activities. Maps were not initially available to all organizations. Recommend that a supply of maps with the same scale for each possible "trouble" city be kept current at state level. Maps would then be available for committed organizations

b. Collection effort in early phases was too slow and information was inaccurate or incomplete in many cases. Establishment of liaison with police from brigade down to battalion later gave immediate and functional intelligence for areas of responsibility. Information on ethnic groups, gang activities, patrol routes, vital installations, and sensitive areas to investigate or avoid were immediately available. Recommend that:

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

(1) Support plans for a given city direct monthly visits between the planning organization and the police department.

(2) Upon alert the organization CO or S2 will contact the police department and or the State Police to obtain intelligence they have available.

(3) The G2 or S2 will prepare a collection plan upon being alerted prior to mobilization. The EEI should be specific and pertain to sniper, fire bombing, looting activities and gathering of hostiles.

(4) Support plans specify the use of a Situation Activity and Incident (SAI) Report which will focus the commanders attention on troubled areas. It is an overlay of zone showing Red, Amber, and Green condition. Red meaning "numerous to many hostile activities"; Amber meaning "limited hostile activities"; and Green meaning "no hostile activities". This report should be due every two (2) hours during darkness and every six (6) hours during daylight.

c. Other observations:

(1) Friendly indigenous personnel may be used to obtain information on unfriendly activities.

(2) Air spotter teams were effective during daylight for gathering information on fire bombing and crowds.

(3) Teletype communications between brigade, division and corps headquarters is an absolute necessity for timely submission of information.

(4) Illumination by helicopter and tanks needs further study-use during the riot was indeterminate.

10. LOGISTICS:

a. If the National Guard had not been on duty many more problems as listed below would have arisen:

(1) Lack of Rations (Class I)

(a) No rations would have been available.

(b) No source would have been able to break down the Class I supplies for the National Guard to start with.

(c) National Guard must have 3 days of MCI Rations on hand in some storage for immediate employment for this type of mission.

(d) Service support must go on duty at the same time as combat troops or sooner.

(e) Once a month items, like condiments and janitorial supplies would have to be issued immediately upon mobilization.

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, Subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

b. Class I Supplies:

(1) Rations for the Reinforcing Reserve (non SRF) units of the Division were furnished from National Guard stocks on hand at Camp Grayling for the first 3 days. Rations for the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) units of the Division were obtained from Selfridge Air Force Base. Very few major problems were encountered in supporting the operation with Class I supplies, however, it is felt that this would have been a very critical area if the RR units had not been attending Annual Field Training and the rations for these units had not been available at the AFT Site. The ration support furnished by the 5th Army Forward Support Detachment and Selfridge Air Force Base commissary was outstanding from the second day of operations.

72

c. Great volumes of volunteer civilian food items were brought to troop areas by various citizens for free distribution to the forces on duty. On occasion this created numerous problems trying to dispose of these items such as cakes, hams, cookies, etc. Troops would consume these items and as a result quantities of food prepared by the unit messes were not completely utilized, however, part of this residue was fed to local police and firefighting personnel working with our troops.

d. Another problem area encountered was that National Guard Units are not following active army supply procedures as outlined in AR 735-35 in that it is contrary to National Guard Regulations and therefore unit personnel were not familiar with the Request for Issue and Turn In Form (DA Form 2765-1). A procedure had to be established integrating the use of this form into National Guard supply accounting procedures. A special class was held with all Division logistical personnel to familiarize them with the Requisition Form and Army Supply Accounting procedures on 26 July 1967.

e. Recommend additional training be given to supply personnel pertaining to Active Army Supply Accounting procedures.

f. Many new enlistees (EEP trainees) which were not taken to APT, were called to duty. They had not been issued individual clothing and equipment items. Requisitioning equipment for these personnel created a major problem.

g. This Division received 4000 each blankets, air mattresses and sets of fatigues which were requested and supplied from XVIII Corp for the operation. The fatigues were issued to units to fill shortages. The air mattresses provided were of great assistance and a letter has been forwarded through command channels requesting retention of these items for future use on riot missions and during field exercises.

h. P. O. L. (Class III)

(a) Commercial tankers would have to be used as Michigan ARNG Units do not have enough of these vehicles to support their requirements without the loan from other states.

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

i. Ammunition (Class V).

73 (a) If Michigan ARNG units were alerted after AFT, very little Class V would be available. Security ammunition and Ground Shield Security Class V is not adequate for this type of mission. Recommend the following basic load of State Security Ammunition be maintained at Company, Battery, Troop level and 1 day at Battalion level:

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>QUANTITY AND TYPE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON</u>
Machine Gun, 7.62mm	2 Belt, Ctg, 7.62mm 4-1 Tracer
Carbine, Cal .30	3 Magazine (10 rd ea) Ctg Cal .30
Rifle US Cal .30 M1	3 Clips (8 rd ea) Ctg Cal .30, AP
Machine Gun, Cal .30	2 Belt, Ctg Cal .30 4-1 Tracer
Submachine Gun, Cal .45	2 Magazines (30 rd ea) Ctg Cal .45
Pistol, Cal .45	3 Magazines (7 rd ea) Ctg, Cal .30
Rifle, BAR, Cal .30	2 Magazines (20 rd ea) Ctg, Cal .30
Machine Gun, Cal .50	1 Belt, Ctg, Cal .50 4-1 Tracer (Bn ASP only)

j. Housekeeping. The immediate requirement for Janitorial house-keeping supplies posed quite a problem. These supplies must be procured and distributed to units, kitchens and areas on the first day of operation. National Guard troops in training at AFT were able to bring a limited amount of this type of supply with them, however, the troops that were mobilized at home station had none.

k. Transportation. The use of city owned buses to transport certain maneuver elements proved to be great value. Recommend every effort be made to satisfy the transportation requirements by issuing the TOE vehicles authorized.

l. Hospitalization and Evacuation. Initially elements of the Medical Battalion were assigned security missions which prevented them from performing adequate Medical support. This slowed down the evacuation procedures and certain medical support. Recommend medical units be assigned a Medical support role only.

m. Conclusions:

(1) Operation Garden Plot proved to be a very realistic training exercise.

(2) The shortage of personnel in service support elements of the Division seriously handicapped the accomplishment of their mission which was only overcome by making personnel work extremely long hours. The use of support personnel to perform tactical missions, guard details and escort prisoners to various jails seriously hampered the logistical support mission. Recommend that personnel assigned to logistical support units not be given additional missions as referred to above.

Basic Ltr., Hq 46th Inf Div, subj: TF Operational Report, dtd 7 Aug 67, cont.

11. OTHERS: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

74

s/sRichard H. Davis  
RICHARD F. DAVIS  
LTC, GS Mich ARNG  
Act Asst Adj Gen

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							
UNCLASSIFIED							
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE				
PRECEDENCE							
ACTION	PRIORITY						
INFO	PRIORITY			DTG			
FROM: CG 82D ABN DIV, FT BRAGG NC				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS			
TO: CG XVIII ABN CORPS AND FT BRAGG NC							
INFO: CO, 3D BDE							
UNCLAS _____ AJDGC-0							
Subject: After Action Report - Operation Detroit							
Reference: TF Detroit unclas msg F 043, Subj: TF Operational Report, DTG 311900Z July 1967.							
The following after action report of Operation Detroit is submitted in response to referenced message.							
SECTION I (Principal operations, activities and administration).							
1. At 240530 Jul 67 the Division SDO received directions to prepare one brigade for deployment for riot control operations in Detroit with tentative aircraft loading time of 241200 hours. Final implementing instructions were received at 241110 hours for 241300 hours loading time, 241400 hours take off.							
2. CG, 82d Abn Div was designated as commander of TF 82 (2d Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div) and departed on aircraft chalk #1 at 241400 hours with elements of TF 82 TAC CP and CO, 3d Bde. CG, TF 82 arrived at Selfridge AFB at 241615 hours.							
DATE		TIME		DATE		TIME	
9		1125Z		MONTH		YEAR	
AUG		67		PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE		SIGNATURE			
s/ Archie Carpenter		47106		s/ Thomas A. Graham III			
ARCHIE E. CARPENTER				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE			
LTC, GS				Cpt JAGC DSDO			
ACofS, G3							
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			
UNCLASSIFIED							

DD FORM 173  
1 NOV 63

E-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAR 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

GPO 1966 O-221-067

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				MINOR, THOMAS F. MAJ, GS	
INFO PRIORITY				PHONE 47106	
<p>Lead elements with command group of 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div arrived at 241552 hours. 7</p> <p>3. At 242145 hours TF 82 was directed to move three battalions to the Michigan State Fairgrounds and to prepare for further deployment. TF 82 CP opened at the fairgrounds at 250045 and the first three battalions closed at 250100. Movement from Selfridge AFB was made by a combination of tactical vehicles and city busses which remained available to the TF throughout the operation.</p> <p>4. Oral orders issued by CG, TF Detroit at 250055 Jul directed coordination with the 46th Inf Div (NG) to effect relief of NG forces east of Woodward Avenue and to reestablish law and order in the area.</p> <p>5. 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div with 2 battalions moved into the area east of Woodward Avenue and relief of the NG elements was completed by 250400 hours. 3d Bde CP was established at SE High School with the Southeastern Police CP.</p> <p>6. By 251630 hours TF 82 had deployed 5 battalions into the East Detroit zone of operations. Additionally, a provisional battalion was formed in the 3d Bde from two cavalry troops and an engineer company. Two battalions were in reserve at the fairgrounds, less one company from the 3/187 deployed at Alger School. One of these battalions (1/502 Inf) was designated as Task Force Detroit Reserve and in conjunction with the 17th Avn Co, conducted thorough reconnaissance, J</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 5	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1  
1 NOV 60

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

E-2

76

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
				UNCLASSIFIED	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DISPATCHED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				MINOR, THOMAS F., MAJ GS	
INFO PRIORITY				PHONE 47106	
<p>77 planning and rehearsals for airmobile employment throughout the city.</p> <p>7. During the period 25 July through 29 July, TF elements encountered isolated snipers and incidents; however, law and order were reestablished throughout the zone of operations with the incident rate rapidly decreasing until TF 82 was relieved by elements of the 46th Division on 30 July.</p> <p>8. On 310900 July TF elements began movement out of Detroit to Selfridge AFB for assembly and subsequent airlift to home stations.</p> <p>9. Elements of 101st Abn Div completed redeployment to Ft Campbell on 01 August and the last elements of the 82d Abn Div closed Ft Bragg at 021745 August.</p> <p>SECTION II (Recommendations)</p> <p>1. Personnel: NONE</p> <p>2. Operations:</p> <p>a. Existing plans should be changed to allow units to deploy with selected crew served weapons, especially M60 machine guns.</p> <p>b. Issue of chemical (Riot Control) rounds for M79 grenade launcher should be expedited.</p> <p>c. Military boundaries generally should coincide with police boundaries for most effective coordination and to facilitate eventual disengagement.</p> <p>d. Military and Police CP's should be collocated and liaison</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		3	5		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
				UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

E-3

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				PHONE	
INFO PRIORITY				MINOR, THOMAS F., MAJ, GS 47106	
<p>exchanged at the lowest practicable level. Military and police patrols should be integrated.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">7</p> <p>e. Rules governing control of firing and use of chemicals should be precise, but tailored to fit those situations where no officer is immediately available for timely decisions.</p> <p>3. Training and Organization:</p> <p>a. Emphasis should be placed on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Combat in cities modified for area control.</li> <li>(2) Use of chemicals.</li> <li>(3) Detection and apprehension of snipers and application of night vision devices.</li> <li>(4) Intelligence procedures specifically directed to civil disturbance operations.</li> <li>(5) Realistic riot control training which provides a base of confidence for soldiers.</li> <li>(6) Individual responsibilities and procedures for all soldiers in civil disturbance operations.</li> </ul> <p>b. Organization:</p> <p>(1) Headquarters elements should be adequate to permit liaison with higher headquarters, with adjacent (presumably National Guard) units, and with police headquarters without detracting from</p> <p style="text-align: right;">1</p>					
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD		MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES		INITIALS	
4		5			
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED.  
E-4

78

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
				UNCLASSIFIED	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				PHONE	
INFO PRIORITY				MEMOR, THOMAS F., MAJ, GS 47106	
<div style="position: relative;"> <span style="position: absolute; left: -40px; top: 0; font-weight: bold;">79</span> <p>the capability to closely control subordinate units.</p> <p>(2) The force should include sufficient tactical vehicles for prompt deployment into the city and for the initiation of extensive patrolling. The object is to give the impression that military troops and units are everywhere.</p> <p>(3) Helicopters are needed for command and control.</p> <p>4. Intelligence: Maps of potential trouble spots must be made readily available in adequate quantities.</p> <p>5. Logistics:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">a. Credit cards for local purchase of POL should be available to each battalion to establish issue points within the battalion area until more formal resupply is established.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">b. Local purchase and contract authority should be delegated to battalion size units for initial phases of civil disturbance operations.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">c. Car and truck rental authority should be established to provide transportation for liaison and nontactical operations to preclude any drain on the mobility of troop units.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">d. Sufficient individual uniforms must be carried to the objective area to permit an extended stay.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">e. Citybuses or other commercial transportation should be placed at the disposal of troop units. The same busses should be left in support of troop units throughout the operation.</p> </div>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		5	5		
DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1  
NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.  
E-5

**Michigan  
Air  
National  
Guard  
on  
RIOT  
DUTY**



127th TAC RECON WG

4 August 1967

AFTER ACTION REPORT

82

Due to the conditions of domestic violence and disorder existing in Detroit on 23-24 July 1967, the President issued Proclamation No. 3795 at 2320 EDT, 24 July 1967, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to call up the Army and Air National Guard of Michigan for an indefinite period to assist in restoring law and order.


This order placed Air Guardsmen who had no specific training for this type duty (except the Air Police) in a situation of being rapidly drawn together, issued equipment, given instruction and deployed for duty under the direction of the Detroit Police Department. The response from the Officers and Airmen was extremely gratifying. They stepped forward as Guardsmen have done traditionally for centuries. We had to turn back volunteers. The Detroit Police gave high praise and admiration of our Airmen from all echelons of Command.

We had no major problems in equipping, training and deploying a security force within six hours, consisting of 220 per shift, or a total of 660 per day. We then rotated personnel to gain experience until 850 men had served a tour on guard duty before our inactivation.

I believe the Air National Guard can be a very effective force in civil disasters, with a minimum amount of training. With proper guidance a plan could be made up establishing a new Alert Plan, organization and a duty assignment to be put in effect when notified. However, it is extremely important that at the outset of the call up, the exact reason be given, if a unit is to be used in an assignment other than it's normal mission.

This requirement would necessitate key officers to meet with the State Adjutant General, Army Guard and local police to work out specific details and resolve equipment, housing, subsistence and transportation requirements.

I am convinced that through this Wing's recent experience and contribution to restoring civil order, that all levels of command in the State and National Guard would be proud of the reaction, appearance and ability displayed by the Officers and Airmen of this Wing. I feel sure any unit in the Air National Guard could respond similarly.

  
ROBERT MCMATH, Colonel, Mich ANG  
Commander

BRIEF RESUME OF EVENTS

Sunday 23 July

Detroit riot starts.  
Michigan Air National Guard increases Base security.

Monday 24 July

Air Technician Detachment flies photographic reconnaissance missions of riot areas and delivers prints to Washington D.C. at the request of USAF. Activation preparations begun in anticipation of a call to active duty.

Tuesday 25 July

Michigan Air National Guard Federalized as a Wing under Lt. Gen. Throckmorton, Detroit Task Force Commander.  
Aerial sorties increased.  
Communication networks established and manned.  
Twenty-four operations began and liaison maintained with Selfridge AFB and Detroit Task Force Command Posts.  
Initial steps taken to train 300 men in riot control procedures

Wednesday 26 July

All operations put on 12 hour shifts.  
Mobilization processing started.  
Weapons and field equipment issued.  
288 Air Guardsmen deployed in Detroit on riot duty.  
Tactical Hospital and personnel reported available to Task Force Headquarters.  
Reconnaissance/operations and intelligence in full operation and pictures being delivered.  
Augmentation support personnel offered to Selfridge AFB.

Thursday 27 July

Approximately 400 additional Air Guardsmen committed to Detroit riot duty.  
Medical teams toured guard posts in riot area to check condition of troops.

Friday 28 July

Riot Duty and Flying operations continued.  
Augmentation personnel requested by Selfridge AFB.

Saturday 29 July

Riot duty and flying operations continued.  
Received defederalization orders for all Michigan Air National except for selected units.  
Started preparations for de-activation.  
Augmentation personnel arrive at Selfridge AFB.  
Sunday 30 July

Release processing and equipment turn-in accomplished for all but the 322 personnel remaining on active riot duty in Detroit.  
De-activated at 2359 hours.

Monday 31 July

The reduced forces maintaining riot control duties were:  
127th Combat Support Squadron (Command)  
127 Tactical Hospital  
191st Tactical Dispensary  
191st Air Police  
110th Air Police

Tuesday 1 August

Riot control duty operations continued.

Wednesday 2 August

Remaining units were de-federalized and returned to Michigan Military Establishment at 1200 hours.  
All were de-activated at 2359.

EVENTS LEADING TO ACTIVATION  
23 - 24 JULY 1967

95

The Detroit riots were touched off by a police raid on a blind pig early Sunday, 23 July during which 83 persons were arrested.

Conditions deteriorated throughout Sunday. The news did not receive the attention ordinarily paid by the public because it was a beautiful day and many people were outdoors without radio reports or television.

By 1800 hours it became apparent that a full scale riot was in progress. The Michigan Army National Guard was called to duty from Field Training at Grayling. At this time the disorder was confined to the near downtown area.

Approximately 2000 hours key Michigan Air National Guard personnel decided that base security should be strengthened. One Officer and one technician air policeman were sent to augment the civil guard to protect the base. The Wayne County Road Patrol were contacted and they included the main gate guard post on their 15 minute patrols.

By 2400 hours the situation had reached the point where we called out one air police officer and 10 air policemen who were in place at posts around the base by 0130 24 July.

There were no attempts made to sabotage or otherwise threaten the base at any time during the disorder.

At approximately 1000 hours the National Guard Bureau made a telephone request for an area coverage photographic mission of the Detroit area. Two RF-84F planes were sent on the mission. The film was processed and prints delivered to Washington late in the afternoon by another RF-84F. A representative of the Bureau met the plane at Andrews AFB and received the film.

Conditions continued to deteriorate. The Army Guardsmen were assigned to duty in Detroit and all Detroit policemen were called to duty. Michigan Governor George Romney and Detroit Mayor Jerome P. Cavanaugh called Washington with reports of the situation and requests for Federal troops.

At 2300, President Johnson made a nation-wide television and radio talk on the situation and announced that the Michigan Army and Air Guard were being federalized and that regular Army troops were being sent to Detroit. The executive order activating the Michigan ANG was issued by the President and delivered to the Department of Defense at 2320.

DETAILED REPORT OF EVENTS  
2320 HOURS 24 JULY - 1200 HOURS 2 AUGUST

25 JULY

EDST

0010

B/Gen Erick W. Kyro received call from Major Gen. Winston P. Wilson, Michigan ANG is Federalized as of 2320 hours 24 July 1967.

0020

Col. Robert McMath, 127 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing Commander, notified by B/Gen Erick W. Kyro; Michigan ANG units are Federalized and to contact Lt Gen Throckmorton, Detroit Task Force Commander.

0050

Due to communications breakdown in trying to contact Gen. Throckmorton. Col. McMath initiates alert recall of forces. Television and radio stations cooperated in making spot announcements of the recall.

0800

80% of assigned personnel had reported for duty.

0915

Wing Staff meeting held: The following decisions placed in effect:

1. The two groups would merge resources under a single manager for each section and establish a 24 hour work schedule.
2. Begin mobilization processing of personnel.
3. Photograph substantially damaged areas of Detroit in anticipation of higher headquarters requests.
4. Fly missions in support of outstanding TAC Oplan 24 targets.
5. All units concentrate on OJT and upgrade training until such time as the unit's specific mission can be determined as other than tactical air reconnaissance.
6. Assign liaison officers to establish contact and work with the Detroit Task Force command post at Selfridge AFB.
7. In keeping with the Governor's order, the sale of alcoholic beverages are prohibited.

1200

No direction received as yet on the exact role of the federalized Air National Guard.

EDST

1230 The USP&FO of Michigan had withdrawn funds and no new funds had been authorized by TAC.

87 1300 Due to local situations, rations were impossible to purchase as of this time. Personnel permitted to go off base for the noon meal.

1400 Housing arrangements for personnel living more than 50 miles from the base negotiated with NIKE site commander. (75 beds available).

1415 The office of the Mayor of Detroit and the Detroit Police Department Intelligence Bureau received requested photography.

1430 Wing Commander still unable to contact Gen. Throckmorton directly, advises his acting Chief of Staff, Col. Hard, that the Air National Guard is standing by for orders and can provide aerial reconnaissance assistance communications, medical assistance, courier service, civil engineering, air policemen, etc..

1500 An Operations Order was published outlining the operation under the primary mission of tactical reconnaissance. Aerial photos were marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"

1530 Hot lines to TAC, 12 Air Force, and Selfridge AFB command posts were installed in the unit command post.

1540 Mobilization Order from Headquarters TAC received.

1600 The Tactical Hospital/Dispensary erected two field hospital tents for emergency use.

1700 One T-33 and one C-47 aircraft and crews placed on 15 minute alert for courier/support missions.

1730 Two RF-84F aircraft and crews placed on 15 minute alert sunrise to sunset.

1800 U. S. Senators Hart and Griffin arrive on VC-141 for helicopter tour of Detroit's devastated areas. They were later escorted by Major General Turner, U.S. Army Provost Marshall, to the Detroit Task Force Command Post.

1930 Blankets and linen for 75 cots available at NIKE site arrived by airlift from Alpena. In-flight rations were also flown in.

2000 82% of assigned personnel present for duty.

26 JULY

88

EDST  
0815

Wing Staff meeting held. The following decisions placed in effect.

1. Each tactical group provide 150 officers and men equipped and prepared for riot duty. This force would be selected a percentage of assigned strength of subordinate units.
2. The Commander, 127th Combat Support Squadron was selected as Troop Commander of this Task Force and ordered to start riot suppression training as soon as possible.

C915

A meeting was held with Headquarters TAC representatives to clarify problem areas in the comptroller function, personnel, and administration. It was at this meeting the Wing Commander first learned that the specific purpose of the recall order was for riot suppression in support of Lt Gen Throckmorton. It was indicated, that 90% of reports normally required by higher headquarters could be dispensed with due to the nature of the recall.

1000

Rations received and Mess Hall set up for 3 meals per day.

1100

The Wing Information Services Officer prepared letter to employers asking consideration for differential pay for guardsmen recalled to duty.

1115

Wing Commander tasked 110th Tactical Reconnaissance Group to obtain photo targets in Detroit.

1145

127th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron alerted to receive all film products for mass production and detailed analysis.

1215

Colonel Robert L. Cardenas, Commander 835th Air Division offered assistance in personnel processing. (Personnel arrived next day).

1330

Wing Commander met with Lt Gen Throckmorton. The General asked the Wing Commander to provide the following forces for riot duty:

1. 127th Combat Support Squadron
2. 127th Tactical Hospital
3. 191st Tactical Dispensary
4. Air Police branch of the 110th and 191st Tactical Reconnaissance Groups.

89

EDST  
1400 Less the Combat Support members, the original task force turned in weapons and field equipment for re-issue to the above selected forces except weapons to the medical units.

1500 Riot training for 288 personnel initiated with assistance of a police officer from the Wayne County Sheriff's Office.

1550 191st Combat Support Squadron assumed base functions including base security.

1600 The troop commander established liaison with the Detroit Task Force and set up a command post in the Detroit Police Headquarters building.

1700 Selfridge AFB command post requested vertical and oblique photos of damaged areas.

1900 70 Air police dispatched to police headquarters for riot duty.

2000 88% of assigned personnel present for duty.

2030 The remaining task force members dispatched for riot duty.

2100 USP&FO contacted and arranged for pick-up of 400 poncho's ( foul weather) to be used by personnel on riot duty. Items were available at 0500 27 July '67.

27 JULY

0600 Requested photos delivered to Selfridge AFB command post.

0700 Around the clock riot suppression forces requested by the Detroit Police Department.

0730 Riot reaction teams A, B and C of 220 officers and men established on a 12 hour shift basis. 0730 - 1930 hours

0800 Issue of field equipment and weapons initiated for teams B and C.

0900 Commander, 835th Air Division offered legal assistance to the Wing Commander as necessary.

1000 Flying operations were curtailed because of the need for maintenance personnel to help fulfill the manpower requirements for riot teams B and C.

EDST

1200 The Wing Commander attended a conference with Lt Gen Throckmorton to discuss the use of Air National Guard personnel. Col McMath explained the Combat Support Squadrons were not combat units as he might expect, but rather housekeeping units. It was also pointed out that the two medical units were not being utilized. The General indicated deactivation of the Air Guard units with the exception of the previously selected units was being considered.

90

1300 Services of medical personnel were for the second time volunteered to Selfridge AFB and local hospitals, but were not needed. They were then dispatched to tour the riot area and provide assistance to Air Guard personnel if needed.

2600 93% of assigned personnel present for duty.

28 JULY

1600 During a press conference held at the Detroit Task Force Command Post, it was announced that 600 to 800 National Guard are being released from active duty.

1100 Lt Gen Throckmorton that his recommendation to deactivate Air Guard personnel had been forwarded to Washington.

1300 The Wing Staff determined that approximately 36 hours would be required to complete de-mobilization processing actions.

1400 Key personnel required for de-mobilization processing and other areas were excused from guard/riot duty.

1430 Wing Commander's request honored by Ford Motor Company to provide four station wagons to ease the transportation problem.

1500 Wing Commander was unable to receive any official confirmation that Air National Guard personnel would be released from active duty.

1700 94% assigned personnel present for duty.

29 JULY

0800 Six airmen dispatched to Selfridge AFB to ease their shortage of personnel in billeting and commissary functions.

1500 Official de-activation orders received effective 2359 30 July 1967.

EDST

1530 The Detroit Police Department was notified that effective 0730 on the 30 July the Air National Guard forces would be cut to less than 100 officers and men on each shift.

91

1600 Action was started to transfer the 110th and 191st Air Police personnel temporarily to the 127th Combat Support Squadron.

1615 Preparations were undertaken to start equipment turn-in and de-mobilization processing actions, effective 0800 30 July 1967 for those units and personnel affected.

1700 99% assigned personnel present for duty.

30 JULY

0730 Riot duty force was cut to 140 officers and men.

0800 Equipment turn-in and de-mobilization processing actions started.

1200 Wing Commander delivered photography requested by Senator Hart to the Detroit Mayor's Office.

1700 De-mobilization processing actions completed. 331 officers and men remained on extended active duty

STATISTICAL DATA  
25 - 30 JULY 1967

1. Personnel present for Duty: 

<u>Officers</u> 147	<u>Airmen</u> .1165	<u>Total</u> 1312	<u>% Assigned</u> 99%
------------------------	------------------------	----------------------	--------------------------
2. Total personnel deployed on riot duty - 850.
3. Aircraft Operations
  - a. Direct support of mission
    1. Sorties flown - 30.
    2. Flying hours - 37.7 UEAC (RF-84F/RB-57) Other - 10.0
  - b. Upgrade training and TAC Oplan 24
    1. RF-84F      sorties, 74;      Hours, 132
    2. T-33        sorties, 18;      Hours, 30.5
    3. C-47        sorties, 20;      Hours, 20.0
  - c. Film used - 3553 feet.
  - d. Prints produced - 10,819.
  - e. Aircraft in commission rate - 73%.

#### TROOP COMMANDER'S REPORT

93  
Shortly after it became apparent that ANG troops would be committed to riot duty in Detroit, the Commander of the 127th Combat Support Squadron was assigned as troop commander and ordered to train men for this new duty. Field equipment and weapons were issued.

An officer from the Wayne County Sheriff's office arrived minutes after a call to that office. He instructed the troops in various formations they might use in handling mobs. These personnel were given a quick course on the riot control use of bayonets and weapons. Instructions included packing and carrying of the equipment.

Training lasted from 1500 to about 1800 hours. The situation changed so fast that they were committed to riot duty before little more than this basic riot training could be completed.

All of the men had qualified with assigned weapons at annual field training which ended the first of July.

Air Policemen were armed with M-16 rifles. Other troops had M-1 carbines or 45 pistols. They were issued two clips of ammunition; those with M-16's received 60 rounds, those with carbines 40 rounds, and 14 rounds for those with the 45 pistols.

The first call was for 70 Air Police. This was soon increased by a call for the additional 218 trained personnel. A total of 288 men were assigned riot duty on 26 July.

After this first day, shifts averaged 220 men, with about 660 guardsmen rotated on riot duty. A total of 860 men received riot duty experience through changes in shift arrangements and assignments. Volunteers were plentiful.

Generally the riot troops were assigned to the Detroit Police Department and worked with the Department during the period of active duty.

While the men were receiving riot training, the Troop Commander set up a command post in Police Headquarters in a room near the Task Force Commander. He had two desks crowded in a room already in use by the police. For communication he had one police net telephone and one outside line telephone. There were other phones nearby if needed.

The Police Department gave him a list of 11 main areas they wanted the ANG personnel to guard. Most of these were in the downtown area and included the Police Station, Police radio communications centers, hospitals, stores, power sub stations, fire stations, telephone centers, and similar places. These posts were covered by guardsmen other than Air Police.

The Air Police were assigned to ride in police patrol cars and occasionally they were assigned as guards during transport of prisoners. More than 4,000 persons were arrested during the riots. Some were taken to confinement locations 30 to 60 miles away. The Air Police on bus transport guard duty were accompanied by Detroit Policemen. 94

Air Police were assigned to patrol cars in groups of two or three per car. Each car always had four men including one or more Detroit policemen. Their job was to hunt snipers and generally keep order in the riot areas.

The first ANG 288 man force was on duty by 2200 hours 26 July. This first tour required that these men work a minimum of 26 hours straight. They had reported for work at the base at 0730, went on duty at 2200 hours and finished their duty at 100 hours the next day. After this first day, shifts became 12 hours on and 24 hours off. But this totaled to about a 14 to 15 hour duty tour, considering time to get them on post and back to the air base. They then dispersed to their homes for rest. Quarters had been set up for those beyond commuting distance.

Officers and airmen reported to the air base and were transported downtown on city buses, accompanied by Detroit Police. One of the first buses deployed received hits in the windows by sniper fire, but there were no injuries.

Air Guard vehicles were also used for transportation so that men could be taken directly to their posts in order to save time.

The first troops were supplied with in-flight ration packets which had been flown in from Wurtsmith AFB. Food was no major problem because civilians in the area usually provided the men with meals. Those in isolated posts continued to use the package rations.

After a confusing first day, the riot duty detachment assumed the following routine:

- a. The command post was manned by a Commander, administrative airman, and clerk, usually supplemented by a deputy commander.
- b. The AP's were assigned to patrol cars at police headquarters and reported directly there for duty.
- c. Those in the perimeter guard areas were driven directly to and from their posts and were always assigned to posts in pairs. As an example; the downtown main hospital was guarded by 20 men with posts outside the building and men assigned to each floor to guard wounded prisoners.

- e. Guardsmen had the telephone number of the Command Post with orders to phone in any unusual circumstance and to report every two hours if not contacted by a patrol.

The Task Force Commander ordered a flash telephone report on any use of firearms by Guardsmen. Only two reported firing their weapons and there were three reports of Air Guard personnel being fired upon.

- a. One guardsman fired two shots in returning sniper fire.
- b. Another fired at an escaping prisoner, who was captured uninjured.
- c. Four men posted atop one of Detroit's tallest buildings reported they had been fired at, but did not return the fire. Their job was to keep snipers off the roofs of other buildings.
- d. Another pair of men reported persons in a speeding car had fired at them.
- e. There were no injuries reported.

On 29 July the police department modified the ladies bath house on Belle Isle, a recreation area in the Detroit River near downtown, as a prison. The ANG was assigned guard duty during the transporting of prisoners to this confinement area and maintaining security thereafter. More than 500 prisoners who had been confined in buses for two or three days, were moved to the island in these city buses and a force of 30 guardsmen assigned to guard them on each shift.

The main force of the Michigan ANG was de-activated 30 July, leaving a total of 331 men assigned for riot duty. They were split into shifts and continued the work with the police at a reduced level.

On 2 August the remaining guardsmen were taken from riot duty, returning to State Control before final official release at midnight.

## PERSONNEL SIDELIGHTS

The sudden call to active duty for the Michigan ANG found the guardsmen scattered throughout the United States. On the first day civilian planes brought men to Detroit from as far away as California, Florida and New York. 96

One airman was located by the Colorado Road Patrol camping with his wife of only three days. He had been married on Saturday and was on his honeymoon. The couple boarded a plane and he was on duty two days after the call up.

A pilot who in civilian life flies for Pan American World Airways was on a route from Chicago to Detroit to London. During the stopover in Detroit he called the base and learned for the first time of ANG federalization. He reported for duty and PanAm flew in a replacement.

An airman assigned to guard the Detroit Edison Building surprised onlookers when he suddenly challenged an attractive woman entering the building for work. Then he grabbed her and kissed her. It was his wife whom he hadn't seen for two days.

Guards posted atop one of Detroit's tallest buildings to look for snipers reported that they were fired upon. They quickly made a realistic looking dummy and set it in the guard position hoping to draw more fire. However, the sniper didn't fire again.

A sergeant was assigned to guard a fire station only three blocks from his home. He called his wife to tell her where he was located. She found out how many men were with him and that night showed up with a roast beef dinner for the guardsmen and firemen.

The improvised jail in the women's bath house on Belle Isle quickly was dubbed the "Ritz Hotel" by prisoners, and "Bellcatraz" by the guards. Most of the prisoners had been confined in buses for two or three days. In their new jail they had showers and were provided three meals a day.

The compound with more than 500 prisoners was guarded by ANG personnel on walls, roofs, and temporary towers. They reported that the prisoners, mostly Negro, spent most of the night singing spirituals.

An airman assigned to guard part of one of Detroit's biggest department stores didn't have any trouble with rioters, but did capture a thief who had stolen a ham from the store.

In a bus loaded with guardsmen and headed for riot duty a sergeant asked for three volunteers to look for snipers. Every man volunteered. The three guardsmen with the highest scores in weapon qualification at Field Training were selected after considerable discussion.

## ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM AREAS

- 97 1. PROBLEM: The mission (riot control duty) was not specified at time of mobilization.

DISCUSSION: The initial call up did not indicate that the 127 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was to function in any capacity other than its normal mission of aerial reconnaissance. Actually we were told later that our sole reason for activation was to assist in riot control and in the restoration of law and order in the greater metropolitan Detroit area. The unit could have responded much sooner and more effectively had we known this was our primary reason for being mobilized. Thirty-three hours elapsed before we were told that our basic mission was riot control.

SOLUTION: If deemed necessary for controlling civil disorders, have Air Guard units be prepared to assist in this type duty, plus insuring the initial phone calls and TWX's spell out the reason for mobilization very clearly.

2. PROBLEM: Air National Guard personnel did not know U.S. Army Command structure and nomenclature and vice versa.

DISCUSSION: We were mobilized directly under the command of Lt Gen Throckmorton (U.S. Army). Although we have annual training lectures on joint Army and Air Force operations, this training was insufficient when we were employed as a regular ground (army) unit. We should have been able to work with all echelons of command within Army structure and coordinate with our counter parts in Army units.

SOLUTION: Have more comprehensive lectures conducted by Army Guard Officers and/or Army Guard Advisors. In return, have our Air Guard Officers give the Army cross training on our structure and methods of operation.

3. PROBLEM: Contact with key personnel.

DISCUSSION: In a fast moving situation such as Detroit's civil disorder, with scores of communications contacts to make, it sometimes became difficult to locate key personnel (i.e. Task Force Commander, G-3, Wing Commander, etc.). There should always be a method of communication with these key personnel.

SOLUTION: Equip all key personnel with a walkie talkie. He can then receive and send messages to his command post. Or at least a radio unit that can alert key personnel on command to call the command post. Because of phone lines being tied up or possibly being damaged, the two way radio is best.

4. PROBLEM: Inadequate transportation.

DISCUSSION: Transportation to and from riot control duty stations for 220 personnel was a problem area. Transportation assigned this base is inadequate for the riot control mission. Our transportation resources are allotted to support a two group reconnaissance operation at this base. Commercial bus transportation was arranged for our troop moves by the Detroit Police Department. There were lengthy delays due to the number and dispersal of locations which our personnel were manning.

SOLUTION: Preplan utilization of available transport by possible missions assigned and prearrange for vehicle rentals by GS contract, as required.

5. PROBLEM: Employer's policies and reactions to recall of employees.

DISCUSSION: Their employees call to duty revealed a wide range of employers policies concerning their personnel being placed on extended active duty. Attempts were made through the personal plea of the Wing Commander for employers to give differential pay to our airmen personnel during their tour of duty. Reaction and policy varied from 100% to zero cooperation.

SOLUTION: The Department of Defense through the National Guard Bureau take immediate necessary action to educate employers in a better community relations program, specifying limits and applicable federal laws while encouraging maximum cooperation to lessen loss of income to guardsmen and reservists.

6. PROBLEM: News releases of de-activation.

DISCUSSION: News releases over radio, television and in local newspapers indicated the Air National Guard forces were being de-activated more than 24 hours before any notification was given the Air Guard Commander. This resulted in some confusion and a multitude of telephone queries.

SOLUTION: Insure the Air Guard Commander is notified prior to news releases.

7. PROBLEM: Individual Field Equipment

99 DISCUSSION: All 795 sets of field equipment, excluding weapons and ammo, were packed in kit bags for mobilization deployment. Not knowing what duties or facilities would be assigned, and because of the time allotted, all items in one bag were issued to individuals. The extreme weather clothing bag was not issued. Actual assignments proved no need for shelter halves, mosquito net, sleeping bag, etc.. Insufficient quantity of bayonets were on hand. The rain jackets on hand as substitute for ponchos were impractical for riot duty.

SOLUTION: If future federalization can be expected for civil disorder control, field equipment must be more readily accessible in the quantity and configuration required. Bayonets and ponchos are a necessity.

8. PROBLEM: Funding and federalization orders for pay purposes.

DISCUSSION: Finance regulations cover paying on orders which normally indicate a call to active duty for specific periods. The mobilization orders did not so specify which complicated all financial matters, and emergency procurement of supplies had to be based on unknown period of need. Immediately after the Wing received call up orders, the USP&FO of Michigan withdrew all ANG base funds without our receiving support funding or guidance from other sources. (USAF). Later this withdrawal was recinded and other funding arrangements made which were in some ways detrimental to our Detroit ANG Base FY 1968 financial plan. Many other problems arose as to legalities and proper payments to be made under this special call up or situation, especially in the personnel pay and travel authorization plus number of days active duty pay when traveling to home of record over 350 miles etc.. As the situation now stands under our specific type of call up one regulation counteracts another. Even our gaining USAF Command and paying finance agency cannot agree.

SOLUTION: Have the proper agency at the highest level of USAF Command write and disseminate special instructions for civil disorder (riot or insurrection) duty call up specifying exact pay authorizations and limitations.

9. PROBLEM: Troop subsistence

DISCUSSION: Several factors adversely affected troop subsistence. The speed of the call up prevented timely ration draw from Selfridge AFB Commissary and no standby package rations were on hand. Although some emergency local purchases were made, panics had cleaned nearby markets of staple items. The dining hall and kitchen equipment was adequate for one meal a day four times a month on normal UTA status, but was inadequate for 24 hour operation with approximately 1200 troops subsistive. The apparent misunderstanding of the Task Force Commander which put the mess officer and half of the Food Service personnel on riot duty added to the difficulty in feeding troops on base. The funding for emergency purchase of subsistence was in doubt till TAC clarified

the problem later. No field ranges or like equipment was on hand although all troops had mess kits issued.

SOLUTION: Standby emergency packaged rations for one or two days issue should be on hand till commissary ration draw can become effective. Food Service personnel must be assigned correctly. If troops are to be fed in the field for riot control duty, either such field kitchen equipment must be authorized or the troops should be attached to any available Army Field Kitchen for rations.

100

10. PROBLEM: Mobilization/De-Mobilization Processing. Orders calling personnel to active duty normally specify a period of such duty. The mobilization orders received did not so specify and considerable confusion was caused in publishing correct and comprehensive orders at Wing level.

DISCUSSION: Due to the problem above, normal mobilization/de-mobilization procedures were not necessary or required by our USAF gaining command. This leaves what is, or is not required, up to interpretation by various personnel in our gaining command who are not fully acquainted with Reserve Forces governing regulations and laws. No clear cut guidance covering all situations was received so that mobilization orders could be cut without amendments, and amendments to the amendments. Changes were made daily as to how orders should or should not read.

A good example of a de-mobilization problem is the fact that personnel were taken off federal duty at 1200 hours by order of the Department of the Army in Washington while still on duty in downtown Detroit by order of the Task Force Commander. These personnel still had to be relieved from their posts, returned to the air base, process out, and return to their homes. What status would they have been in if killed or injured? How do you publish de-mobilization orders in this instance?

SOLUTION: Positive pre-determined rules and regulations be formulated by the highest gaining command to cover mobilization/de-mobilization for this type of duty.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

101

OPERATIONAL REPORT--LESSONS LEARNED  
ACofS, G4  
TASK FORCE DETROIT

SECTION I. Logistic Organization and Operations, 240600 July  
Through 022239 August 1967.

1. Record of Significant Events.

a. Predeployment. GARDEN PLOT alert notification was received by ACofS, G4 at 0600 hours, 24 July 1967. By 0850 hours initial contact had been made with Selfridge Air Force Base (SAFB) in anticipation of deployment. Decision to deploy to SAFB was announced at 1115 hours; G4 component of tactical CP to be ACofS, G4, Operations Officer, Transportation Officer and Sergeant Major. At 1140 hours DCSLOC, Headquarters Fifth US Army was advised of TF requirement for transportation, purchasing and contracting and real estate services. Fifth Army advised that a liaison team was enroute to SAFB. ACofS, G4, announced composition of follow-on G4 element, to be deployed if required.

b. Deployment. Tactical CP departed Pope AFB at 1240 hours and arrived at SAFB 1500 hours 24 July. Troop carrying aircraft began lift of 82d (3d Bde and elements of Div HQ) at 1400 hours. Departure Airfield Control Group operations were to be handled by the 82d Abn Div until departure of the divisional elements and then transferred to the 189th Maintenance Battalion of the 12th Support Brigade. G4 follow-on element alerted at 1730 hours and departed Pope AFB at 2020 hours 24 July.

c. Employment. On arrival at SAFB, ACofS, G4, met with Headquarters US Fifth Army Liaison Group and discussed ground rules governing logistic support of TF DETROIT. Subsequent to accomplishment of normal activities associated with CP establishment, a meeting was held at 2100 hours with representatives of the Fifth Army Liaison Group, 82d Airborne Division G4, 46th Infantry Division G4, and base support personnel from SAFB and logistics policies and procedures announced. This was the first of the daily logistics meetings which continued for the duration of the operation. At 0140 hours, 25 July, a request was placed on the DA AOC for the introduction of certain nondivisional combat service support units

G-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

102

into the area of operations; troop list for operation had contemplated only use of divisional CSS organizations. At 0205 hours DA was requested to assign a requisition Project Code for the operation. Courier Service between Ft Bragg, Ft Campbell and the area of operations was requested at 1948 hours, 25 July. On 26 July, at 0900 hours, Administrative Order Number 1 was published. This order outlined policies and procedures to be used to obtain logistic support. By 1610 hours, 26 July, additional CSS units had been programmed for movement into the area of operations. Use of Project Code NAA for support of TF DETROIT was approved on 26 July. The Commanding Officer of the 43d General Support Group arrived at 0300 hours, 27 July, and by 1530 of the same day the remainder of the nondivisional combat service support units had closed and commenced support operations. These units were: the 364th Supply and Service Co (DS) (-), the 99th TC Detachment (Movement Control), the 571st Ord Ammo Co (-), and the 352d Transportation Co (Lt Trk). In anticipation of early redeployment, a meeting was held at 2000 hours in the TF Main CP to obtain movement data from units needed to determine aircraft requirements. Combat service support unit activities on this date consisted of dispatch of maintenance contact teams to the 46th Infantry Division and TF 82; attachment of one light truck squad to the TF 82; unit distribution of rations to 46th Infantry Division by nondivisional CSS unit vehicles; and preparations being made to relieve Air Force Commissary of ration breakdown responsibility. Subsequent to 28 July, logistical support requirements stabilized into a routine and major activity centered around redeployment of the Force.

d. Redeployment. As stated above, redeployment planning commenced on the 27th of July under the impetus of possible short notice redeployment of the 101st's 2d Brigade. DACG operations were to be executed by the 43d Group, who initially delegated the task to the 571st Ordnance Ammunition Company; however, this assignment was redelegated because of the deployment of Ft Campbell units on 1 August. Prior to redeployment each unit was required to turn in hand receipt and rental property; return loose ammunition to the supply point and draw amounts required to replenish basic load; draw three days operational rations and advise of desired termination date of contract services. Personnel to support redeployment activities were provided by the 43d General Support Group. Redeployment operations for all units with home station Ft Campbell were completed on 1 August; Ft Bragg

G-2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

23

and STRATCOM elements redeployed on 2 August; and Ft Carson organizations completed redeployment on 4 August.

2. Logistics Mission of ACofS, G4, TF DETROIT. Obtain required supplies, equipment and services needed to sustain tactical operations directed by the CG, TF DETROIT.

3. Method of Mission Execution.

a. General. Primary responsibility for the overall logistical support of TF DETROIT was given to the CG, US Fifth Army and was executed through the Fifth Army Liaison Office collocated with the ACofS, G4, TF DETROIT. All approved logistic support requirements originating from TF DETROIT units were forwarded to the ACofS, G4, TF DETROIT, who within available resources satisfied the requirement, or if force resources were inadequate to meet the need, requested assistance from the Fifth Army Liaison Office. Depending upon the nature of the requirement, the Fifth Army Liaison Office took one, or a combination of, the following courses of action: obtain item or service from Selfridge AFB; place requirement on US Army Materiel Command; request issue from either Fifth Army or CONARC assets; or locally procure or lease the item through the SAFB procurement office. Control over requirements was exercised by having all requests from units screened and approved by ACofS, G4, prior to action being taken by Fifth Army Liaison Office. The key to the success of the logistical support effort, however, was the daily logistics meeting held with all using units and the SAFB support personnel by the ACofS, G4. All logistics support problems were discussed and the majority solved during the course of the meeting or at least by the end of the day.

b. Specific Procedures Used to Obtain Materiel and Services.

(1) Materiel.

(a) Class I. Units deployed with 3 days operational rations. However, by the second day of the operation, 25 July, "A" rations were available to the entire force, including the 46th Infantry Division. Initially, rations were broken down for major units by the Selfridge AFB Commissary and picked up by the units. However, upon the arrival of combat service support elements a system was implemented whereby the 43d Group operated the ration breakdown point and delivered rations to the major units.

G- 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

104

(b) Class II and IV (Repair Parts). Regular Army units deployed with 15 days PLL items in accordance with CONARC Pam 700-1. Therefore, no major problems were experienced by these units. However, a large number of requisitions were placed by the 46th Infantry Division. Requisitions were placed on AMC and filled on a high priority basis. Processing of the requisitions was accomplished at the Fifth Army Forward Support Center at SAFB. Some repair parts assistance was also provided by the 67th Maintenance Co (DS).

(c) Class II and IV (Other than Repair Parts). Establishment of the courier service between Ft Bragg, Ft Campbell and SAFB enabled the Regular Army units to obtain additional TOE items required to support their operations. The 46th Infantry Division, because of the circumstances under which they were employed and the divided equipment authorizations (SRF vs non-SRF) under which they are organized, required emergency action to obtain the following items of equipment: Xenon searchlights for six tanks; approximately 4,000 each sets of fatigues, blankets and air mattresses; 200 each M1 rifles; and, later cancelled, 3 suits of protective clothing for chemical handlers, and 6,000 sets of body armor. In all of the above cases response by AMC was positive and immediate.

(d) Class III and IIIa (POL). Regular Army units deployed with vehicle tanks three quarters full plus vehicle mounted 5 gallon gasoline cans. The bulk of the POL was delivered to major unit areas by contractors. JP-4 for Army aircraft was provided by Selfridge AFB. AVGAS for 46th Infantry Division Aircraft was procured from vendors at the Detroit City Airport. Vehicle gasoline for units stationed at SAFB was provided by SAFB. Diesel fuel was obtained through contract action. No major problems were experienced in obtaining POL.

(e) Class V. Regular Army units deployed with basic load of ammunition. Expenditures, 206 rounds, created no supply problem. However, upon redeployment, it was necessary to collect and turn in ammunition which had been distributed to individuals. Concurrently, an attempt was made to replenish the basic load from stocks at SAFB under Fifth Army Control. In some instances the total requirement for packaged ammunition could not be met. Heavy ammunition expenditures by the 46th Infantry Division at the outset of the operation necessitated immediate action to obtain additional

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

25 rifle, machine gun (caliber 30 and 50), pistol, carbine and chemical ammunition. Replenishment was obtained, for the most part, from installation stocks within the Fifth Army Area. In addition, an approved requirement for 50,000 rounds of carbine ammunition was placed by the Michigan State Police. Twenty thousand rounds were issued and the remainder withheld.

(f) Ice, bread and milk. Deliveries of ice, milk and bread were made to units by local contractors. Initially, deliveries of ice to the 46th Infantry Division were heavy because of its use to refrigerate perishable subsistence; however, arrangements made for positioning of mobile refrigerator trucks in the 46th Infantry Division Area reduced this requirement.

**(2) Services.**

(a) Maintenance. Direct support maintenance in the area of operations was provided by the 46th Infantry Division Maintenance Battalion, a support platoon from the 782d Maintenance Battalion, the support platoon from the 801st Maintenance Battalion and a platoon from the 67th Maintenance Company. Additionally, in order to mount the Xenon searchlights on the tanks of the 46th Infantry Division, the US Army Tank Automotive Center made its facilities and personnel available to the force. Contact teams from the 67th Maintenance Company were, upon their arrival in the area of operations, dispatched to both TF 82 and the 46th Infantry Division. Wrecker support to the 67th Maintenance Co was provided by ATAC who furnished both the wrecker and the operator.

(b) Laundry. Without doubt the most irritatingly persistent logistics problem encountered by the force was that of establishing and maintaining a satisfactory and responsive laundry service. At the time the additional combat service support units were being requested, it had been determined that the Supply and Service Units being considered had no laundry equipment. Therefore, laundry service for the force was exclusively contractor provided. However, the only available contractors were, essentially, operators of small, neighborhood laundries and were not prepared to give one-day service on fatigues to 5,000 man increments of the force. After numerous attempts to solve the problem by using three contractors, SAFB procurement personnel permitted major subordinate commanders to select laundries in their areas on the basis of need, subject to ACOFS, G4, approval.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

(c) Refrigerator Service. The use of contract mobile refrigerators and vans enabled the major units of the force deployed in the downtown Detroit area and the ration breakdown point operated by the 43d GS Group to store perishable items of subsistence.

106

(d) Real Estate and Buildings. Five Detroit city schools, the Michigan State Fairgrounds and Chandler Park were leased through the District Office of the Army Engineers. Additionally, when the Tactical Operations Center of the Task Force relocated to the Detroit Police Station, land to the rear of the police station was leased and two office trailers rented. At the same time seventy-five hotel rooms were rented for billets for the TOC personnel.

(e) Medical. Initially, on 24 July the message from TF DETROIT, which requested additional combat service support units, included a requirement for a medical evacuation hospital to supplement divisional medical support. However, this requirement was cancelled when it was learned that the following hospital facilities had been made available to the force:

Selfridge AFB Hospital	40 beds
Dearborn VA Hospital	100 beds
Saginaw VA Hospital	100 beds
AnnArbor VA Hospital	100 beds
Public Health Hospital at Windmill Point	
Great Lakes Naval Hospital	25 beds
Scott Air Force Hospital	25 beds
Wright-Patterson AF Hospital	25 beds
Chanute AF Hospital	25 beds

Dispensary service for force elements located at SAFB was also provided by the Selfridge AF Hospital. Finally, a helicopter evacuation service was established to assure expeditious movement of casualties and patients to the Selfridge Hospital.

(f) Waste and Trash Disposal. Extensive use was made of leased chemical toilets in those locations where normal facilities were not available or where field techniques would be inappropriate. Trash and garbage disposal in the downtown area was handled by Dempster Dumpsters spotted in strategic locations by the City of Detroit. Units at SAFB were provided this service by the base.

G-6

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

107

(g) Transportation.

1. Surface. Twelve automobiles were rented to provide transportation to the Commanding General and the key members of his staff. Major troop movements were accomplished through the use of 87 leased Detroit street railway busses supplemented by organic unit transportation. The 352d Transportation Corps Light Truck Company, had the operation continued, would have become the primary source of movement for both distribution of supplies and lift of personnel in the area. Movement control over military vehicle assets was exercised by the 99th Transportation Detachment (Team LA, Movement Control).

2. Air Movement Control. A daily courier service was established between Ft Bragg, Ft Campbell and SAFF for the purpose of establishing controlled movement of personnel and unit TOE equipment. Regulation of this service was accomplished by the ACofS, G1, for personnel and the ACofS, G4, for movement of cargo. Manifesting of all personnel and cargo to be lifted at either end of the flight was undertaken by the 43d Group (99th TC Det) as approved by these staff sections. Control over the redeployment of the force was managed by a Departure Area Control Group operated by the 43d Group and supervised by ACofS, G4, personnel.

4. Conclusions. There were no logistical problems to which solutions could not be found by utilization of resources available to the TF DETROIT.

G-7

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**OPERATIONAL REPORT--LESSONS LEARNED  
ACofS, G4  
TASK FORCE DETROIT**

108

**SECTION II. Lessons Learned.**

**1. Army Area Liaison Team Management of Logistical Support.**

a. Observation: Use of 5th Army Liaison team during Operation GARDEN PLOT was extremely successful and provided a focal point of contact for ACofS, G4, TF DETROIT with all agencies supporting the force.

b. Lessons Learned: Continued use of Army Area Liaison Teams should be encouraged when Army Forces are employed on operations such as GARDEN PLOT.

**2. Attachment of Combat Service Support Units to force packages consisting largely of Airborne Combat Elements.**

a. Observation: GARDEN PLOT operation troop list did not envision nondivisional or divisional combat service support units. Therefore, because of requirements for transportation, distribution of supplies and, especially direct support maintenances, additional units were required.

b. Lessons Learned: Forces of brigade strength or greater require attachment of nondivisional combat support elements when dispatched to GARDEN PLOT operations.

**3. Local procurement activity during operations similar to GARDEN PLOT.**

a. Observation: Operations in metropolitan areas impose special requirements on logistics support which do not arise in so-called "field operations." GARDEN PLOT required numerous items which are not included in organizational TOE property. 5th Army Procurement Officer purchased/leased such items as commercial sedans, ice, office trailers, lease of buildings, portable toilets and mobile refrigerators.

b. Lessons Learned: Local procurement capability is essential to GARDEN PLOT type operations; however, facilities

G-8

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

109 of General Services Administration (GSA) Office in Detroit could have been tested as a possible source of demand satisfaction for commercial-use items.

4. Logistic Support of Federalized National Guard forces during contingency operations.

a. Observation: Operation GARDEN PLOT required HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps to assume logistic support responsibilities for the 46th Infantry Division of Michigan National Guard. Experience was valuable to ACofS, G4, organization in gaining some insight into practical and organizational differences between active Army and National Guard logistics support concepts.

b. Lessons Learned: CPX and FTX based upon GARDEN PLOT type operations should inject play which requires use of Reserve Component Forces.

5. Interservice Support during GARDEN PLOT type contingencies.

a. Observation: During operation GARDEN PLOT, Selfridge AFB was used as the logistics support base. Local procurements, receipt, storage and issues of rations, POL, and housekeeping activities were provided by the base. This additional unprogrammed burden was successfully assumed and handled in an outstanding manner.

b. Lessons Learned: Where facilities exist and proximity permits, there should be no hesitation in selecting facilities of other services as logistics bases.

6. Training of National Guard personnel in US Army supply procedures:

a. Observation: During Operation GARDEN PLOT the federalization of the 46th Infantry Division brought out the fact that, generally, National Guard personnel were unfamiliar with Army supply procedures. It was necessary to send AMC customer assistance liaison teams to the 46th Infantry Division for the purpose of providing on-the-spot assistance in the preparation of requisitions.

b. Lessons Learned: National Guard supply personnel should be given instruction and assistance from USAMC Customer

G-9

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Assistance Liaison Teams during their drill periods and annual field training in standard Army methods of supply. 110

**7. Advance liaison party for GARDEN PLOT type operations.**

a. Observation: During Operation GARDEN PLOT the Task Force DETROIT Commander and his principal staff arrived in the area of operations at approximately 1400 hours. Within an hour thereafter the troop units, which had been air-lifted from home stations, began to arrive. Despite some preparations having been made to receive the troops by the Headquarters, United States Fifth Army Liaison Team and 28th Artillery Group Personnel at Selfridge Air Force Base, there was insufficient time to satisfactorily conduct arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG) Operations.

b. Lessons Learned: Consideration should be given to including in the basic GARDEN PLOT OPLAN a requirement for the dispatch of a small arrival airfield control group so as to arrive in the area of operations at least three hours prior to the arrival of major troop units.

**8. Utilization of locally available resources.**

a. Observation: Although local resources were utilized during Operation GARDEN PLOT, the concept should be maximized and extended by developing a dossier of available logistical support within each area of probable employment. (The local city telephone directory is the best source document on which to base the dossier and determine availability.) Preplanning would allow maximum utilization of local resources by matching availability against requirements during the planning stages by either requesting availability in advance or establishing a requirement/solution within the plan.

b. Lesson Learned: The majority of required logistical support for a civil disturbance operation such as GARDEN PLOT can be provided from local resources, and this support would be greatly facilitated if planned for in advance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AFTER ACTION REPORT

111

1. Establishment of TF Detroit Communications System.

a. At 1500 hours 24 July 1967, the advance element of Headquarters, XVIII Abn Corps arrived at Selfridge AFB, Michigan. Minimal communications equipment accompanied the advance element and no prior provisions had been made to include required communications support. After an on-the-spot evaluation, members of the Corps Signal Section analyzed requirements and at 242010 July 1967 requested 19 aircraft to transport required support elements of the 50th Sig Bn (AbnC) to Selfridge AFB, Michigan. Thirteen(13) of these aircraft closed Selfridge AFB at 251145 July 1967; however, the additional six(6) aircraft had to be requested a second time and did not arrive at Selfridge AFB until 261345 July 1967.

b. The 107th Sig Bn, 46th Inf Div arrived in the objective area at 251700Q and established command and control communications by 261200Q. Commercial telephone was the primary means of communications for the 46th Inf NG Div during the initial operations.

c. The 82nd Sig Bn (Abn Div) (-), 82nd Abn Div closed into the objective area by 252400Q and established command and control communications via FM and HF/SSB radios. Only limited telephone communication equipment accompanied the 82nd and 101st elements. This was due to a limited number of aircraft. No VHF radio relay equipment was programmed into the objective area. Telephone service was provided down to infantry battalion through commercial means.

d. TF Detroit Communications System was established as follows:

(1) 82nd Abn Div: A communications team from the 50th Sig Bn (AbnC) was dispatched from Selfridge AFB on the afternoon of 25 July 1967 and established the following communications at the times indicated:

FM Cmd Net #1	251705Q
HF/SSB Cmd Net #2	251705Q
HF/SSB Cmd Msg Net #3 (RTT)	252340Q
VHF Radio Relay System	252010Q
Teletype Circuit	252100Q

(2) 46th Inf Div (NG): A communications team from the 50th Sig Bn (AbnC) was dispatched to the 46th Inf Div (NG) the afternoon of 25 July 1967 and established the following communications:

H-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

FM Cmd Net #1	251709Q
HF/SSB Cmd Net #2	251709Q
HF/SSB Cmd Msg Net #3 (RTT)	251940Q
VHF Radio Relay System	252310Q
Teletype Circuit	300900Q

112

(3) TF DETROIT MAIN was established at Selfridge AFB on the afternoon of 25 July 1967 by the 50th Signal Bn (AbnC) as follows:

Commercial Telephone	251800Q
FM Cmd Net #1	251705Q
HF/SSB Cmd Net #2	251705Q
HF/SSB Cmd Msg Net #3 (RTT)	251940Q
VHF Radio Relay System to TF	
Detroit TAC CP	252100Q
VHF Radio Relay System to 46th	
Inf Div (NG)	252310Q
VHF Radio Relay System to 82nd	
Abn Div	252010Q
Comm/Center Operational	252100Q
Switchboard Operational	251600Q

(4) TF DETROIT TAC: A communications team from the 50th Sig Bn (AbnC) was dispatched from Selfridge AFB on the afternoon of 25 July 1967 and established the following communications at the times indicated:

FM Cmd Net #1	251711Q
HF/SSB Cmd Net #2	251711Q
HF/SSB Cmd Msg Net #3 (RTT)	252300Q
VHF Radio Relay System	252200Q
Comm/Center Operational	252100Q
Switchboard Operational	252100Q

e. Michigan Bell telephone company and Selfridge AFB provided outstanding communication support and service and completed the installation of all initially requested communications in a 24 hour period. This included service for the 82nd Abn Div and the 46th Inf Div (NG). Base and commercial telephone personnel were notified by the Corps Signal Section at Fort Bragg two hours before the advance party arrived that communications support would be required. These personnel met the advance party at plane side and installed a total of 192 locals, 10 AUTOVON, and 12 long haul circuits.

f. The DCA/USTRATCOMM personnel and equipment assembled at Selfridge AFB on 24 and 25 July 1967 with the last section arriving at 281000 July. These personnel provided terminating facilities for two(2) secure TTY circuits to DA AOC and emergency HF/ISB radio system to Ft Detrick, MD.

H-2

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

113

g. The USAF C-130 "Talking Bird" from 5th MOB Comm Gp arrived at Selfridge AFB at approximately 241500 July and established secure TTY system to Ft Detrick, MD at approximately 242000 July 1967.

h. The TF Detroit Communications Center facilities transmitted 478 and received 490 messages. Messenger vehicles traveled 7398 miles providing courier service.

**2. General Comments and Conclusions.**

a. Limitation on Airlift sorties restricted the amount of communications-electronics equipment delivered into the objective area. Initially, the primary means of communications was FM radio and commercial telephones. After arrival of the major combat forces, heavier type communications equipment was programmed into the objective area for establishment of normal tactical communication systems. Although commercial facilities were working well, it was considered essential to establish a tactical system as a safeguard against possible loss of commercial facilities.

b. With the initial limitation of Airlift sorties for communications equipment, maximum utilization was made of the supporting military base (Selfridge AFB) communications systems and commercial communications. For timely support in this area, communication support requirements must be forward to supporting agencies as soon as possible, preferably by personal liaison.

c. The supporting communications detachments, including USASTRAT-COM and the USAF C 130 "Talking Bird", arrived in the objective area with little or no coordination with HQ XVIII Abn Corps. Some delays and difficulties were encountered in the integration of communications established by these teams into TF Detroit communications systems. This was due to the poor liaison and coordination by supporting communications detachments.

d. No major problems were encountered in the area of frequency allocation or utilization, although several minor problems were encountered on frequency interference. This was due to the inadvertent assignment of the same frequency to two or more units, and was immediately corrected.

e. Major communications-electronics lessons learned during this operation are as follows:

(1) During the alert phase, communications-electronics liaison and coordination must be established with Department of the Army, Continental Army Headquarters in the objective area, supporting military base in objective area and commercial telephone company.

H-3

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

(2) Initially, adequate mobile type communications must accompany combat forces and major headquarters for establishment of Command Control Circuits within a built up area. Base radio stations must be established with mobile equipment, utilizing auxiliary antennas on rooftops. 114

(3) Communication Centers must integrate all available resources to include supporting facilities from higher headquarters, and weld these facilities into an effective communication complex.

(4) Messenger means of communication was extensively used throughout this operation and proved to be rapid and reliable.

(5) The communications center personnel received invaluable training in these areas:

(a) Refile procedures from a tactical communication center to the DCS.

(b) Utilization of various means for transmission of messages. This included TTY circuits, FM voice radio, HF/SSB voice radio. Secure HF/SSB RATT, Telephone and messenger.

(c) Establishment and utilization of relay facilities for tactical traffic.

(d) Integration of supporting communications systems.

(6) Communications to Department of the Army were established by USASTRATCOM detachments. The detachments and equipment were assembled from various installations and facilities throughout CONUS. Following are areas for improvement for these detachments.

(a) Establish and designate a controlling element for these detachments.

(b) Establish procedures to insure arrival of a complete communications system.

(c) Establish training for coordination of requirements for integration of STRATCOM Facilities into tactical systems.

(7) During the initial phase of this operation, commercial radio telephone sets into the Detroit telephone exchange could have provided invaluable means of communications for TF CG and key staff officers. This would have provided Department of the Army a means of contacting the TF CG while mobile.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

3. Recommendations:

115

a. That USASTRATCOM organize, establish and locate a contingency/riot control supporting communication unit at Ft Bragg, N. C. Specific recommendations on organization of this unit will be submitted separately.

b. That commercial radio telephone sets mounted in sedan or 1/4 ton trucks be made available for the CG and key staff officers.

c. That during the initial alert phase, supporting communication elements establish liaison with the controlling Task Force Headquarters.

H-5

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECTION I

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
G3, AVIATION DIVISION  
TASK FORCE DETROIT

117

Narrative Account: 24 July Through 2 August 1967.

a. Deployment.

(1) During the initial deployment of Task Force Detroit (24 July 1967) to support the GARDEN PLOT Operation, the 61st Aviation Company (Am1) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, provided 16 UH-1D aircraft to support the Task Force. An additional 12 UH-1D aircraft assembled from Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, and Fort Campbell were later attached to the 61st Aviation Company which gave it the capability to lift one Infantry Company.

(2) On 26 July 1967, the 61st Aviation Company received orders to return to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The 17th Aviation Company (Am1), Fort Riley, Kansas, selected to replace the 61st Aviation Company, closed Selfridge Air Force Base at 1800 hours, 27 July 1967 and was placed under operational control of CG, TF 82 as of 0600 28 July 1967. The departure of the 61st Aviation Company left 12 UH-1D aircraft in addition to the 27 brought by the 17th Aviation Company. Four of the 12 aircraft, specially equipped (2 CS and 2 C&C aircraft), were attached to the 17th Aviation Company for support of TF 82. The remaining eight UH-1D aircraft and two U-10A aircraft (loudspeaker equipped) were kept in general support of XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters and Task Force 46.

(3) When the decision is made to deploy an airmobile force to a city to support GARDEN PLOT Operations, the Aviation Officer of the Task Force should immediately get in touch with FAA representatives to coordinate restricted or prohibited airspace, special control features, and communications procedures. This will prevent small aircraft from interfering with airmobile operations.

b. Operation.

(1) With the advent of airmobile operations within and in close proximity to cities the size of Detroit, location of adequate and safe landing zones free of high voltage electrical wires and supporting poles in the vicinity of the selected objective will, in most cases, present a serious flying and safety hazard, especially since a large majority of the LZ's will of necessity have to be City Parks or Recreation Areas which contain many of the hazards mentioned above. Another factor to consider when conducting airmobile operations within and in close proximity to large cities with the objective to support GARDEN PLOT Operations is that the operation will, in most cases, be conducted at night and during the summer months.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(2) The use of Parks and Recreation Areas which are normally small and surrounded by numerous trees and installed power poles with electrical wires; coupled with high density altitude and the steep approach angle to these confined areas presents an acute problem to the operation from a flight safety standpoint. A possible solution to assisting the Aviation Unit Commander in preventing accidents as a result of these inherent hazards is for the supported commander to plan on not having more than two helicopters landing in an LZ at any given time. Additionally, pathfinders with required equipment should be included in the commander's plan in order to assist the airmobile force in landing safely in an LZ during day or night operations. Exceptions to the above would be an LZ which would permit a shallow approach angle and could support more than two helicopters landing at the same time during day operations.

(3) Aviation support rendered to TF 82 was limited and essentially consisted of reconnaissance missions, administrative support, and practice airmobile operations with and without troops to an objective area with no actual landings.

(4) Although no specific data pertaining to night airmobile operations within and in close proximity to large cities was collected, my conclusion is that they are practical up to a point, this point being where flying hazards and safety of flight become primary considerations and begin to outweigh the advantages of conducting an airmobile operation in support of GARDEN PLOT Operations.

c. Significant Achievements.

(1) The magnitude of the operation never progressed to a point where airmobile operations had to be employed. Consequently, no major significant achievements were recorded as a result of the deployment and use of Army Aviation support available.

(2) At the termination of the GARDEN PLOT Operation by TF Detroit, aviation support rendered to XVIII Abn Corps Headquarters, Task Force 82, and Task Force 46 were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>
XVIII Abn Corps	24 Jul-3 Aug 67	119.5	257	472	3,565	115
TF 82	24 Jul-3 Aug 67	447.3	484	886	54,300	0
XVIII Abn Corps U-10A	24 Jul-3 Aug 67	4.5	2	0	0	0

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

119

d. Aircraft Availability.

Aircraft availability averaged out to be approximately 95%, which is considered by established standards to be exceedingly high and an outstanding accomplishment with respect to maintenance support. A major contributing factor to this percentage is the fact that the unit was in a field posture and could devote full time to maintenance activities.

e. Redeployment.

(1) All aviation units in support of TF Detroit were released to proceed to home stations on 021030 August 1967. The 17th Aviation Company could not depart until 030400 August 1967 due to weather along route of flight and existing at destination.

(2) Final arrival reports on each unit indicate that each one conducted the return flights without any incident or accident.

1-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

SECTION II

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
G3, AVIATION DIVISION  
TASK FORCE DETROIT

120

**Lessons Learned.**

- a. Observation: Aviation units supporting TF Detroit were not trained to operate within and in close proximity to cities the size of Detroit.

Recommendation: That a program of instruction and training be established and included in ATP's for aviation units, so as to better prepare them to conduct safe and effective airmobile operations when in support of GARDEN PLOT Operations.

- b. Observation: Inadequate pathfinders available to support multiple landing zones during night airmobile operations.

Recommendation: Necessary pathfinders and equipment should be included in the ground commander's plan.

- c. Observation: No school trained Aviation Safety (not authorized under present TOE for G3) was present to evaluate incidents and accidents and conduct periodic surveys and inspections of landing zones and aviation operations.

Recommendation: For future operations, Fort Bragg Post Aviation Officer who is authorized two safety officers, one military and one civilian, will be asked to make one available.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

- 121
- d. Observation: XVIII Airborne Corps Aviation Office is inadequately staffed to maintain a garrison and field posture at the same time.

Recommendation: A study is presently being staffed in an effort to alleviate this situation.

- e. Observation: Piece-meal deployment of Army aviation elements left TF 82 without an experienced aviator on its staff.

Recommendation: That once the decision is made to commit troops in support of any operation that will be supported by Army aviation, an experienced Aviation Staff Officer be included on the troop list.

LAW AND ORDER IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

-----

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
A PROCLAMATION

123

WHEREAS the Governor of the State of Michigan has informed me that conditions of domestic violence and disorder exist in the City of Detroit in that State, obstructing the execution and enforcement of the laws, and that the law enforcement resources available to the City and State, including the National Guard, have been unable to suppress such acts of violence and to restore law and order; and

WHEREAS the Governor has requested me to use such of the armed forces of the United States as may be necessary for those purposes; and

WHEREAS such domestic violence and disorder are also obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States, including the protection of federal property in the City of Detroit;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, do command all persons engaged in such acts of violence to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-second.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

-----

124

PROVIDING FOR THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER

IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

WHEREAS on July 24, 1967, I issued Proclamation No. \_\_\_\_\_, pursuant in part to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code; and

WHEREAS the conditions of domestic violence and disorder described therein continue, and the persons engaging in such acts of violence have not dispersed;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to disperse all persons engaged in the acts of violence described in the proclamation and to restore law and order.

SECTION 2. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Armed Forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

SECTION 3. The Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized and directed to call into the active military service of the United States,

125 as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, any or all of the units of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard of the State of Michigan to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. Units, or members thereof, may be relieved subject to recall at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use units, and members thereof, called or recalled into the active military service of the United States pursuant to this section.

SECTION 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred upon him by this order.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 24, 1967.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY					
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
			X		
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE					
INFO				DTG	
<div style="position: relative; height: 300px;"> <span style="position: absolute; left: -40px; top: 20px; font-size: 24px;">129</span> <p>FROM: DA</p> <p>TO: RUCIFIA/COMMANDER SELFRIDGE AFB MICH</p> <p>INFO: RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE</p> <p>RUEOEIA/CGUSCONARC</p> <p>RUECFMA/CGUSATREE FT MCPHERSON GA</p> <p>RUWJLEA/CGUSAFIVE FTSHERIDAN ILL</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL DA 824979 from OPS OD RE</p> <p>SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction GARDEN PLOT 1-67</p> <p>1. Commander Selfridge AFB deliver immediately for action to LTG John L. Throckmorton, US Army, arriving Selfridge AFB about 241400 EDT 24 July 67.</p> <p>2. This letter of instruction is effective on receipt for planning and preparatory action. It is effective for execution only on order of Chief of Staff, US Army.</p> <p>3. You are designated commander of TF Detroit to restore and/ or maintain law and order in the Detroit, Michigan area in connec- tion with the current civil disturbance in Detroit, Michigan.</p> <p>Initial Army units for TF Detroit consist of one brigade, 82d Airborne Division and one brigade, 101st Airborne Division (both</p> </div>					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
					DATE
					TIME
					MONTH
					YEAR
					PAGE NO.
					NO. OF PAGES
					1
					5
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE TRUE COPY:		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	<i>Lex K. Skanchy</i> REX K. SKANCHY LTC GS			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
SECURITY			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY					

DD FORM 173  
1 NOV 63

K-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 59 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM:

DA

brigades presently enroute Selfridge AFB under OPGON CINCSTRIKE) and are hereby assigned TF Detroit on arrival Selfridge AFB. Be prepared to assume command of and employ additional active army units, and Michigan National Guard units which may be Federalized under Presidential authority.

a. In carrying out your duties, you will be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army. You will establish your command post initially at Selfridge AFB and report subsequent locations. You are authorized direct communication with Army, Air Force and Navy installation commanders in the vicinity of your operation;

b. In carrying out your assigned mission you will use minimum force. Desire for use of minimum force must not jeopardize successful completion of the mission. Accordingly, employment plans for use of troops in the Detroit, Michigan area must be responsive to an escalating situation.

c. Normally, application of force will follow this priority

- (1) Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed and sheathed.
- (2) Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed.
- (3) Riot control agent CS.
- (4) Loaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed.

d. Authority to order use of JS is delegated to you. You are not authorized to further delegate this authority.

e. Be prepared to receive assistance from certain active

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYMBOL	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
OPS OD 7E	2	5		

DD FORM 173-1

K-2

342573

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM:

DA

179

Army forces specifically designated to provide tactical, administrative, and logistical support.

f. Department of Justice (DJ) is responsible to advise on the over all political implications. DJ point of contact: Mr. McIntyre, will be located near or at your CP - exact location TBA. Presidential Representative on the scene is Cyrus R. Vance. You will be responsive to his instructions and inform me promptly of instructions received and actions taken in accordance therewith.

h. Should a situation arise necessitating the apprehension of civilian personnel, DJ personnel, possibly in collaboration with local and state police, will operate and maintain or provide for detention facilities. Whenever possible, in such event, US Marshals (or civilian police) should take civilian personnel (ring leaders, violators) into custody. When it becomes necessary for Army personnel to take this action they will immediately seek a US Marshal (or civil policeman) to take over such custody on the spot or at a detention center. In the event the number of civilian personnel taken into custody exceeds the capacity of DJ (or civil police) to detain them, your forces will provide temporary detention facilities until DJ (or civil police) can continue to receive them.

i. Searches of individuals or private property (including automobiles) may be conducted only after you have determined that such searches are reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of your mission. That determination must be based upon either a review of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYMBOL

OPS ON RE

PAGE  
NR

3

NR OF  
PAGES

5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1

K-3

147513

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	
FROM:		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
DA			
<p>the evidence forming the basis of the request for the search or your own preliminary investigation. Searches should be conducted by the following personnel in the order indicated, if available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Local law enforcement officials (municipal, country or state);</li> <li>(2) Representatives of the Department of Justice; or</li> <li>(3) Task Force personnel.</li> </ul> <p>j. You will cooperate with and assist the local law enforcement officers to assume their normal roles. In this regard you will not take orders from state and local civil authorities.</p> <p>k. Major General Carol C. Turner is designated as the personal liaison officer of the Chief of Staff and is available for such assistance and advice as you desire. Also, the following DA representatives have been provided to Major General Turner, as his liaison team:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Colonel G. R. Creel, Office Information representative, to guide public information effort.</li> <li>(2) Major Nolan, a representative of the Office, Chief of Communications - Electronics</li> <li>(3) Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Elliott, a representative of the Office of the Provost Marshal General.</li> <li>(4) Major R. N. Katayana, a Judge Advocate General representative, to oversee legal matters.</li> <li>(5) An Assistance Chief of Staff for Intelligence</li> </ul>		<div style="text-align: right;">130</div>	
SYMBOL		FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	
OPS OD RE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		INITIALS	

DD FORM 173-1

K-4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

From: DA		ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET		FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTIV.					
INFO					

representative, to coordinate intelligence matters, TBA.

(6) A Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics representative, to assist in real estate matters, TBA.

(7) Other representatives available upon request.

1. Major Nolan will establish communication facilities between your CP location and the Army Operations Center, Washington, DC. Direct communication with DA is authorized and directed.

m. You will ensure that DA is fully informed of operations through the submission of:

(1) Interim telephonic reports on major changes which warrant the immediate attention of Headquarters: DA.

(2) Written situation reports covering each 24-hour period, ending 1700 hours local time and transmitted to reach this headquarters by 0800Z hours the following day; (RCS CSGPO-285).

5. Special Instructions: TF Detroit units enroute Selfridge AFB will remain at Selfridge AFB until Chief of Staff, US Army directs execution of this operation.

6. Future teletype correspondence this operation will be prefaced by the words "TASK FORCE DETROIT".

7. Upon execution, this letter is regraded UNCLASSIFIED.

8. Acknowledge receipt of this letter to Duty Officer, Army Operations Center, Pentagon, Washington, DC.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TCO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
OPS OD RE		5	5	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS					

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.  
K-5

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION							
UNCLAS							
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE				
			X				
PRECEDENCE							
ACTION							
INFO				DTG			
FROM: DA				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS			
<p>TO: RUCIFLA/COMDR SELFRIDGE AFB MICH</p> <p>INFO: RUEDPSA/CINCS TRIKE</p> <p>RUEOEIA/CGUSCONARC</p> <p>RUEORMA/CGUSATHREE</p> <p>RUWJLFA/CGUSAFIVE FTSHERIDAN ILL</p> <p>UNCLAS DA 824914 from OPS OD RE</p> <p>SUBJECT: Change to Letter of Instruction GARDEN PLOT 1-67.</p> <p>1. Commander Selfridge AFB deliver for action to LTG John L. Throckmorton, US Army, CG TF Detroit, and MG Carl C. Turner, PMG, US Army.</p> <p>2. LCI GARDEN PLOT 1 is amended as follows- change paragraph three golf to read quote Mr. Cyrus R. Vance has been designated Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for purposes of this operation. You will be responsive to his instructions and inform me promptly of instructions received and action taken in accordance therewith. Unquote.</p> <p>3. Request you acknowledge receipt this message to duty officer, Army Operations Center, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.</p> <p>BT</p>							
TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE		DATE		TIME	
TRUE COPY				25		1512Z	
s/ Rex K. Skanchy				MONTH		YEAR	
REX K. SKANCHY				Jul		67	
LTC GS				PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
1				1		1	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			
UNCLAS							

DD FORM 173

K-6 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

135 JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS					
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
			X		
ACTION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE					
INFO				DTG	
<p style="text-align: center;">FROM: DA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TO: RUCIFIA/COMDR SELFRIDGE AFB MICH</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INFO: RUEDPSA/CINCEPRIME</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RUEOEJA/CGUSCONARC</p> <p>UNCLAS                      DA824900 from OPS OD RE</p> <p>SUBJECT: TASK FORCE DETROIT</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Commander Selfridge AFB deliver immediately for action to LTG John L. Throckmorton, USA, Commander TF Detroit.</li> <li>2. Reference: DA 824879, subject: Letter of Instruction GARDEN PLOT 1-67.</li> <li>3. This is a TASK FORCE DETROIT message.</li> <li>4. Change instructions contained in paragraph 3, M. (2) to read as follows:</li> </ol> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Written situation reports covering each six (6) hour period ending 2400, 0600, 1200 and 2000 hours local time and transmitted to reach this headquarters by 0800Z, 1400Z, 2000Z and 0200Z respectively. (RCS CSGPO-285).</p> <p>BT</p>				<p style="text-align: center;">SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>	
				DATE 25	TIME 0755Z
				MONTH Jul	YEAR 67
				PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE TRUE COPY <i>Rex K. Skanchy</i> REX K. SKANCHY LTC                      GS		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DD FORM 173  
NOV 63

L-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
TYPE MSG	BOE	MULTI	SINGLE		
			X		
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION OPERATION IMMEDIATE					
INFO				DTG	
<p>FROM: DA</p> <p>TO: RUCIFIA/CG TASK FORCE DETROIT</p> <p>INFO: RUEOEIA/CGUSCONARC</p> <p style="padding-left: 100px;">RUWJLEA/CGUSAFIVE FISHERIDAN ILL</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL      DA 825280 FROM OP3 OD RE</p> <p>SUBJECT: Change to LOI GARDEN PILOT 1-67.</p> <p>1. Para three Delta of subject LOI is rescinded and the following substituted therefore; quote authority to use riot control agent CS is delegated to you. You are authorized to delegate this authority to company level at your discretion. unquote</p> <p>2. Request that you provide to the duty officer, Army Operations Center, HQ DA a copy of delegating instructions you may issue.</p> <p>GP-4</p> <p>BT</p>				<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>	
				DATE	TIME
				26	2052Z
				MONTH	YEAR
				Jul	67
				PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
				1	1
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	TRUE COPY			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
	<i>REX K. Skansky</i> REX K. SKANSKY LTC      GS				
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION      INSTRUCTIONS					

DD FORM 173

1-2 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
137 UNCLAS					
TYPE MSG		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	
				X	
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION FLASH					
INFO			DTG		
<p style="text-align: center;">FROM: DA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TO: RUCIFLA/CMR SELFPRIDGE AFB MICH</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INFO: RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RUEOEIA/CGUSCOMARS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RHWJLFA/CGUSARFIVE FTSHERIDAN ILL</p> <p style="text-align: center;">UNCLAS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">DA 824699</p> <p>FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY</p> <p>SUBJECT: LOI GARDEN PLOT 3-67, from CSA signed Johnson.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Commander Selfridge AFB deliver immediately for action to LTG John L. Throckmorton, USA, Commander TF DETROIT, and for information to Major General Carl C. Turner, CSA Liaison Officer.</li> <li>2. This is a Task Force Detroit message.</li> <li>3. Execute Letter of Instruction GARDEN PLOT 1-67 effective 250320Z July 67.</li> <li>4. Assume command of all the units and members of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of the State of Michigan, except the Michigan State HQ &amp; HQ Det, ARNG; the Michigan State HQS, ANG; and the 1st Bn (NIKE-HEAC), 177th Arty.</li> <li>5. Par 5, LOI GARDEN PLOT 1-67 is rescinded.</li> </ol>					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
			DATE		TIME
			25		0704Z
			MONTH		YEAR
			Jul		67
			PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES
			1		1
D C A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	<p style="text-align: center;">TRUE COPY</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Rex K. Skanchy</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">REX K. SKANCHY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">LTC GS</p>				
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS		
UNCLAS					

DD FORM 173

L-3

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Task Force Detroit  
Detroit, Michigan  
250400 Jul 1967

OPORD 1-67

Map: City Detroit, Michigan

Task Organization:

46th Inf Div (NG)	TF 82
	3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
	2d Bde, 101st Abn Div

1. SITUATION:

A. Friendly Forces:

- (1) See Task Organization.
- (2) Detroit Police Department

B. Enemy Forces:

Individual civilians and groups up to several hundred acting as snipers, arsonists and terrorists. Armament includes highpower rifles and Molotov cocktails. There is no overall command and control of violaters.

2. MISSION: To restore and/or maintain law and order in the Detroit, Michigan, area in connection with the current civil disturbance in Detroit.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Concept of Operation: Task Force Detroit will deploy in the city of Detroit in two sub-task forces of division (-) strength. Task Force 82 will relieve 46th Inf Div (NG) of responsibility for area east of Woodward Avenue at a time mutually agreed by respective CG's. Elements of 46th Inf Div will displace west of Woodward Avenue and assume responsibility for that area.

B. Rules of Engagement:

- (1) Minimum force will be used but if mission is in danger of jeopardy, more force will be applied.
- (2) Troops must be responsive to an escalating situation.
- (3) Normally, application of force will follow this priority.
  - (a) Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed and sheathed.
  - (b) Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed.

139  
OFORD 1-67, HQ Task Force Detroit (Continued)  
250400 July 1967

(c) Riot Control Agent CS.

(d) Loaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed. Troops will carry live ammunition, but will load it into weapons and fire only on order of a commissioned officer.

(4) Authority to order use of CS Agent, remains with CG Task Force Detroit.

(5) Searches of individuals or private property (including automobiles) may be conducted only on order of the Task Force Detroit Commander.

(6) Task Force personnel will cooperate with and assist state and local law enforcement officers to assume their normal roles.

(7) Civilian personnel that are, by necessity, apprehended and detained by military personnel will be released to the custody of civil police or Department of Justice representatives as soon as practicable.

(8) Authority for the establishment of military detention facilities remains with CG Task Force Detroit.

C. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Reports: Situation reports will be submitted every six hours to this headquarters. The cut-off times for the reports will be 0600 hrs, 1200 hrs, 1800 hrs, 2400 hrs.

(2) Reserve Force: CG Task Force 62 will maintain one battalion at State Fair Ground to be deployed only on order of CG Task Force Detroit.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS:

Omitted.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. CG Task Force Detroit at City of Detroit Police Headquarters, 1300 Beaubien Street, Detroit, Michigan.

B. Current TOI in effect.

THE ROCKFORD  
LNG

OFFICIAL:

FOR  
FOR

L-5

Unacknowledged.

OFORD 1-67, HQ, Task Force Detroit (Continued)  
250400 July 1967

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - HQ XVIII Abn Corps & Ft Bragg, Ft Bragg, N.C.
- 3 - 46th Inf Liv (NG)
- 3 - 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
- 3 - 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
- 2 - File TF Detroit

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				PREPARED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER															
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION																			
UNCLAS																			
14 TYPE MSG		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE															
			21																
PRECEDENCE																			
ACTION IMMEDIATE																			
INFO PRIORITY				DTG															
<p>FROM: CG, TF DSECRIT</p> <p>TO: CG, TF 82D ABN DIV DETROIT, MICH (ZEN)</p> <p>CG, 46TH INF DIV, DETROIT, MICH (ZEN)</p> <p>CO, 127TH TAC RECON W3, ANG, INDIANAPOLIS, MICH</p> <p>INFO: CG, XVIII ABN CORPS, FT BRAGG, NC</p> <p>CG, 82D ABN DIV, FT BRAGG, NC</p> <p>CG, 101ST ABN DIV, FT CAMPBELL, KY</p> <p>UNCLAS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">AIRPTD-C G-031</p> <p>SUBJECT: FRAG ORDER NO. 1 to OPORD 1-67</p> <p>TASK FORCE DETROIT</p> <p>1. In the event that friendly forces are required to open fire a FLASH REPORT will be submitted to this headquarters ASAP with the following information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Brief description of the incident</li> <li>b. Location.</li> <li>c. Time.</li> <li>d. Number of rounds by Cal. which were expended.</li> </ul> <p>2. Each maneuver battalion (Inf, Arty, Armor, Eng or other) used in a ground security role will maintain one platoon sized</p>						<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>													
						<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>DATE</td> <td>TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> <td>2350Z</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH</td> <td>YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Jul</td> <td>67</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PAGE NO.</td> <td>NO. OF PAGES</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		DATE	TIME	26	2350Z	MONTH	YEAR	Jul	67	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES		
DATE	TIME																		
26	2350Z																		
MONTH	YEAR																		
Jul	67																		
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES																		
D R A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE		SIGNATURE														
	S/S W. H. HARD W. H. HARD, COL, GS, ACOFS, G3		23133																
					<p style="text-align: center;">TRUE COPY</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>W. H. Hard</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">REX L. SKRACHY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">LTC</p>														
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS															
UNCLAS																			

DD FORM 173

L-7

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 63 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		UNCLAS	
FROM: <span style="float: right;">142</span>			
<p>force to be able to load on surface transportation within fifteen minutes for commitment against local targets of opportunity.</p> <p>3. Above confirms previous foncon notification.</p> <p>4. Acknowledge.</p>			
SYMBOL		PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES
AJETFD-C		2	2
		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		UNCLAS	
		INITIALS	

DD FORM 173-1

L-8

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMBINATION CENTER													
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION																	
UNCLAS																	
143 TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE														
		M															
PRECEDENCE																	
ACTION IMMEDIATE																	
INFO PRIORITY				CTG													
<p>FROM: CG, TF DETROIT</p> <p>TO: CG, TF 82D (COURIER)</p> <p>CG, 46TH INF DIV (COURIER)</p> <p>INFO: DA, WASH DC (FOR OCS OPS)</p> <p>CG, XVIII ABN CORPS, FT BRAGG NC</p> <p>UNCLAS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">AJBTFD-C F-013</p> <p>SUBJECT: FRAG ORDER Number 2 to OPORD 67-1, TF DETROIT</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No change in task organization.</li> <li>2. CG, 46th Inf Div assumes area responsibility for the 5th Precinct effective 291200Z Jul 67 after relieving elements of TF 82d in zone.</li> <li>3. CG, TF 82d.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Prepare for transfer of responsibility for the 5th Precinct to element of the 46th Inf Div effective 291200Z. TF 82d elements in zone will select and establish a CP and assembly area in the vicinity of ZACHARIAN CHANDLER PARK.</li> <li>b. Be prepared to reinforce 46th Inf Div elements on order CG, TF DETROIT.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS													
				<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">DATE</td> <td style="width: 50%;">TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td>28</td> <td>2215Z</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH</td> <td>YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Jul</td> <td>67</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PAGE NO.</td> <td>NO. OF PAGES</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> </table>		DATE	TIME	28	2215Z	MONTH	YEAR	Jul	67	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	1	2
DATE	TIME																
28	2215Z																
MONTH	YEAR																
Jul	67																
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES																
1	2																
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE													
	S/S W. H. HARD W. H. HARD, COL GS, ACOFS, G3		23133	<p style="text-align: center;">TRUE COPY</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>[Signature]</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND GRADE            REX K. SKANCHY            LTC GS</p>													
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS													
UNCLAS																	

DD FORM 173

L-9 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
FROM:		UNCLAS	
		144.	
<p>4. Coordinating instructions.</p> <p>a. Direct coordination between 46th Inf Div and TF 82d authorized.</p> <p>b. Selected assembly area and CP location for TF 82d elements will be reported ASAP.</p> <p>c. 46th Inf Div element CP locations within the 5th Precinct will be reported ASAP.</p> <p>5. Acknowledge.</p>			
SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
			INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1  
MAY 64

L-10

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER									
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLAS</b>													
15 TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE										
		M											
PRECEDENCE													
ACTION IMMEDIATE													
INFO PRIORITY				DTG									
<p style="text-align: center;">FROM: CG, TF DETROIT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TG: CG, TF 82, DETROIT, MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CG, 46TH INF DIV, DETROIT MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INFO: DA, WASH DC (FOR OCS OPS).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CG, XVIII ABN CORPS, FT BRAGG NC</p> <p>UNCLAS <span style="float: right;">AJBTFD-C F-023</span></p> <p>SUBJECT: Change 1 to FRAG ORDER Number 2 to OPORD 67-1</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reference msg TF Detroit cite AJBTFD-C F-013 DTG 2215Z.</li> <li>2. The effective time stated in para 2 and 3a of ref msg is changed to read 301200Z Jul 67.</li> <li>3. Acknowledge.</li> </ol>							SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS						
							<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">DATE 29</td> <td style="width: 50%;">TIME 1945Z</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH Jul</td> <td>YEAR 67</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PAGE NO. 1</td> <td>NO. OF PAGES 1</td> </tr> </table>	DATE 29	TIME 1945Z	MONTH Jul	YEAR 67	PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1
DATE 29	TIME 1945Z												
MONTH Jul	YEAR 67												
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1												
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE s/s W. H. HARD W. H. HARD, COL GS, ACoFS G3		PHONE 23133	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE <div style="text-align: right;">TRUE COPY</div> <div style="text-align: right;"><i>Reg. K. Skanchy</i></div> TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE <div style="text-align: right;">REX K. SKANCHY LTC GS</div>								
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLAS</b>		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS										

DD FORM 173  
1 NOV 65

L-11 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				146	
UNCLAS					
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
		M			
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION <u>IMMEDIATE</u>					
INFO <u>PRIORITY</u>				DTG	
<p style="text-align: center;">FROM: CG, TF DETROIT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TO: CG, TF 82 DETROIT, MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CG, 46TH INF DIV, DETROIT MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INFO: DA, WASH DC (FOR DCS OPS)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMARC, FT MONROE, VA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CINCSERIKE, MACDILL AFB, FLA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CINCAFSTRIKE, LANGLEY AFB, VA</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CG, FIFTH US ARMY, FT SHERIDAN, ILL</p> <p style="text-align: center;">UNCLAS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">AJBTFD-C <u>P-C34</u></p> <p>SUBJECT: FRAG ORDER Number 3 to OPORD 1-67, TF DETROIT</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No change in task organization.</li> <li>2. CG 46th Inf Div - No change in present mission.</li> <li>3. CG TF 82. Displace 2 bde, 101st Abn Div, 1/501 Inf, 2/501 Inf and 3/187 Inf to Selfridge AFB by motor beginning 310900 Jul 67 (local) for subsequent re-deployment by air to home station.</li> <li>4. Coordinating Instructions.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Direct coordination with Selfridge AFB authorized and directed.</li> <li>b. Coordination for traffic control assistance will be effected by this Hqs.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>					<p style="text-align: center;">SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>
<p>DATE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">30</p> <p>MONTH</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Jul</p> <p>PAGE NO.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1</p>		<p>TIME</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1940Z</p> <p>YEAR</p> <p style="text-align: center;">67</p> <p>NO. OF PAGES</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2</p>			
D R A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	<p>s/s W. H. HARRD</p> <p>W. H. HARRD, COL GS, ACOFS G3</p>		23133	TRUE COPY	
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
			<p style="text-align: right;"><i> Rex K. Skanchy</i></p> <p>REX K. SKANCHY</p> <p>LTC GS</p>		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		
UNCLAS					

DD FORM 173  
1 NOV 63

L-12 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	
FROM:			
<p>147</p> <p>c. Movement time from present location and closing time at Selfridge AFB for battalions will be reported to this Hqs.</p> <p>d. Supplemental transportation requests will be forwarded to G4 this Hqs.</p> <p>5. Acknowledge.</p>			
SYMBOL AJPTFD-C		PAGE NR 2	NR OF PAGES 2
DD FORM 1 MAY 64 173-1		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	
		INITIALS	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				148					
UNCLAS									
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE						
		M							
PRECEDENCE									
ACTION <b>IMMEDIATE</b>									
INFO <b>PRIORITY</b>				DTG					
<p style="margin: 0;">FROM: CG, TF DETROIT</p> <p style="margin: 10px 0 0 40px;">TO: CG, TF 82, DETROIT MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">CG, 46TH INF DIV, DETROIT MICH (COURIER)</p> <p style="margin: 10px 0 0 40px;">INFO: DA, WASH DC (FOR DCS OPS)</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">CONARC, FT MONROE VA</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">CINCPACSTRICK, MACDILL AFB, FLA</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">CINCPACSTRICK, LANGLEY AFB, VA</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">CG, FIFTH US ARMY, FT SHERIDAN, ILL</p> <p style="margin: 10px 0 0 40px;">UNCLAS</p> <p style="margin: 0 0 0 40px;">AJBTDF-C F-041</p> <p style="margin: 10px 0 0 40px;">SUBJECT: Frag Order Number 4 to OPORD 1-67, TF Detroit</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No change in task organization.</li> <li>2. CG 46th Inf Div - No change in present mission.</li> <li>3. CG TF 82               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Be prepared beginning 010500 Aug 67 (local) to displace 1/502 Inf to Selfridge AFB by motor on call G4 this Hq for subsequent redeployment to home station.</li> <li>b. Displace Hq TF 82, 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div, bde combat spt elements, 1/505 Inf, 2/505 Inf, and 1/508 Inf to Selfridge AFB by motor beginning 010900 Aug 67 (local) for subsequent redeployment by air to home station.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>								<p style="margin: 0;">SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>	
DATE		TIME		TRUE COPY					
31		1510Z							
MONTH		YEAR							
Jul		67							
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES							
1		2							
TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE				SIGNATURE			
s/s W.H. HARD		23133							
W.H. HARD, COL GS, ACOFS G3				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE					
				REX K. SKANCHY					
				LTC GS					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS					
UNCLAS									


DD FORM 173

L-14 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	
FROM:			
<p>149</p> <p>4. Coordinating Instructions.</p> <p>a. Direct coordination with Selfridge AFB authorized and directed.</p> <p>b. Coordination for traffic control assistance will be effected by this Hqs.</p> <p>c. Movement times from present location and closing times at Selfridge AFB for bns will be reported to this Hqs.</p> <p>d. Supplemental transportation requests will be forwarded to G4 this Hqs.</p> <p>e. Operational control of redeploying forces will revert to CINCSRIKE upon departure from Selfridge AFB and to parent organization upon arrival at home station.</p> <p>f. Ammunition will be removed from troops immediately upon arrival at Selfridge AFB.</p> <p>5. Acknowledge.</p>			
SYMBOL AJBTFD-C	PAGE NR 2	NR OF PAGES 2	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS
			INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1

L-15

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER											
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY															
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	150											
		M													
PRECEDENCE															
ACTION <b>IMMEDIATE</b>															
INFO <b>PRIORITY</b>				DTG											
<p>FROM: CG, TF DETROIT</p> <p>TO: CG, TF 82, DETROIT, MICH (COURIER)</p> <p>CG, 46TH INF DIV, DETROIT, MICH (COURIER)</p> <p>CO, 127TH CBT SPT SQDN, DETROIT, MICH (COURIER)</p> <p>INFO: DA, WASH DC (FOR DCS OPS)</p> <p>CINCSTRIKE, MACDILL AFB, FLA</p> <p>CONARC, FT MONROE, VA</p> <p>CINCPACSTRIKE, LANGLEY AFB, VA</p> <p>CG, FIRST US ARMY, FT MEADE, MD</p> <p>CG, THIRD US ARMY, FT MCPHERSON, GA</p> <p>CG, FOURTH US ARMY, FT SAM HOUSTON, TEX</p> <p>CG, FIFTH US ARMY, FT SHERIDAN, ILL</p> <p>CG, SIXTH US ARMY, PRESIDIO, S.F., CAL</p> <p>CG, XVIII ABN DIV, FT BRAGG, NC</p> <p>CG, 82D ABN DIV, FT BRAGG, NC</p> <p>CG, 101ST ABN DIV, FT CAMPBELL, KY</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p style="text-align: right;">AJBTFD-C F-055</p> <p>SUBJECT: Frag Order Number 5 to OPORD 1-67, TF DETROIT (U)</p>				<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>											
				<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">DATE</td> <td style="width: 50%;">TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0245Z</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH</td> <td>YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Aug</td> <td>67</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PAGE NO.</td> <td>NO. OF PAGES</td> </tr> </table>		DATE	TIME	1	0245Z	MONTH	YEAR	Aug	67	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
DATE	TIME														
1	0245Z														
MONTH	YEAR														
Aug	67														
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES														
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE											
	S/S W.H. HARD		23133	TRUE COPY											
	W. H. HARD, COL GS, ACofS G3														
	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND GRADE REX K. SKANCHY LTC GS											
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS												

DD FORM 173

L-16 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 67 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

151 ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET					
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE		
ACTION					
INFO					
<p>1. (C) The 46th Inf Div and attachments, and all Federalized Mich Air National Guard units are relieved from the active military service of the United States effective 021200 Aug 67 (EDT).</p> <p>2. (C) TF Detroit is relieved of the mission of providing riot control assistance to the City of Detroit effective 021200 Aug 67 (EDT), and is dissolved effective 021800 Aug 67 (EDT).</p> <p>3. (C) All regular Army units supporting TF Detroit will redeploy to home station in accordance with movement airlift schedule established by this Hqs. Operational control will revert to CINCSTRIKE upon departure from Selfridge AFB, and to parent organization upon arrival at home station.</p> <p>4. (C) All remaining Regular Army units of TF Detroit in the Detroit area as of 021800 Aug 67 (EDT) revert to control of 5th US Army. Upon departure from Selfridge AFB, units will revert to CINCSTRIKE control and to parent organization upon arrival at home station.</p> <p>5. (C) 17th Avn Co is detached from TF 82 021200 Aug 67 and attached to TF Detroit. 17th Avn Co and remaining Avn units supporting TF Detroit will depart the Detroit area on order this Hqs.</p> <p>6. (U) Major subordinate TF Detroit elements acknowledge.</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	
				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
Headquarters, Task Force Detroit  
1300 Beaubien Street, Detroit, Michigan

152

SUBJECT: Use of CS Agent

26 July 1967

TO: CG, 46th Inf Div (NG)  
CG, Task Force 82d Abn

1. Reference: OPORD 1-67 Headquarters, Task Force  
Detroit, 250400 July 67.

2. Paragraph 3B (4) of reference is rescinded. The  
following instructions are substituted therefore: "Authority  
to use riot control Agent CS is delegated to you. You are  
authorized to delegate this authority to company level at  
your discretion."

3. In the delegation of this authority I expect extreme  
care to be taken to insure a full understanding and appreciation  
of the attendant responsibilities in the use of this weapon.

  
J. D. THROCKMORTON  
LTJG, USA  
Commanding

Info cy turn:  
Army Operations Center  
Headquarters Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

L-18

153

# CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS



## GUIDELINES

## FOR

## SMALL-UNIT COMMANDERS

## AND TROOPS

155

GUIDELINES FOR SMALL UNIT COMMANDERS AND TROOPS

IN THE CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

157

#### THE NATURE OF CIVIL DISORDER

#### THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION IN CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

Circumstances Under Which Federal Troops Are Committed To Control Civil Disorder

Emergency Intervention

Martial Law

Legal Considerations

Apprehension and Detention of Civilians

Cooperation With Civil Authorities

Troop-Civilian Relations

The Press

### ORGANIZATION

The Rifle Company Deployed For Control of Civil Disorder

### OPERATIONS IN CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDER

Command and Control

Show of Force Operations

Patrolling: General Considerations

Mounted Patrols

Foot Patrols

Conduct of Reliefs

Anti-Sniper Operations

Looting and Vandalism

"Troop-Baiting"

Operational Communications

Acceptance of Gifts From Civilians

Use of Chemical Agents

When To Load and Load; When To Fire

Armed, Friendly Civilians

Curfews and Their Enforcement

Withdrawal From Areas of Responsibility

### INTELLIGENCE

General

The Recorder

Reports

Detention And Search; Tagging of Weapons and Loot; Women Suspects

### SUMMARY

## INTRODUCTION

The fundamentals of military operations have changed little in history. They must, however, be adapted to meet the challenges of changing times. When they are adapted they are called techniques. The recent experience of the 82d Airborne Division in Detroit illustrated that the nature of civil disorder in the United States - disorder that has been rare in our history - has to some extent changed. While maintaining exacting standards of training to deal with the more obvious forms of civil disorder (mob violence, wide-spread vandalism), we must also prepare ourselves to use new techniques in meeting the 'new' characteristics of civil unrest (random sniping, looting and the like). This pamphlet presents new means for dealing with the complexities of situations arising from civil emergencies and the commitment of the 82d Airborne Division to confront them. It does not supersede AR 500-50 or FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters; rather, it goes several steps beyond information provided in these publications. Commanders should use both publications in training and operations, remembering that they may as easily be confronted with an angry mob as they may be by a hidden sniper. 158

There can be no greater test of the airborne soldier's maturity, common sense, and discipline than his performance in controlling civil disorder and in restoring the peace and tranquility our government promises all citizens.

## THE NATURE OF CIVIL DISORDER

159 No government in history has proved able to satisfy all its citizens all the time. If enough citizens are dissatisfied with their elected representatives, they can, in the United States, replace them with others at elections. But always there will remain a body of citizens who are unhappy with some aspects of their government's rule. Normally such citizens hope to correct the situation as they see it by electing new representatives. This is the democratic method required by our constitution. Sometimes groups of citizens ignore this democratic process and attempt to make their protests felt by violent means strong enough to bring public attention to them. The hope is that the government will be forced to yield to their wishes.

Sometimes the protesting group is organized; sometimes it is not. Sometimes it is very small - such as a dozen men who have been thrown out of a public park for drunkenness and who react by throwing rocks at windows. Often a small "protest" like this will attract others who wish to "join the fun". At any rate, the violent form of protest is a fact of life; and local, state, and federal agencies of government must be prepared to deal with it.

To violence arising from some grievance, we should add violence arising, literally, from boredom or from a perverse wish to create disorder. This frequently goes hand-in-glove with the former category. Detroit is a well defined example. After mob violence had been substantially quelled, lawless elements continued sniping, random looting, and pillage. This general disorder, which may well lack organization or intelligent purpose, requires special techniques by law enforcement agencies, including federal troops.

Historically, federal troops have seldom been used to suppress domestic violence; however, units of the Armed Forces must be prepared to meet any challenge to the rule of law and to restore order. The recent experience of the 82d Airborne Division in Detroit underscored areas on which training emphasis needs to be placed. Despite its commitment to the containment of a form of civil disorder it had not specifically planned for, the division's performance was widely acknowledged to be outstanding. Hence an important conclusion. the well-trained, disciplined airborne soldier is capable of dealing successfully with civil disorder if he and his leaders use sound common sense. Let it be said at the outset that the mere arrival of disciplined troops at the scene of a disturbance acts as a strong deterrent to all but the most determined law-breakers. The division's experience in Detroit illustrated this fact dramatically.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 82D AIRBORNE  
DIVISION IN CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

Circumstances Under Which Federal Troops Are Committed To Control Civil Disorder

160

FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, outlines circumstances under which federal troops may be committed in case of domestic violence, disaster, or for other specific purposes. Briefly stated, these are the following:

- To aid a state at the request of that state.
- To enforce the laws of the United States.
- To protect the civil rights of citizens within a state.
- To protect government property.

Congress has authorized the President to intervene in any of these circumstances when, in his judgement, the situation warrants intervention. The commitment of troops to Detroit at the request of the Governor of Michigan is an example of the first circumstance listed above.

Federal law makes it a criminal offense to use the Army to execute or enforce civil laws except where expressly authorized by the constitution or congressional enactment. It prohibits the use of Army units in individual acts of law enforcement. However, it does not impair the powers of the President to commit Federal troops in those situations mentioned above, nor does it affect the recognized right of a nation to protect itself, its agencies, and its property against violence. Based on this principle, a commander of troops may take such action as the circumstances reasonably justify to protect life, property, and restore law and order if local law enforcement authorities are ineffective and the circumstances are so imminent that it is dangerous to await instructions from Department of the Army. In any event, the commander must inform Department of the Army of his actions in order that proper guidance may be furnished. Modern communications facilities indicate that rarely will Federal soldiers be committed on this basis. As noted in the preceding paragraph, Detroit was not an "emergency" intervention by a military commander.

Martial Law

Federal martial law may be invoked by the President when civil agencies of government (state and local) are unable to function effectively. "It depends for its justification on public necessity." What this means to the individual soldier or small-unit leader is that he, rather than the local police, becomes the main law-enforcement agency. Local and state laws remain in effect (with certain temporary modifications--curfews, etc); offenders may be apprehended by federal forces and kept in military custody until

civil authorities are in a position to try them in courts of law. In Detroit, martial law was not declared. The remainder of this pamphlet refers to situations where, as in Detroit, martial law is not in effect, and federal troops are in a supporting role to the local authorities.

### Legal Considerations

The President of the United States, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, can commit the Army to quell civilian disorders only in a martial law situation and instances where such authority is granted by the US Constitution, or authorized by Congress. Any action by the President, not based on such authority, is illegal. Therefore, the Army must act only in compliance with the directives of the President as implemented by appropriate military authorities including the local commander of the federal forces.

Authorization to act is usually given by a Letter of Instruction issued by the President through Department of the Army to the local commander. Normally this will be written in broad general terms, and will require amplification. In implementing the LOI, necessity is the key factor to legality. Necessity is determined by the use of hindsight. Looking back on the act, was it necessary? If the answer is yes, it was legal; if no, then it was illegal. Prior to issuing any implementing orders, the local commander should first consult with his staff judge advocate or legal officer to insure that his actions are legal and do not exceed the authorization of the LOI.

Prior to committing any federal troops, the local commander should effect close cooperation with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies involved, and with state and federal judicial authorities. This cooperation will result in the efficient accomplishment of the mission, facilitate withdrawal of federal troops and return of the area to civilian control at the earliest practical time. Also, it facilitates the prosecution of criminals who were detained during the disturbance. To the maximum extent possible, local police should enforce the law. When they are unable to do so, then federal troops should assist them; at no time will federal troops be commanded by anyone other than their military commanders.

Criminal sanctions may be imposed against any trooper who exceeds his authority in accomplishing his mission. These sanctions may be imposed under the UCMJ, and Federal or State criminal statutes. The rule of necessity is the guide used to determine whether a trooper exceeded his authority. However, if acting in good faith and pursuant to lawful orders, the trooper's conduct is usually not criminal.

Usually, federal troops are committed at the height of the disturbance. As the situation changes, and the civilian police are able to enforce law and order, the actions of the military become more restricted, and the trooper must act with greater restraint and caution. As soon as local police are able to enforce law and order, the trooper is placed in the same position as any private citizen when he detains an individual for a violation of the law.

### Apprehension and Detention of Civilians

The authority committing soldiers to control of civilian disorders, Federal and local State law, and the LOI to the Commander of Federal Troops involved will, to a large degree, determine to what extent Federal troops may detain or arrest civilians. At the earliest possible moment, commanders must ascertain to what extent detention of civilians is authorized, and this information must be disseminated to the lowest level (the individual trooper). Preferably, local, state and federal civil authorities should effect all detentions and federal troops should detain civilians only as a last resort and when local state authorities are not available for this purpose. In the event it becomes necessary for federal troops to detain a civilian, the civilian detained must be turned over to local law enforcement officers as soon as possible. A statement setting forth the facts and circumstances surrounding the detention and the physical condition of the person detained should be obtained from the soldier effecting the detention. If possible, statements should be obtained from two additional witnesses. This will serve to protect the trooper and the Federal Government from a subsequent claim that the detention was unlawful. Also, this will assist the local judicial authorities in subsequent prosecution of the civilian in question. In detaining a civilian, only minimum force will be used. 162

As stated above, soldiers engaged in operations to control civil disorders are subject both to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and to local/state laws. In this regard, it is important for the individual soldier to remember that if he uses common sense and acts in good faith in obedience to orders, there is little chance of his being charged and tried by a military or civilian court.

### Cooperation With Civil Authorities

Except when martial law has been declared (and it is only rarely declared), the 82d Division's operations in control of civil disorders are done in support of similar operations by local and state authorities. Local agencies of government (police, fire departments, courts, boards, etc) continue to function as fully as possible; their authority for such operations remains the same as it was before the arrival of federal troops.

Such support must be given in the spirit of friendly cooperation; the soldier is called on to give emergency help to professionals who have made a career of enforcing order, who know their areas and the people who live and work in them, who are familiar with local and state laws and who have had practical experience in dealing with civil disorder. On the other hand, federal troops are never placed under command of police at any level.

To the lowest level possible, soldiers and police will serve together in restoring order. Ideally, a policeman would accompany squad-sized elements on their patrols. In any case, the company command post (CP) must be able to make immediate contact with police in the area. If this capability exists, any problem serious enough to cause the patrol leader to call the CP for help or counsel can result in the immediate deployment of police to the scene of the difficulty.

### Troop-Civilian Relations

Soldiers should remember two facts about the vast majority of civilians: First they are decent, and law-abiding, and deplore civil disorder; therefore, they will cooperate in any way with police, National Guardsmen, and other federal troops to restore order. Second, they have a healthy respect for federal troops (particularly for paratroopers).

163 Small-unit leaders therefore must brief their troops before deployment on troop-civilian relations, stressing the following point: Each paratrooper represents the 82d Airborne Division and the Federal Government. Some civilians will see only one or two paratroopers during the Division's stay in their city and their impression of the Division will be formed by their impression of those soldiers. Since troopers will be under close scrutiny at all times, a fine by-product of our effort to stop the disorder can be a renewed public interest and respect for the US Army.

More important is our mission. The restoration of order in an American city is not "combat in built-up areas". Our guideline is minimum application of force consistent with our objective. Unless large elements of the Division are committed under central control to quell mob violence, we must accomplish our objective in small, fragmented bodies of troops.

These troops have frequent contact with friendly civilians. They must show the utmost courtesy in their dealings with them, and particularly with women and children. Soldiers on missions must firmly discourage civilians from loitering around their posts or "tagging along" while they are on patrol.

When questioning civilians, those offering information as well as suspects, courtesy is again the keynote.

Soldiers ignore unfriendly remarks.

No soldier will enter any private dwelling unless on official business.

Soldiers who are "propositioned" decline the offer and report it immediately to their superior.

### The Press

Newspapemen will often attempt to interview soldiers committed to the control of civil disorder. They should be treated with courtesy and respect, but junior leaders and troops should make no comments (even if told their remarks will be "off the record") on the origins and nature of the civil disorder, or on the means, planned or actual, by which the 82d Airborne Division is handling the situation. The most common question asked troops in Detroit was, "What do you think about all this?" Most troops did not rise to the bait.

Should a disorder take the form of a "race riot", Negro troopers can expect to be asked leading questions about their stand on civil rights.

Their standard answer to such questions should be something on the order of, "I am proud to be an 82d Trooper, and I follow the instructions of my superior officers."

164  
Finally, it should be emphasized that most newspapermen have or are forming in their minds a definite point of view. Likewise, their publications will be committed to viewpoints for which interviews with troops may provide supporting material. It is easy for reporters to take remarks out of context, and the result may be that the comments of individual troops may be rearranged or edited to alter their meaning. For instance, a trooper might tell a reporter, "I think this thing is a mess, but it's certainly not as bad as we'd heard and it's improving". This might appear in a paper as: "An 82d paratrooper observed, 'This thing is a mess!'"

More specific guidance on troop-press relations will be given during operations, but the best general rule remains the use of common sense.

#### ORGANIZATION

##### The Rifle Company Deployed for Control of Civil Disorders

In general, the rifle company of the 82d Airborne Division deploys as it would for combat operations. There are certain exceptions:

- 81mm mortars and 106 recoilless rifles are left behind.
- The weapons platoon is deployed as a rifle platoon.
- A number of M-79s, machine guns, and 3.5 rocket launchers are left behind; guidance is furnished by Division.
- Extra vehicles (1/4 and 3/4 ton trucks) may be assigned to the company.

To these exceptions others may be added, depending on the judgement of the Division Commander. In any case, weapons whose deployment is not called for are left in readiness should the situation demand them later.

The deployed strength of the company is rarely its assigned strength. Since the basic unit of operation in the control of civil disorder is the patrol, normally the size of a full squad, certain adaptations may have to be made by the company commander to insure full-sized patrols (henceforth in this pamphlet, the terms patrol and squad are synonymous). The principle of small-unit integrity is followed as closely as possible when patrols are brought up to full strength.

Each patrol should have assigned to it, in addition to a patrol leader and his assistant, a recorder, a radio-telephone operator (RTO), and one grenadier. The remainder are riflemen.

Assuming an average company deployed strength of 125 men, the company might be organized into four platoons of three nine-man patrols each.

The remainder of those deployed serve as drivers, company RTOs, runners, and headquarters NCOs.

165

Platoon CPs may be co-located with the Company CP, allowing direct communication between the patrols and the company CP. Another advantage of co-location is that one of the platoon leaders can serve as action officer in the absence of the company commander. Such arrangements are, of course, subject to modification under varying circumstances.

Finally, certain other items of equipment may be added to the company's store of equipment. Among these are telescopic sights and night vision devices; M-14s in place of a number of M-16s; loud-speakers; chemical canisters and grenades; machine-gun mounts for 1/4 ton trucks; and small searchlights.

#### The Company Command Post

The company CP should be established in the area of responsibility (AOR). Though many circumstances may dictate its location, the following characteristics are desirable:

- The CP should be in the "heart" of the AOR.
- Public telephone facilities should be immediately at hand.
- A building should be selected which will provide billeting space, sanitary facilities, desks or tables, room for the mobile reserve parking space, and an area for mess facilities. Particularly desirable are police headquarters, schools, firehouses, and office buildings. Size will be dictated by whether or not off-duty troops are billeted elsewhere.

Guards are positioned at all entrances to the CP to insure that no one enters the CP without proper authority. Communications are centralized in one location. Another area is set aside for the mobile reserve unit, normally of patrol size. Company vehicles, also carefully guarded, are kept immediately available.

Civilians are discouraged from loitering in the area.

No soldier moves outside the CP building without his individual weapon, full LBE, and helmet.

A regular schedule of duty officers and NCOs is posted by the first sergeant. The duty officer should be the platoon leader whose platoon is providing the on-duty patrols at that time. The duty NCO is the platoon sergeant of the same platoon. One of these two is in the CP whenever the other is out checking patrols. He is the direct link between the patrol in the streets and the company commander. The duty NCO alerts each relief at a time sufficient to allow its members to prepare to go on patrol. He also is responsible for the police and security of the CP during his shift.

Prior to occupation of an area, rights of entry must be obtained. The Division Engineer or the District Engineer usually obtains these rights. A survey of the area should be conducted to ascertain the physical condition of facilities prior to use by Federal troops. If necessary, a unit officer will conduct such a survey.

166

#### OPERATIONS IN CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDER

##### Command and Control

Units of the 82d Airborne Division will normally be assigned sectors of responsibility in cities where the Division's presence has been required. As far as possible, these sectors coincide with those regularly established by local police authorities. For example, a battalion might be made responsible for the restoration of order in a police precinct. The battalion commander assigns company AORs within his sector. Acute disorder (mob violence, fire storms, etc) may require the company to move rapidly to another area; therefore, the company commander must brief his subordinates on the procedures for rapid redeployment.

The key tactical element in the restoration of order is the patrol. Whether on foot or mounted in vehicles, the patrol moves through its area of responsibility frequently and in an irregular pattern. Each unit must saturate or give the impression of saturating its area of responsibility with troops. This is done both to reassure citizens and to deter prospective lawbreakers.

The company commander controls his unit by radio and by personal contact. He and other small-unit leaders constantly check their men for alertness, relevant knowledge, and military appearance. Company officers and NCOs insure that their location is always known to company headquarters and remain in close touch with headquarters.

##### Show-of-Force Operations

Every military operation in control of civil disorder is in a sense a show-of-force operation. Operations are conducted to make clear to prospective law-breakers that the unit (company, platoon, patrol, squad) means business and is fully capable of carrying out any assigned task.

These operations take many forms. During initial deployment into an area of responsibility, elements of the company move under arms with fixed bayonets. If marching at attention, their movements are executed with snap and precision. Comments from bystanders are completely ignored. The impression of calm, determined professionalism is created.

Practice alerts and deployments at company level are executed with similar vigor. The mobile reserve moves as quickly as possible to the threatened area; communications checks are made; small unit leaders check their stationary posts. Although practice deployments are not normally conducted as a show-of-force, they can hardly fail to make an impression on civilians.

167  
When the situation allows, the unit conducts regular morning physical training (PT). In Detroit, for example, PT was conducted several times in battalion strength, specifically for its show-of-force effect. Again, the impression of military fitness is reemphasized. PT normally concludes with a run through the unit's sector of responsibility, planned to be seen by as many people as possible, particularly in areas that have been hard hit. The unit runs in column of threes close to the curb, weapons at port arms, without bayonets (each trooper carries one magazine in his right rear pocket). A 1/4 ton truck should accompany the PT detail, to insure continuing communication with the CP. In hot weather, units should wear their PT "T-shirts", with unit insignia.

The value of show-of-force operations cannot be overestimated. Their efficient conduct is the responsibility of junior officers and NCOs, but every soldier should constantly be reminded that his every act receives public scrutiny. His military professionalism is the best possible show-of-force to the population, be they law-abiding or disorderly.

#### Patrolling-General Considerations

A patrol operating in an area of urban civil disorder has a three-fold mission:

- It acts as a deterrent.
- It gathers information.
- It quells lawlessness and disorder.

The company commander determines the size of his patrols, taking into consideration the nature of the disorder in his area of responsibility. He and his subordinates plan the routes of foot and mounted patrols. In no case should patrols follow a fixed route or maintain a fixed speed. Once a prospective arsonist, looter, or sniper senses a regularity to the patrol's movement, he can gauge the best time to conduct his activity, e.g., when the patrol will be farthest away from a particular target.

A reserve patrol/squad ("mobile reserve") is kept on call near the company CP with the mission of providing immediate reinforcement to any patrol that may require it. It deploys by vehicle at the maximum safe speed to the scene of the action.

#### Mounted Patrols

The company normally will use mounted patrols when the seriousness of the disorder is somewhat diminished. Extensive mounted patrolling will, of course, require additional vehicles from higher headquarters. Initially, a single mounted patrol should be assigned a patrol route through the entire company area of responsibility. However, the company commander should not send out a mounted patrol unless some other provision has been made for transport for his mobile reserve.

The patrol leader rides in the cab of the truck and directs the driver (with a local policeman, if assigned). He has the immediate responsibility for the performance (alertness, appearance, etc) of those riding in back. The vehicle moves at a speed which will permit good observation of danger areas. Guidance will be furnished from higher headquarters as to whether or not vehicle lights should be on or off.

168

Those riding in back face outboard, the assistant patrol leader assigning each man an area of surveillance. When suspicious activity is observed, a report is immediately radioed to the company CP. Concurrently, the vehicle is halted and the troops disembark to investigate, always leaving behind them two or three men to insure the safety of the vehicle and its driver. The vehicle is never parked near street-lamps or other bright lights; its lights are turned off when parked.

Substantially the same guidelines apply to smaller patrols mounted in 1/4 ton trucks. Most mounted patrolling activity during serious phases of civil disorder (when sniper fire, looting, vandalism and fires have not been suppressed) is conducted in 1/4 ton trucks, so that the larger company vehicles may be used to deploy the reserve as necessary. Five-man patrols are the norm, and include a driver, patrol leader (often an officer inspecting his sector), two riflemen, and an RTO. These patrols move slowly through the streets, with their lights out. Again, alertness is the key to success. Troops do not smoke while patrolling in vehicles.

#### Foot Patrols

Foot patrols are the company's main activity in control of civil disorder and represent the best deterrent to crime. Depending on the deployed size of his platoons, the company commander forms from two to four patrols from each platoon; depending on the situation, he deploys from 25% to 100% of the patrols at once. Like mounted patrols, foot patrols are assigned a route and sector of responsibility through which they move at varying intervals and in different directions.

The formation used is up to the patrol leader: He is given the mission, and he, more than anyone else, should know the requirements in his sector.

Some general guidance for patrols:

- Patrols avoid moving under street lights and similar danger areas.
- Members keep staggered intervals between each other.
- Though courteous to civilians, they do not engage in idle conversation.
- The RTO keeps in constant touch with the platoon (or company) CP.

-- Adequate security is provided to the front, flanks, and rear.

169  
-- No member of the patrol loads a magazine or chambers a round unless specifically instructed by the patrol leader. Normally such instructions will not be given unless the patrol is fired on or unless there is sniper fire in the general area. Such guidance of necessity varies from situation to situation and must comply with general guidelines published by the commander of troops in the city. During the Detroit mission, one infantry battalion successfully accomplished its mission without firing a shot, and its area of responsibility was generally regarded as the "hot spot" of the eastern section of that city.

In summary, mobile and foot patrols act as deterrents to prospective lawbreakers, gather information, and restore order when necessary. A good patrol is an excellent deterrent to disorder -- and the success of the deterrent depends upon the professionalism of the patrol.

#### Conduct of Reliefs

The relief commander, normally the platoon leader from whose platoon patrols are drawn, personally places his men on stationary posts and is responsible for coordination with the previous relief commander to insure that the area of responsibility remains adequately covered by mobile and foot patrols during the time for changing reliefs. Stationary guards exchange all information of value with their reliefs. The same exchange is accomplished by mobile and foot patrols. Information passed along may include:

- Danger areas in the patrol's AOR.
- Scenes of reported violations of the law.
- Areas in which curfew is frequently broken.
- Location of nearest police officers.
- Code-words and call-signs.

The relief commander personally checks his patrols at least once each hour they are on duty. He stresses the need for continued alertness, military bearing and caution in dealing with suspect civilians.

#### Anti-Sniper Operations

A sniper is an individual who fires a small-calibre weapon from a concealed location. Since he represents a dangerous adversary to civilians and troops alike, his immediate capture or elimination is one of the most important duties of the soldier in the streets. And it must be remembered that the apprehension of the sniper in an American city is a much different proposition from the elimination of the sniper in a combat zone. Here again, the guideline minimum force consistent with accomplishment of the mission is crucial. Despite attempts to remove all innocent civilians

from the area of operations, some may remain. Since our purpose is to safeguard their security, we accomplish nothing if we fire indiscriminately at suspected general areas.

In Detroit a whole brigade of the 82d Airborne Division noted only ten sniping incidents in six days of operations. Of the five instances where troops were targets, only one soldier was slightly wounded. From these and similar facts in the experience of other federal units, it is clear that few snipers care to operate in areas that are saturated with well-trained troops. Further, those that do operate tend to fire inaccurately. 170

In short, when a sniper feels his chances of being caught are good, his activity will be minimal.

Troops operating in built-up areas must form the habit of looking for likely positions from which sniper fires may be directed at them or at civilians. On street patrols, both foot and mobile, the patrol leader must assign areas of surveillance to men in his unit. Certain men are detailed to look to the flanks, at windows, rooftops and trees on each side of the street. Others are instructed to provide rear security from sniper fire. Finally, the point men keep a close watch during movement on the likely sniper locations to their front. The squad leader makes frequent checks on his troops' alertness, and insures that, where possible, they avoid moving under street lights or other lighted areas. As in all street patrolling, he varies his route and speed of march. Troops riding in vehicles follow substantially the same guidelines: they face outboard and look up constantly.

Areas which are known to have come under previous sniper fire or which represent good targets to the sniper (e.g., intersections) may be assigned stationary guards. These men make use of available cover and concealment: In no case should they be positioned on rooftops unless local police and other troops are shown their locations. Stationary guards are checked often and should not remain at their posts for more than four hours.

The following is a recommended method of eliminating or capturing a sniper: On coming under fire, the patrol takes cover immediately. No fire is returned unless the sniper's location is definitely pinpointed, in which case single, aimed shots are fired as necessary. The RTO immediately reports the sniper fire, giving approximate location, number of rounds fired, and casualties to the company CP. The company commander immediately deploys the mobile reserve to help seal-off the immediate area. Meanwhile, the squad leader, cooperating with local police, moves to block each exit to the building from which the shots were fired. He and his patrol members instruct civilians to move out of the area or to take cover. Then, after the suspected building has been "covered" by the patrol, the leader and appointed troops enter the building with local police.

After the sniper has been instructed to lay down his weapon and come out of the building (by electronic megaphone -- one of which should be carried by each patrol), the search team, cooperating with local police,

moves to the suspected room and apprehends the suspect. As far as possible, apprehension is left to local police, who are trained in such duties. For this reason, local police should be on the scene before the search is initiated. Escaping snipers are warned "Halt!" and then (1) shot to wound (aiming at legs) if armed or (2) physically restrained and searched if unarmed. If there is doubt whether the sniper is armed, the soldier, acting under the explicit guidance of his patrol leader or other senior officer, shoots to wound.

### Looting and Vandalism

Civil disorder is characterized by looting and vandalism. Deployed patrols have among their main objectives the deterrence of both and the detention, if necessary, of those observed committing crimes and in possession of property under circumstances which indicate that it was obtained unlawfully during the period of disturbance.

An effective saturation of the company's area of responsibility with troops will do much to eliminate both problems. All places of business, especially liquor stores, department stores, and grocery stores should be checked regularly on the patrols' rounds. However, this is a police function, and should be accomplished by the local police. Also company commanders must be wary of too many "point commitments", especially when made at the specific request of business owners. These commitments tend to tie down troops whose presence may be required elsewhere.

If either vandalism or looting occurs, and looters or vandals are caught "in the act", troops either apprehend or assist the local police to apprehend individuals as necessity requires. The RTO immediately radios the company CP, giving all relevant details of the crime, and requests police assistance if none is available on the spot. Civilians not involved are requested to leave the area.

All necessary measures short of firing at looters or vandals are taken to apprehend them. Exits are blocked off and individuals are told to leave the buildings. If they remain inside, soldiers and local police then enter the building with weapons locked and loaded to detain them. All loot is turned over to local police.

Vandalism is more difficult to control than looting. It is without pattern or rational cause; moreover, vandals are rarely caught in the act. All acts of vandalism are reported to the Company CP and local police forces; also, areas which have proved particularly susceptible to vandalism are carefully watched. Persons observed in the act of vandalism are carefully watched. Persons observed in the act of vandalism are detained in the same manner as looters.

### Troop-Baiting

Soldiers can expect a certain amount of criticism from local civilians. Most of it is good-natured or well-intended. Some of it is not.

Soldiers marching in formations are especially liable to be jeered by unfriendly civilians. The comments and jeering must be ignored. Getting a "rise" out of an individual soldier only encourages the "troop-baiter".

Often the jeering is directed at individual soldiers with distinguishing weapons or equipment, or those with distinguishing features. Both the individual and his fellow troopers ignore the jeering.

If the disturbance has racial overtones, Negro troopers may be singled out by troop-baiters. Their discipline in the face of such deplorable activity is crucial. They should not betray their feelings in any way. A "color-problem" does not exist in the 82d Airborne Division, and the jeers of the ignorant or uncouth can hardly hope to create one. Equally to be avoided is the attempt of the well-meaning soldier to "stick up" for any one of his friends who is singled out by the crowd.

Some forms of troop-baiting are more serious. Among these are the throwing of rocks, bottles, garbage, etc at troops, and the distribution of propaganda pamphlets among them by "activist" groups. With regard to the former: troops in formation continue to move through the area from which debris is thrown at them unless, in the opinion of the NCO or officer in charge, the activity is intense enough to warrant detaining of suspects. At this time the commander of troops on the spot radios the next higher headquarters for support and further guidance. Police may be called in (if they are not deployed with the marching or patrolling unit). Meantime, using minimum necessary force, the troop commander detains the individuals. He avoids the actual use of the bayonet, and under no circumstances allows the men under his command to fire unless (1) they are fired on and (2) the location of the hostile fire can be pinpointed. Automatic fire is never used.

Propaganda pamphlets are immediately sent back to headquarters. Extra copies may be read for their amusement value.

#### Operational Communications

The infantry company deploys to areas of civil disorder with its organic communications equipment plus necessary backup radios. PRC-6s can be of service (for use in intra-patrol communications at short ranges). The RC-292 antenna may be required for use by company headquarters should interference from power lines make communications with battalion headquarters difficult.

There are two very basic requirements which must be fulfilled. First, every patrol must have completely reliable communications with the company CP; second, the company must have completely reliable communications with battalion headquarters and local police. To accomplish this, the company commander must locate his CP near local telephone facilities. Since Army radios do not net with police radios, company headquarters must have access to civil telephone communications. As a corollary, the company headquarters must remain in continual communication with the CO when he leaves the CP for any reason.

As always, patrol RTOs must keep careful tabulation on the number of hours their batteries have been used and replace them at the first sign of weakening strengths.

### Procedures

**173** Communications checks between all elements in contact with one another (patrol-company; fire-team to fire-team, etc) are made every half-hour. Immediate measures are initiated to restore contact should it be lost.

Normal security procedures are followed. The scene of civil disorder is regarded as "the field", and the company's deployment is fully tactical. Any known "enemy" jamming or other interference should cause an immediate change to the alternate frequency. RTOs are informed before going out on patrol of the code-word for change to an alternate frequency.

Signal Operating Instructions do not go "forward" of the company CP.

Maximum utilization of code-words for important or frequently sent messages is strongly encouraged.

As in combat, leaders do not habitually walk along beside their RTOs. This can be a deadly tip-off to an alert sniper.

If, for any reason, a patrol should become engaged in an anti-sniper operation or any operation of similar seriousness, and if it finds itself unable to communicate with the company CP or police, local pay-telephone booths should be used to regain contact. (Note: leaving the door of the booth ajar will keep its light off.) Failing this, a runner is sent immediately to the CP.

### Acceptance of Gifts From Civilians

The overwhelming majority of civilians in areas of civil disorder will welcome the deployment of troops to restore order. Many civilians will try to show their gratitude by offering various gifts to soldiers.

As a general guideline, soldiers in the streets should refer such offers to the company CP. Gifts of food, soft drinks, dairy products, magazines, newspapers, paperback books, stationary and cigarettes may be accepted at the company CP where they will be centralized and redistributed equitably. Gifts other than those listed, and their like, will not normally be accepted unless permission is specifically granted by a higher headquarters. Under no circumstances will soldiers solicit gifts of any sort from civilians. No soldier or headquarters will accept any alcoholic beverages from any source.

There were cases in Detroit of grateful shopkeepers inviting both on-duty and off-duty troopers into their stores to "help themselves". Beyond accepting a soft drink, or some similar token, the soldier should refuse the offer as courteously as possible.

## Use of Chemical Agents

FM 19-15, para 121, provides the following guidance in the use of "riot control" agents in periods of Civil Disorder:

"The employment of riot control agents is an effective and humane method of riot control when a mass mob must be rendered physically ineffective for a limited period of time in order to impose the will of authority on a mob." 174

The FM goes on to provide more explicit guidance in subsequent chapters. These are, however, concerned with mob control. Assuming control of mobs and crowds is not required, what are other uses of chemical agents in the control of civil disorder? Who has the authority to order their use? What are their effects - both physical and psychological?

Authority to order use of chemical agents. Plainly, any situation which requires a decision as to the use of gas or smoke requires immediate decision. However "humane" chemical agents may be, they are often condemned by public officials or the press; more important, their use may rally the lawless elements which troops are trying to control. Therefore, the authority to use gas will vary with the situation. Sometimes it will be delegated to platoon leaders; sometimes the company commander will be ordered to hold all stocks of chemical agents at the CP. Sometimes these agents will not be distributed to the company.

The following guidance assumes authority has been granted to the lowest commissioned grades. Normally a lieutenant will accompany a patrol on its rounds or will be in the CP with the company commander. If the patrol leader feels chemical agents are required, he immediately radios the CP for permission to use them. If the company commander or lieutenant in charge feels the circumstances call for their use, he gives permission and then immediately moves to the scene of the disorder.

### Situations other than crowd control which may require use of chemical agents:

To clear armed looters from a building. If an order to leave the building fails to bring the desired response, a tear-gas canister may be thrown into the area being looted. This should bring the "desired response" quickly, i.e., the looters will leave the building without loot.

As an anti-sniper agent: The situation will have to dictate whether tear agents are called for. The patrol leader must remember that a sniper can move easily from one room to another. If he has been firing from, say, a fourth or fifth story window, the tear agent will not solve the problem of bringing him to bay. After the anti-sniper team has entered the building (with local police), the decision to use gas will pass to the police themselves. Police have normally a much better knowledge of building interiors, escape routes from buildings, etc, than do soldiers. The patrol leader should abide by their judgment.

To prevent escapes down alleys or enclosed passages. Plainly, chemical agents are in this case more "humane" than bullets, but they should be employed if and only if no other means of detaining the suspect are available. Again, if police are working with troops, the patrol leader should abide by the decision of the police (without, of course, placing his patrol under command of the police).

## 125 When To Lock And Load; When To Fire

Subject to certain exceptions, the major commander or federal troops will provide guidance as to the considerations outlined in the chapter heading. Troops will be issued a basic load of ammunition at the Departure Airfield (DAF) prior to deployment. It is difficult even to prescribe theoretical policy in advance for the employment of firearms by members of the Division. The guideline minimum force consistent with the mission is valid, but "minimum force" means different things to different people. And small unit leaders (in some cases individual soldiers) may, in areas of responsibility covered by scattered patrols, have to judge whether or not to order fires or fire their own weapons.

The following guidance is therefore subject to modifications by major commanders:

- Soldiers who are fired on and who can identify the locations of those firing may return aimed, single-shot fire at their targets.
- Soldiers entering areas known or strongly suspected to contain armed suspects may lock and load.
- Detention of suspects who may be armed calls for a weapon locked and loaded. A loaded weapon is trained on the suspect during the search of his person that follows apprehension. When the search is completed, the suspect is detained for turn-over to police authority. After he is disarmed, he is only physically restrained. The "cover" weapon is no longer trained on him.
- Only on the explicit orders of a senior commander will troops employ automatic fires.
- A sniper should draw only aimed, single shots from troops.

### Armed, Friendly Civilians

Subject to state and local regulations, law-abiding citizens are authorized to own and carry weapons. In cities where the Division is deployed to control civil disorders, troops can expect to find friendly civilians who have armed themselves to protect themselves, their families, and their property.

Such individuals normally pose no problems to law enforcement agencies. However, in periods of limited visibility armed, friendly civilians can be dangerous to troops. For instance, many residential areas are intersected by alleyways separating backyards, and often lined with trees and shrubbery; and the civilian "guarding" his house from the back porch, any sound of movement in the back yard is initially a hostile sound. At the same time, shouted warnings by soldiers would alert possible suspects who are hiding or escaping in alleyways, side-streets, etc. 176

This "dilemma" is easily resolved. In deploying into an assigned area of responsibility, the unit leaders should identify, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, those shop-keepers and home-owners who are keeping their weapons ready for use. Normally the assigned area will be too large to make a complete check practicable. The company commander, therefore, designates critical areas (business establishments, alleys, etc) against which vandalism is likely to be directed, or where snipers may hide. If he deploys soldiers in stationary locations, he informs friendly civilians in the area where they are to be placed, so that they will not be fired on.

Also, unit leaders should caution civilians having weapons to use care in identifying their targets before firing. Civilians should be urged not to load their weapons unless they intend to use them immediately.

Finally, civilians must not be permitted to join in fire-fights between troops and suspects. Their efforts, however well-intended, can only add to the problem.

#### Curfews and Their Enforcement

An emergency serious enough to warrant the commitment of federal troops will usually cause a curfew to be imposed on the city. Its enforcement is vitally important. Troops work with police to insure it is not broken.

Violators of curfews are immediately stopped and questioned as to where they are going. If no exceptions to the rule of curfew has been authorized, all violators are detained and held until local police arrive, and turned over to them. Sometimes the local government will allow certain exceptions to curfew, such as working a night shift. If the trooper feels that the person detained has an honest reason which authorizes him to be out after curfew, he allows the person to proceed. On the other hand, anyone who does not appear to have a valid excuse to be out on the streets, either as a pedestrian or in a car, is detained and given over to the custody of local police.

Curfews are normally imposed during hours of darkness. For a time after the curfew hour, traffic is often heavy, and troops located at intersections should not stop each automobile to determine its destination - otherwise serious tie-ups result. When the traffic thins down, cars should be stopped.

No matter what their excuse, pedestrians should not be allowed on the streets and sidewalks during curfew hours. They should either be detained until police arrive for questioning them, or, if the distance is not far, directed to move quickly to their place of business. Their risk should be explained to them; obviously, they do not understand the situation if they are out needlessly on the streets.

177 Licenses of cars which do not stop at established roadblocks or questioning points are taken down and sent forward to higher headquarters, along with careful descriptions of the cars and their occupants. Mere violation of curfew or an attempt to escape from arrest for curfew violation never justifies the use of firearms to detain such violators.

#### Withdrawal From Area of Responsibility

When order has been re-established in the operational area, the major commander of troops will provide guidance for the withdrawal of federal units from their areas of responsibility. The withdrawal will be accomplished gradually and, as in Detroit, the initial redeployment will most likely be to a site near the operational area.

Even before preliminary withdrawal guidance is issued, the company commander and his subordinates may be able to gauge a gradual improvement in their AOR. At this time bayonets are sheathed on weapons. Later they are removed altogether. The number of on-duty patrols diminishes, though the mobile reserve remains on alert. The company commander may direct regular training classes be held for off-duty personnel; PT is held in the mornings, and, if space is available, athletics provide a good diversion for the troops.

An effective withdrawal is characterized by close liaison with the new occupying units, if any. Liaison is carried on down to the lowest practical levels. National Guardsmen, if taking over responsibility from regular troops, are briefed as fully as possible on all aspects of their new area of responsibility.

Upon receipt of the withdrawal order, patrol/squad leaders should compile lists of items lost by troops; these lists should be sent to the company CP early enough to allow a careful search of the area before the company pulls out. In addition, a careful police call is held in all areas occupied by the company's elements. Where possible, patrol leaders, platoon leaders, and the company commander thank civilians who have been particularly helpful during the period of our operations in their neighborhoods.

An exit survey for possible damage should be conducted upon withdrawal from buildings used by troops. Representatives of the Corps of Engineers will usually help in this survey; however, in the absence of engineer assistance, unit officers should conduct a survey and record the results for future reference in the event of damage claims.

## INTELLIGENCE

### General

Control of civil disorder requires adequate intelligence data at all levels. Individual soldiers and small-unit leaders must constantly look for useful information and "indicators" within their assigned sectors of responsibility. Plans are based on intelligence -- and a company control plan, for example, is largely based on the information the company commander has received about his AGR. Normally the reduced "hostile" activities of daylight hours free junior leaders to move through their sectors, looking for critical areas, likely places for concealment of snipers, and potential targets for snipers and looters. Civilians, particularly those who own small businesses in the area, should be questioned about previous lawless acts that have occurred near their places of business. They should be encouraged to report hostile phone calls, threats, and all acts of looting, vandalism, sniping, as well as rumors of plans for similar acts. "Tips" from civilians may indicate serious danger to stores and houses. In such cases small-unit leaders may recommend positioning of troops to guard against the possibility, although troop commitments to specific locations should be minimized. The individual soldier must report to his immediate superior any information which may have any possible value to the commander in his planning. As in combat, troops should use the key word "S A L U T E" (Size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) in reporting information. Each patrol must be debriefed by the patrol leader at its conclusion. He in turn reports to the CP and presents his findings to the company commander or platoon leader, where they are noted in the intelligence journal. 178

Likewise, relevant intelligence is disseminated down to lowest levels during patrol briefings, e.g., intelligence about suspected cars moving across several sectors of responsibility.

### The Recorder

Control of civil disorder has, as shown above, a continuing need for up-to-date intelligence data. To insure its benefits be used, it must be written down by a soldier appointed as a recorder. Each patrol (or squad-sized element) is assigned a recorder from the patrol or from company headquarters. The recorder stays with the patrol leader and records in detail all actions of the patrol and information of possible intelligence value. He includes as much detail as time permits, and re-checks his record at the conclusion of the patrol. It is then used by the patrol leader in his report to the unit commander and turned in to the company recorder (a clerk) who keeps an accurate and up-to-date journal of the company's activities. Collected records of unit activities may later be used for:

- Their intelligence value.
- To set the record straight in the face of inaccurate or slanted reporting.
- To improve future operations.

## Reports

179 In addition to written reports of intelligence data and small-unit activities, patrols report by radio to company headquarters as often as the company commander may direct, but never less frequently than once each hour, and always at the first indication of disorder. Regular reports may vary from a brief "situation negative" to a fairly detailed accounting of the patrol's activities during its last hour (excluding, of course, any information which would compromise the unit's plans if unfriendly elements were monitoring the net). In general, the company commander directs what radio reports should include. He in turn forwards hourly "SITREPS" (situation reports) to battalion.

## Detention of Suspects; Tagging of Weapons and Alleged Stolen Objects; Women Prisoners

Higher headquarters will furnish guidance for the detention of individuals by federal troops (the laws vary from state to state). In the absence of police forces, however, the patrolling unit may have to detain individuals (those, for instance, caught in the act of looting or vandalism). Though more explicit guidance will be given by the commander of troops in the city, the general rule is that troops do not fire at suspects who attempt to escape, though they may load their weapons as a precaution. Wherever possible, troops surround the suspect, and, if necessary, use minimum physical force to restrain him. He should never be threatened with a weapon. This will prevent the soldier's "bluff" being called by an individual foolish enough (or shrewd enough!) to attempt escape with a weapon trained on him.

In the meantime, a radio report is immediately sent to the CP, and police are called in.

The detainee is immediately searched. Concealed weapons and loot are taken from him and tagged, to be turned over to the police.

Women will not be searched under any circumstances, and will be physically restrained only as a last resort, to prevent their escape. There are several reasons for this, one being that women suspects, when captured, tend to become martyrs to other lawless elements; it is also obvious what the repercussions of any physical contact between troops and women could be when embellished by hostile witnesses.

A written report giving a detailed description of the circumstances under which each detention occurs will be made at the earliest practical time after detention. Statements from at least two witnesses should be obtained when possible.

#### SUMMARY

The 82d Airborne Division paratrooper is recognized by the public as one of America's finest fighting men. In the future he may be called on to expose the reputation he has earned as a combat soldier to the hazards of controlling civil disorders in his own country. There is no doubting his ability to serve with as much courage, maturity, and skill in such a situation as he has in combat against an enemy. 180

In a civil disorder, he continues to serve his country by restoring law and order, and by providing an atmosphere where the rule of law will prevail. The successful accomplishment of this mission with a minimum of force must be recognized by the trooper as one of great honor and service to his country.

The accomplishment of this mission, of necessity, differs from the situation where the trooper is committed against a hostile enemy on a foreign soil. In a civil disturbance, the individuals he deals with are fellow American citizens entitled to the protection of the US Constitution, even though they may be acting without regard for the Constitutional guarantees of others.

And so the keynote of all operations aimed at the curtailment of civil disorder is restraint. The soldier acts confidently and with firmness, but he must gauge his action to the seriousness of the disorder he seeks to deter or contain.

It is on the shoulders of the individual paratrooper and his small unit leaders that the main burden of the task falls. The mission in Detroit was accomplished in a magnificent manner -- should another occasion arise, the 82d Airborne Division remains ready to perform it "ALL THE WAY".